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Chapter 1
Preface
Standard financial market models are based on the simplifying assumption that trading can
be performed without frictions (i.e. zero transaction costs and no institutional restrictions
on trading). Such assumption is the building block of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
and its extensions, such as the multi-period ICAPM and the consumption CAPM. The as-
sumption of frictionless markets also underlies derivative pricing models such as the Black-
Scholes model in which the absence of arbitrage opportunities allows obtaining the deriva-
tive price by setting up a perfect replicating portfolio using the underlying and riskless bonds.
The assumption of a frictionless market is clearly a strong idealization of reality, since ample
empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of sizable market frictions.
The two most important types of market frictions are transaction costs and institutional re-
strictions on trading. Transaction costs can either be interpreted as the explicit costs charged
on trades in the form of commission fees and taxes or other implicit costs such as the bid-ask
spread. Institutional restrictions take the form either of prohibitions on particular classes of
trades, or of conditions that must be fulfilled before trades are permitted. One type of institu-
tional restrictions on trading that has attracted relatively little attention from researchers are
margin requirements. Margin requirements that are often imposed by exchanges not only
restrict the amount of money investors can borrow, but also specify the minimum amount of
cash (equity) investors have to deposit with the exchange to cover potential losses. Besides
these two types of market frictions, other types of frictions include asymmetric information
and differences between lending and borrowing rates.
There are many attempts in the literature to build asset and derivative pricing models incor-
porating transaction costs and trading constraints. These frictions have been found to have a
sizable impact on the trading behavior of market participants, optimal asset allocations and
equilibrium asset prices and hence alter many of the conclusions of traditional theory. This
thesis contributes to the literature by investigating the impact of various market frictions on
asset prices (both stocks and options) and on information and portfolio choice.
This thesis mainly answers three questions. First, what is the impact of imposing margin re-
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quirements on option prices? Second, index futures and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are
index derivatives with payoffs very close to that of the index. However, when taking trans-
action costs into account, such index derivatives are not redundant, because they provide
investors a cheap way to gain exposure to the broad market. Given the increasing popularity
of index futures and ETFs among investors, what is the impact of trading activity in index
derivatives on underlying stocks’ correlations? Third, investors in financial markets have in-
complete information regarding the payoff of the assets. How investors allocate their infor-
mation has important implications for their portfolio choices. Do transaction costs, a proxy
for liquidity, also play a role in determining information acquisition? Each essay of the thesis
answers one of the above questions.
In the first chapter collateral smile, we analyze the impact of funding costs and margin re-
quirements on index options traded on the CBOE. Assuming differential borrowing and lend-
ing rates, we derive no-arbitrage bounds for European options. We show that funding costs
and the CBOE’s margin requirements lead to an increase in option prices, which translates
into skew and smile patterns for implied volatility curves even under constant volatility. Em-
pirical tests confirm that our model-implied slopes have significant statistical power in ex-
plaining the slopes observed in the market. Hence, at least in part, funding costs and collat-
eral requirements provide an institutional explanation of the volatility smile phenomenon.
In the second chapter how index futures and ETFs increase stock return correlations, we ex-
amine whether increased trading activity in index futures and exchange traded funds (ETFs)
is associated with higher equity return correlations. We build a simple model to analyze how
demand shocks for index ETFs and futures are transmitted to the underlying stocks through
arbitrage. Our model predicts that demand shocks to ETFs and futures lead to a stronger
price comovement not only for index stocks but also for non-index stocks. Moreover, de-
mand shocks to physical (rather than synthetic) index ETFs have a higher impact on stock
return correlations than demand shocks to futures. We confirm the model predictions by
studying the average pairwise correlation of S&P 500 stocks after the inception of S&P 500
futures. Controlling for several factors, we show that trading activity in futures and ETFs
explains the time variation of the average S&P 500 stock return correlation with ETFs exhibit-
ing a significantly stronger explanatory power. An examination of the relationship between
current and lagged returns suggests that at least some of the return comovement is exces-
sive. Furthermore, we confirm that trading activity in futures and ETFs is also associated
with higher return correlations among non-index stocks.
In the third chapter the impact of liquidity on information acquisition, we extend the infor-
mation acquisition problem considered in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) to a more
realistic setting with transaction costs, including both proportional and quadratic transaction
costs. Our findings differ from those obtained without transaction costs. As an asset’s trans-
action costs rise, it becomes less attractive for investors to learn about it. Investors’ decision
about which assets to learn depends on their initial holdings. Moreover, transaction costs
might change investors’ information acquisition policy from specialized learning to general-
3ized learning. Hence, in addition to the assets’ Sharpe ratio, investors’ initial asset holdings
and assets’ liquidity play an important role in determining optimal information acquisition
strategies.

Chapter 2
Collateral Smile
with Markus Leippold
This paper is accepted for publication in Journal of Banking and Finance, 2015, Volume 58,
Page 15-28, Copyright by Elsevier B.V.
Abstract
We analyze the impact of funding costs and margin requirements on index options traded on
the CBOE. Assuming differential borrowing and lending rates, we derive no-arbitrage bounds
for European options. We show that funding costs and the CBOE’s margin requirements lead
to an increase in option prices, which translates into skew and smile patterns for implied
volatility curves even under constant volatilities. Empirical tests confirm that our model-
implied slopes have significant statistical power in explaining the slopes observed in the mar-
ket. Hence, at least in part, funding costs and collateral requirements offer an institutional
explanation of the volatility smile phenomenon.
We thank Panayiotis Andreou, David Bates, Jonathan Berk, Tony Berrada, Josh Coval, Stephen Figlewski, Rajna
Gibson, Lasse H. Pedersen, Adriano Rampini, Paul Whelan, Alexandre Ziegler and the participants at the Rev-
elstoke Finance Seminar, the Conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, the 18th Annual
Conference of the Multinational Finance Society, Swiss Finance Institute Asset Pricing Workshop 2011, AFA
2013 San Diego, and the finance seminars at the University of Geneva and the University of Zurich for useful
comments. Financial support by the Swiss Finance Institute (SFI), Bank Vontobel, and the National Center of
Competence in Research “Financial Valuation and Risk Management” is gratefully acknowledged.
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2.1 Introduction
We analyze the impact of funding costs and margin requirements on the prices of index op-
tions traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Margin requirements are col-
lateral the option sellers are required to deposit with the exchange. Funding costs refer to
the spread between borrowing and lending rates. We propose a model that gives upper and
lower bounds for option prices in the absence of arbitrage in a dynamically incomplete mar-
ket with differential borrowing and lending rates. We shows that funding costs and margin
requirements generate arbitrage bounds that allow for skew and smile patterns for implied
volatilities (IV) that are consistent with what we typically observe in option markets. Empir-
ical tests show that our model-implied slopes have significant statistical power in explaining
the slopes observed in the market.
Imposing margin requirements or collateral requirements is common practice in both over
the counter (OTC) and exchange-based transactions. During the recent financial crisis, mar-
ket participants had to painfully acknowledge that the value of a derivative depends not only
on its payoff structure, but also on the counterparty’s creditworthiness. To mitigate counter-
party risk, the contracting party for whom the derivative has a negative value is required to
deposit collateral on a margin account to guarantee a certain recovery rate in case of default.
While on OTC markets the use of collateral became widespread only over the past few years,
standardized margin requirements have been used at exchanges already since the late 1980s.
Yet, for the most part, the option pricing literature has been silent on how these margin re-
quirements influence the pricing of exchange-traded derivatives. Therefore, we take a closer
look at the price impact of collateral rules on exchange-traded index options.
A critical quantity for our analysis is the spread between borrowing and lending rates, which
may become particularly large during financial crises. This spread captures the difference be-
tween the benefit and cost of depositing collateral. The benefit is the interest rate the investor
receives from the entity where the collateral is deposited. This rate is usually equivalent to the
lending rate. The cost of the collateral refers to the interest rate the investor must pay on the
collateral amount if borrowed from another entity. The wedge between the benefit and cost
of posting collateral is the channel through which collateral requirements affect derivative
prices.
For the pricing of options, the funding costs, measured as the spread between borrowing and
lending rates, must also influence the replicating strategy. The money needed to purchase
the underlying and to be deposited in the margin account is borrowed at a rate that exceeds
the rate at which short selling proceeds can be invested. Indeed, assuming a significantly
higher borrowing rate is in line with the currently prevailing market conditions. In the recent
financial crisis, banks had difficulties in funding and maintaining a certain level of liquidity.
These difficulties were further exacerbated by mutual distrust and an increasing reluctance to
lend money to one another. Very quickly, interbank money markets dried out. In particular,
cash lending became quite restricted and other key funding sources were also inaccessible.
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A commonly agreed-upon measure of funding difficulty is the Libor–OIS spread, defined as
the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and the Overnight Index Swap
rate. Between 2002 and the beginning of the recent financial crisis, the three-month Libor–
OIS spread was usually around 10 to 30 basis points (bps). However, it jumped to 66 bps on
August 20, 2007, and remained high until March 2009, with a peak of 364 bps on October 10,
2008. In a situation in which the historically stable Libor–OIS spread varies dramatically and
rises to new levels, the assumption of a single risk-free rate for borrowing and lending is no
longer appropriate. The wedge between these two rates in interplay with collateral require-
ments may then have an economically significant impact on the pricing of derivatives.
Motivated by the increased importance of collateralization in the aftermath of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, we put forward a model which takes these two market frictions into account.
To isolate the effect of collateral requirements and funding costs on option prices, we choose
the classical Black–Scholes model as our starting point. However, we work in an incomplete
market framework as in Bergman (1995), which allows us to drive a wedge between the bor-
rowing and lending rate. In an incomplete market, a unique equilibrium option price can
only be derived when additional assumptions on the structure of the economy are made.
Nevertheless, the absence of arbitrage allows us to put meaningful bounds on option prices.
Hence, we extend the model of Bergman (1995) by incorporating collateral requirements and
we derive solutions for the upper and lower bounds of option prices. We find that the lower
bound is equal to the price given by the standard Black–Scholes formula with the proper in-
terest rate inserted. However, the upper bound depends on both borrowing and lending rates
as well as the specification of the collateral requirements. Furthermore, we can decompose
the resulting upper bound for option prices into the traditional Black–Scholes price and an
additional margin adjustment part.
Depending on the margin rules, the exact form of the option upper prices varies for differ-
ent exchanges. We investigate explicitly the impact of the margin requirements imposed by
the CBOE. By choosing parameter values based on historical data, we show that this margin
adjustment plays a non-negligible role in determining upper bounds of option prices. Fur-
thermore, its relative importance varies with moneyness. We illustrate numerically that the
option IV bounds accounting for margin requirements and funding costs as imposed by the
CBOE are capable of allowing for substantial volatility smiles, similar in magnitude to those
observed in the data. This feature of our model does not rely on jumps or stochastic volatil-
ities of the underlying price processes, which may already and in part explain the observed
volatility smile. Hence, not only deviations from the geometric Brownian motion assump-
tion, such as jumps and stochastic volatility, but also the general institutional set-up of the
market may be responsible for a significant part of the observed IV patterns.
To investigate whether the above claim also holds under more general assumptions regard-
ing the underlying’s stochastic process, we extend the model to allow for stochastic volatility
as in Heston (1993). However, introducing stochastic volatility requires additional assump-
tions on the replicating strategy. We find that, also in the presence of stochastic volatility, the
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upper bounds of the IV taking into account collateral requirements and funding costs show a
significant increase from the IV as implied by Heston’s model. Qualitatively, the impact is the
same as in the constant volatility case.
Bringing our model to the data seems to be a promising next step. In particular, we chal-
lenge our constant volatility model by testing whether we could generate volatility slopes
comparable with the empirical ones. Following the methodology applied in Bakshi, Kapadia,
and Madan (2003) (BKM hereafter), we find a clear link between the empirical slope and the
slope predicted by our model. A simple ordinary least square regression (OLS) on the dif-
ferences shows that, on average, our theoretical slope changes can already account for more
than 30% of the time variation of the empirical slope changes. Therefore, our model provides
an additional avenue to explain at least in part the variation of IV smiles.
Taking margin and funding costs into account is not completely new in derivative pricing. For
instance, Johannes and Sundaresan (2007) discuss the impact of collateral on swap prices.
Using Eurodollar futures rates, they found that swaps are priced above the traditional port-
folio of forwards value and below a portfolio of futures value. Berkovich and Shachmurove
(2013) argue that the collateral requirement for a trading strategy is path dependent. Once
the actual cost of implementing a put selling strategy is fully taken into account, writing put
options on S&P 500 index (SPX) earns only normal returns or even negative returns. Lou
(2009) shows how the recently observed negative swap spread can be explained by asymmet-
ric funding costs.
Our study is also related to papers that investigate option pricing bounds when the Black–
Scholes assumption of a dynamically complete and frictionless market is violated. In an in-
complete market, the usual replication argument is not applicable, because there are not
enough basis assets to span the uncertainty. In the presence of market frictions such as,
e.g., short selling constraints and transaction costs, the no-arbitrage argument alone is not
enough to determine a unique option price. Instead, option prices must lie in a band that
corresponds to the expected value of the option payoff under all the measures that rule out
arbitrage. To determine these bounds, one approach focuses on finding the minimum costs
to hedge (see, e.g., Cvitanic, Pham, and Touzi (1998) and Cvitanic, Pham, and Touzi (1999)).
Another approach obtains tighter bounds by eliminating stochastically dominating strategies
in comparing two portfolios by assuming a risk-averse investor (see, e.g., Perrakis and Ryan
(1984), Levy (1985), and Ritchken (1985)). A third approach tightens the bounds by imposing
assumptions on the pricing kernel, such as its volatility or on the gain–loss ratio (see, e.g.,
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) and Bernardo and Ledoit (2000)). In our model, we follow
the first approach by restricting the equilibrium price of options to a band where arbitrage
opportunities are ruled out.
The papers closely related to our study are Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009), Bergman (1995)
and Piterbarg (2010). However, our work differs from these papers in at least four ways.
Firstly, Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009) argue that the margin calls and funding costs could
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make the strategy involving selling OTM puts unprofitable, and thus OTM put options remain
expensive. Our paper, however, studies directly the impact of these two market frictions on
option prices.
Secondly, Bergman (1995) studies the impact of funding costs on option prices and derives
the resulting no-arbitrage bounds. However, he does not consider the impact of collateral
requirements at all, which may lead to some counterintuitive results when inverting the no-
arbitrage bounds for prices to no-arbitrage bounds for IVs. In particular, in the model of
Bergman (1995) the upper no-arbitrage bound for put options degenerates to a constant.
Hence, the existence of differential borrowing and lending rates cannot generate any smile
pattern.
Thirdly, allowing for differential borrowing and lending rates is a complication that Piterbarg
(2010) does not consider. Piterbarg (2010) introduces the intricacy of differential rates based
on the types of assets that are used to secure the funding, but the same rate is used for bor-
rowing and lending. In contrast, our paper looks at the impact of differential borrowing and
lending rates on option prices. In addition, in Piterbarg (2010) the probability measure is im-
plicitly fixed without further specification. Hence, there are unique option prices. However,
in our model the analysis is based on no-arbitrage bounds, since the market is inherently
imperfect due to the wedge between borrowing and lending rate.
Fourthly, we provide evidence on the actual impact on option prices of the collateral rules as
explicitly specified by the CBOE. Furthermore, using option price data, we also test the per-
formance of our model by fitting empirical IV curves. To our best knowledge, these aspects
have not been considered by previous papers.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of the collateral
requirements for options traded on the CBOE. In Section 2.3, we develop an option pricing
model that accounts for funding costs and margin requirements. We derive the upper and
lower bounds of option prices under the CBOE margin rules. In Section 2.4, we analyze the
margin-based model and the resulting IV curves numerically. Section 2.5 extends the model
to allow for stochastic volatility. In Section 2.6, we bring our model to the data and conduct
an empirical study of IV slopes. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Margin Requirements for Derivatives in Practice
Collateral requirements on exchanges, usually referred to as margin requirements, are set
by each exchange individually, and may differ across markets. For our analysis, we restrict
ourselves to the world’s largest option trading exchange, the CBOE. We explicitly focus on the
margin requirements for the index options traded on the CBOE. In what follows, we briefly
explain these margin requirements and we refer the interested reader to the CBOE’s website
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for detailed explanations and specific examples.1
Margin requirements for buyers and sellers of options differ. Option buyers, who obtain a
right rather than an obligation, are exempted from margin requirements once the full price
of the option is paid. The reason is simple: buyers can always let the option expire with-
out incurring further costs. Moreover, on the CBOE, for options with a time to expiration of
more than nine months, buyers are allowed to pay 75% of the cost of the options as the initial
margin with a maintenance margin at 75% of the option market value. In the following anal-
ysis, we assume that buyers pay the option price in full, since most liquid options have short
maturities and, hence, need to be paid in full.
Writers of options are required to post margins to cover the risk of no delivery (when asked)
at maturity. For example, writing a call option generates the risk of an unlimited loss, as the
underlying price can increase to an arbitrarily large value. Therefore, call option sellers are
required to deposit cash in the margin account to protect buyers against the sellers’ default.
The use of clearing houses guarantees that the option contract will be fulfilled. Therefore, we
do not take into account the option writer’s default risk in our model.
For option sellers, the CBOE uses two alternative margin rules, the strategy-based margin
rules and the portfolio margining rules. Under the strategy-based margin rules, the posi-
tions are managed under the so-called strategy margin account and the margin is calculated
according to each predefined option strategy.2 Strategy-based margin rules have been effec-
tive since the 1980s. In a private communication from the CBOE, we were informed that the
strategy-based margin rules still remain effective for a significant part of the options traded
on the CBOE. Therefore, we include these rules in our analysis.
Strategy-based margin rules use predefined formulas to compute margin requirements based
on the strategy option writers apply. For a naked option traded on the CBOE, the strategy-
based margin rule consists of the option market value and some portion of the underlying
value or strike price, and is
Call: C (t )=max(V (t )+a1S(t )− (K −S(t ))+,V (t )+a2S(t )),
Put: C (t )=max(V (t )+a1S(t )− (S(t )−K )+,V (t )+a2K ), (2.1)
where C (t ) is the margin amount, S(t ) is the underlying price, V (t ) is the value of the option,
and the parameters a1 and a2 represent the margin parameters specified by the CBOE. For
options on a broad index, the CBOE currently sets the parameters a1 and a2 equal to 0.15 and
0.1, respectively. For equity options or options written on a narrow based index, a1 and a2 are
set equal to 0.2 and 0.15. Note that these are the minimal margin requirements for strategy-
based margin accounts for all types of investors, including brokers. Individual investors are
1The CBOE margin manual can be downloaded from http://www.cboe.com/tradtool/marginmanual2000.pdf.
It provides a complete description of the margin requirements for the various option strategies.
2Examples of such strategies are, e.g., a short put, covered call, long vertical call spread, etc.. The CBOE
provides a margin manual on its website to explain the details of the margin requirements for each type of
strategy.
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sometimes subject to much higher margin parameters charged by the brokerage firms, which
could reach 40% for a1 and 35% for a2 (Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009)).
On April 2, 2007, the CBOE amended the margin rules and introduced the portfolio margining
rules, which allow charging margins based on the risk exposure of the whole option portfo-
lio. For some positions, the margin requirements may not have changed significantly, but for
positions with offsetting exposures, the difference can indeed be significant. The portfolio
margining rule is a scenario-based rule that calculates the possible losses assuming various
market moves. For SPX related products, the market moves in the underlying index are spec-
ified within a range of -8% to +6%. The computed largest potential loss must then be com-
pared with a per contract minimum of 37.50 dollars (for SPX options with multiplier 100).
The greater of these two defines the margin requirement. Currently, the option pricing model
that the CBOE uses for computing the possible loss for option positions upon various market
moves is not publicly available. Hence, the best thing we can do for our numerical analysis,
is to assume that the CBOE uses the standard Black-Scholes formula to determine portfolio
margins.
We consider two types of portfolio margin requirements, namely the margin requirement
for a naked short sale and the minimum margin requirement. The naked short sale port-
folio requirement assumes there is only one option in the portfolio margin account, while
the minimum portfolio margin requirement considers the least amount of capital that must
be locked in the account for every option sold. Margin requirement is the amount of equity
(cash) that must be maintained in a margin account. It is calculated as the sum of the market
value of all long positions minus the sum of the market value of all short positions. Note that
whenever an option is written in the portfolio, the cash balance generated by selling the op-
tion is usually kept in the account to offset the short position created by option writing. The
margin for each option is therefore larger than the value of the option. The naked short-sell
margin requirement under portfolio margin account, to be more specific, is
C (t )=max
k∈K
{V ((1+k)S(t ), t ),V (t )+37.50}, (2.2)
where K = {−0.08,−0.07, ...,0.05,0.06} is the set of market scenarios and V ((1+k)S(t ), t ) de-
notes the option price when the underlying moves from S(t ) to (1+k)S(t ). When the underly-
ing value moves to (1+k)S(t ), the loss generated from writing the option is V ((1+k)S(t ), t )−
V (t ). Adding up with the proceeds from option writing V (t ) yields V ((1+k)S(t ), t ). The mar-
gin requirement is thus the greater of the worst possible loss and the per contract minimum.
For a naked short sale, as there is only one option in the account, it is straightforward that
C (t ) = max{V ((1.06S(t ), t ),V (t )+37.50} for calls and C (t ) = max{V (0.92S(t ), t ),V (t )+37.50}
for puts.
Realistically, investors hold not only one, but many options in their trading account. Hence,
we must also analyze the margin requirement for writing an option when the investor is hold-
ing already a portfolio involving many options. This margin requirement depends on the loss
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FIGURE 2.1: Margin requirements for put and call options on the CBOE.
The figure plots the margin requirements as imposed by the CBOE as a function of moneyness. Panel
A plots the strategy-based margin requirements for short selling calls, the portfolio margin require-
ments for short selling calls and the minimum portfolio margin requirements for selling calls. Panel
B plots the strategy-based margin requirements for short selling puts, the portfolio margin require-
ments for short selling puts and the minimum portfolio margin requirements for selling puts. Margin
requirements are computed by assuming the option prices are given by the Black–Scholes formula for
a maturity of three months. Margin requirements for other maturities and other models are similar in
magnitude and share the same qualitative features.
and profit on the composition of the corresponding portfolio. Due to the lack of data on typ-
ical portfolios held at the CBOE, we circumvent this problem as follows. Instead of consid-
ering arbitrary portfolio compositions, we consider only the minimum margin requirement
that writing an option incurs. In particular, the least possible margin requirement for a short
option position in the portfolio is simply the sum of the per contract minimum and the op-
tion proceeds, i.e.,V (t )+37.50. Note that this minimum portfolio margin is the least possible
margin for any type of strategy.3 By using this minimum requirement, we get a conservative
estimate of the margin’s impact under the portfolio margining rules.
In the subsequent analysis, we use three types of margining rules, the strategy-based mar-
gin rules for a naked short sale, the portfolio margining rule for a naked short sale, and the
minimum possible portfolio margining rule for writing an option. In Figure 2.1, we illustrate
these three types of margin rules for various moneyness levels for a call option (Panel A) and
a put option (Panel B). We see that the margin requirements are the highest for ITM options
and then gradually decrease when options become OTM. Among all the margin rules we con-
sider, the strategy-based margin requirement for a short sale is the most stringent, while the
minimum portfolio margining requirement is the least.
3For example, for a covered call strategy, the option seller also needs to satisfy the minimum portfolio re-
quirement.
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2.3 Option Pricing with Costly Margin Requirements
In terms of the price dynamics, we base our analysis on the standard Black–Scholes assump-
tions. However, we depart from the Black–Scholes model by introducing differential borrow-
ing and lending rates as well as margin requirements for option writers. As Bergman (1995)
argues, a dynamically incomplete capital market allows the existence of a wedge between
borrowing and lending rates. Depending on the structure of the market, equilibrium option
prices may depend on other state variables. Even though a pure no-arbitrage argument can-
not uniquely determine option prices, we can derive option pricing bounds, the violation of
which indicates arbitrage opportunities even after accounting for market imperfections.
To analyze the option pricing problem with differential borrowing and lending rates, we in-
troduce three accounts. The first is a cash account, where cash is deposited to finance the
purchase of the underlying and to hold the proceeds from short selling the underlying. It
plays the role of a traditional savings account where the deposited cash earns the lending
rate rl and borrowing is not allowed. Our second account is a debt account, from which the
option writer can borrow the funds used for the replicating portfolio if the writer’s cash hold-
ing is not enough. The debt account is charged at the borrowing rate rb . The third account is
the collateral account to secure the margin requirement. The deposited cash earns the lend-
ing rate rl . To simplify the computations, we assume the borrowing and lending rates are
constant. In general, we have rb ≥ rl , as the spread between the two rates reflects the return
the bank must earn for its operations.
2.3.1 No-arbitrage Bounds
Within our incomplete market setting, we cannot derive a unique option price unless we im-
pose some additional structure. However, arbitrage considerations help us to derive pricing
bounds on the options. To obtain these bounds, we need to analyze the portfolio strategy
that replicates the payoff of the option at expiration. The replicating strategy in our case is
defined by a four-dimensional process (α(t ),β(t ),λ(t ),δ(t )) to capture the different interest
rates earned on different accounts. By α(t ), we denote the amount of stocks that we hold at
time t ; by β(t )< 0, the cash borrowed from the debt account; by λ(t )> 0, the cash deposited
at the cash account; and by δ(t ), the cash deposited in the collateral account.
To prevent arbitrage, we can show that the option price V (t ) with a payoff of h(S(T )) at expi-
ration T ≥ t ≥ 0 must lie within an upper and a lower bound. The underlying price is denoted
by S(t ) with a continuous dividend yield rd . We first focus on the lower bound, and consider
the following minimization problem:
M− : min
α(t ),β(t ),λ(t ),δ(t )
V (0), (2.3)
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subject to
V (t ) = α(t )S(t )+β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ),
dV (t ) = α(t )(dS(t )+ rdS(t )dt )+ rbβ(t )dt + rlλ(t )dt + rlδ(t )dt ,
V (T ) ≥ −h(S(T )),
δ(t ) ≥ C (t ,S(t )) for option buyers.
We denote the solution to theM−-problem by V −0 . Note that an investment used to replicate
a non-positive payoff must have a non-positive initial capital, hence V −0 is less than or equal
to zero. Obviously, V ≥ −V −0 has to hold, otherwise there is an arbitrage opportunity. We
could buy the option and implement the strategy that solves theM−-problem. This strategy
meets the collateral requirement for the option buyer and gives a payoff that is greater than
−h(S(T )). The combined payoff thus gives a non-negative payoff at maturity and generates a
positive cashflow at the initial time,−V −0 −V > 0. Since the collateral requirements for option
buyers are zero, as discussed in Section 2.2, δ(t ) is zero in the optimal solution. Therefore,
collateral does not play a role in determining V −0 .
To determine the upper arbitrage bounds, we consider the following optimization problem,
M+ : min
α(t ),β(t ),λ(t ),δ(t )
V (0), (2.4)
subject to
V (t ) = α(t )S(t )+β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ),
dV (t ) = α(t )(dS(t )+ rdS(t )dt )+ rbβ(t )dt + rlλ(t )dt + rlδ(t )dt ,
V (T ) ≥ +h(S(T )),
δ(t ) ≥ C (t ,S(t )) for option writers.
We denote the solution to theM+-problem by V +0 . V ≤ V +0 has to hold if arbitrage oppor-
tunities are to be excluded. When V > V +0 , selling the option and employing the strategy
that solves the M+-problem is an arbitrage opportunity. This strategy satisfies the collat-
eral requirement for option writers and gives a payoff greater than +h(S(T )). Therefore, the
combining strategy has a non-negative payoff at maturity and generates a positive cashflow
at initiation, i.e., V −V +0 > 0. We can now summarize the above discussion in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In a dynamically incomplete market with rl 6= rb and with collateral require-
ments, the option price V e0 must lie within the arbitrage band [−V −0 ,V +0 ], where V −0 and V +0
solveM− andM+, respectively.
As collateral has no impact on the lower bound of option prices, the lower bound corresponds
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exactly to the one derived by Bergman (1995), who also considers differential borrowing and
lending rates. Therefore, we borrow the following result:4
Proposition 2 (Bergman (1995)) In the Black–Scholes setting, but under differential borrow-
ing and lending rates, the lower bound for calls is given by the classical Black–Scholes call
option formula with the lending rate replacing the risk-free rate. For put options, the risk-free
rate is replaced by the borrowing rate.
However, for the determination of the upper bounds, i.e., the solution toM+, we cannot rely
on Bergman (1995), as he does not take collateral into account.
2.3.2 General Formulas for Upper Price Bounds
In the Black–Scholes model, borrowing or lending occurs at the same interest rate. There-
fore, the same PDE applies for the pricing of both puts and calls, but with different boundary
conditions. However, in the presence of funding costs, the replicating strategy for puts and
calls involves different positions in the cash, debt, and collateral accounts. This leads to sub-
tle differences in the PDE representation of calls and puts. In the case of a call option, we
must carefully segregate the positions into i) a collateral C (t ) required by the exchange to be
deposited in the cash account earning the lending rate, ii) the quantity V (t )−C (t ) borrowed
at the borrowing rate from the debt account to finance the posting of margin, and finally iii)
α(t )S(t ) borrowed from the debt account to finance the stock purchase.5 In the case of a put
option, we have to track separately the positions in the cash, debt, and collateral accounts by
decomposing them as above into i) the collateral C (t ) deposited in the cash account, ii) the
quantity V (t )−C (t ) borrowed to finance the required margin, and iii) the short selling pro-
ceeds α(t )S(t ) deposited in the cash account.6 We summarize the resulting pricing formulas
below. The proof is given in Appendix 2.A.
Proposition 3 In the Black–Scholes setting, but under differential borrowing and lending rates,
the upper bound for call options in the presence of collateral requirements is given by the ex-
pectation
Vcal l (t )= EPbt
[
e−rb(T−t )V (T )+
∫ T
t
e−rb(u−t )(rb − rl )C (u)du
]
(2.5)
under the pricing measure Pb , subject to Vcal l (T )= (S(T )−K )+ and
dS(t )/S(t )= (rb − rd )dt +σdW b(t ),
4We do not repeat the derivation here, but refer to Bergman (1995) for details.
5Even under the portfolio-based margin rule, the proceeds of selling options must be kept in the margin
account. Therefore V (t )−C (t ) is indeed borrowing.
6When short selling stocks, the proceeds are usually kept with the broker and cannot be used by the investor.
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where W b(t ) is a standard Brownian motion under Pb . The corresponding upper bound for
put options is given by the expectation
Vput (t )= EPlt
[
e−rb(T−t )V (T )+
∫ T
t
e−rb(u−t )(rb − rl )C (u)du
]
(2.6)
under the pricing measure Pl , subject to Vput (T )= (K −S(T ))+ and
dS(t )/S(t )= (rl − rd )dt +σdW l (t ),
whereW l (t ) is a standard Brownian motion under Pl .
Intuitively, the pricing formulas in the proposition have two components. For instance, in
the case of the call option, the first component EPbt
[
e−rb(T−t )V (T )
]
plays the role of the tradi-
tional Black–Scholes call option price, but with a different probability measure and discount
rate. The second part, EPbt
[∫ T
t e
−rb(u−t )(rb − rl )C (u)du
]
, reflects the impact of the margin re-
quirements on the option price, and we refer to it as the margin adjustment. Since C (t )> 0,
the margin adjustment is always positive. We can interpret it as the additional price the writer
requires to be compensated for the increasing replication cost induced by fulfilling the mar-
gin requirements. If it is costless to post collateral, i.e., if the collateral earns the same rate as
the borrowing rate rb = rl , then the margin adjustment disappears and the margin require-
ment would not influence the call price at all. Indeed, when rb = rl , equations (2.5) and (2.6)
collapse to the standard Black–Scholes formula. However, whenever rb > rl , which is usu-
ally the case, the margin requirements increase the replicating cost and the call option prices
through the margin adjustment.
It is worth noting that Proposition 3 provides a general formula to compute upper bounds
on option prices under margin constraints and funding costs. Even though we focus on SPX
options traded on the CBOE, its application is not restricted to this particular case.
2.3.3 Upper Price Bounds under the CBOE’s Margin Requirement
Having derived the general option pricing formula in the presence of funding costs and gen-
eral margin requirements, we can now insert the specific margin rule of the CBOE into the
pricing formula to obtain the upper bound under the actual margin rules. We consider for
our analysis three margin requirements: the strategy margin requirement for a naked short
sale, the portfolio margin requirement for a naked short sale, and the minimum portfolio
margin requirement. We collect the corresponding formulas in the corollaries below, which
follow directly from Proposition 3 and are proven in Appendix 2.B.
For options subject to the CBOE’s strategy margin requirements, the upper bound for a short
sale can be derived closed form as shown in the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 At time t , the upper price bound for European call options subject to CBOE’s strat-
egy margin rules for a short sale with maturity T , strike K is
Vcal l (t ) = S(t )e(rb−rd−rl )(T−t )N (d1(T, t ))−Ke−rl (T−t )N (d2(T, t ))
+(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e(rb−rd−rl )(u−t )
(
a2N (−d∗1 (u, t ))+a1N (d1(u, t ))
)
du
+(1+a1)(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e(rb−rd−rl )(u−t )
(
N (d∗1 (u, t ))−N (d1(u, t ))
)
du
−(rb − rl )K
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )
(
N (d∗2 (u, t ))−N (d2(u, t ))
)
du,
with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
d∗1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )(1+a1−a2)K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
where N (·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
We remark that these pricing formulas are somewhat lengthy, but are merely the sum of the
classical Black–Scholes price and the margin adjustment term. Analogously, we can derive
the upper bound for the put option value.
Corollary 2 At time t, the upper price bound for European put options subject to CBOE’s strat-
egy margin rules for a naked short sale with maturity T , strike K is
Vput (t ) = Ke−rl (T−t )N (−d2(T, t ))−S(t )e−rd (T−t )N (−d1(T, t ))
+a2(rb − rl )K
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )
(
N (−d∗2 (u, t ))+N (d∗∗2 (u, t ))
)
du
+a1(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e−rd (u−t )
(
N (−d1(u, t ))−N (−d∗1 (u, t ))
)
du
+(rb − rl )K
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )
(
N (−d∗∗2 (u, t ))−N (−d2(u, t ))
)
du
+(a1−1)(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e−rd (u−t )
(
N (−d∗∗1 (u, t ))−N (−d1(u, t ))
)
du,
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with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rl − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
d∗1,2(u, t ) =
ln(a1S(t )a2K )+ (rl − rd ±
1
2σ
2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
d∗∗1,2(u, t ) =
ln( (1−a1)S(t )(1−a2)K )+ (rl − rd ±
1
2σ
2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t .
For the portfolio margin for a naked short sale, the margin requirements depend on the op-
tion pricing model, as the loss of the naked short sale is determined by the option value under
various market moves. Therefore, we have to solve iteratively for the final option value by us-
ing standard numerical methods. For European call options, we get the following result.
Corollary 3 At time t , the upper price bound for a European call optionwithmaturity T , strike
K , and subject to CBOE’s portfolio margining rule for a naked short sale is
Vcal l (t ) = S(t )e(rb−rd−rl )(T−t )N (d1(T, t ))−Ke−rl (T−t )N (d2(T, t ))
+EPbt
[∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )(C (u)−Vcal l (u))du
]
with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
C (u) = max{Vcal l (1.06S(u),u),Vcal l (u)+37.50},
where N (·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Similarly, we can calculate the upper price bound for European put options under the port-
folio margin rule for a naked short sale.
Corollary 4 At time t , the upper price bound for a European put optionwithmaturity T , strike
K , and subject to CBOE’s portfolio margining rule for a naked short sale is
Vput (t ) = Ke−rl (T−t )N (−d2(T, t ))−S(t )e−rd (T−t )N (−d1(T, t ))
+EPlt
[∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )(C (u)−Vput (u))du
]
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with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rl − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
C (u) = max{Vput (0.92S(u),u),Vput (u)+37.50},
For the minimum portfolio margins, we can derive a closed-form solution, as the margin re-
quirement is the option’s value plus a constant amount. For call options under the minimum
portfolio margins, we derive the following upper bounds.
Corollary 5 At time t , the upper price bound for a European call optionwithmaturity T , strike
K , and subject to CBOE’s minimum portfolio margining rule is
Vcal l (t ) = S(t )e(rb−rd−rl )(T−t )N (d1(T, t ))−Ke−rl (T−t )N (d2(T, t ))
+37.5(rb − rl )
(
1−e−rl (T−t ))
rl
with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
where N (·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Analogously, we obtain the closed-form upper bound price for put options under the mini-
mum portfolio margin requirement.
Corollary 6 At time t , the upper price bound for a European put optionwithmaturity T , strike
K , and subject to CBOE’s minimum portfolio margining rule is
Vput (t ) = Ke−rl (T−t )N (−d2(T, t ))−S(t )e−rd (T−t )N (−d1(T, t ))
+37.5(rb − rl )
(
1−e−rl (T−t ))
rl
with
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rl − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t .
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2.4 Numerical Illustration
To investigate the magnitude of the impact of funding costs and margin rules on option pric-
ing bounds, we compute the option prices for realistic parameter values. Using the sample
ranging from January 2002 to August 2010, we compute the average three-month Overnight
Index Swap rate (OIS rate) and use this value as proxy for the lending rate (rl = 2.3%). The
average three-month US-dollar Libor rate is used as the borrowing rate (rb = 2.6%). For the
volatility parameter, we take σ= 15%. We note that these parameter values are not represen-
tative for the period of an ongoing crisis. They may hold under normal market conditions.
Furthermore, we use the Libor rate as the proxy for the borrowing rate. Hence, the spread
we impose for our numerical analysis is a conservative estimate. Finally, we impose the mar-
gin parameters set by the CBOE for index options, i.e., we use a1 = 0.15 and a2 = 0.1 for the
strategy-based margin. For the portfolio margin rules, the simulated market moves are 15
possible moves ranging from -8% to 6%.
2.4.1 The Impact of Margin Requirements on Option Price Upper Bounds
To measure the impact of margin requirements on option price upper bounds, we first plot in
Figure 2.2 Panel A and B the percentage difference between the upper price bound under the
CBOE margin rules and the Black–Scholes price for puts and calls with a three-month matu-
rity. As input for the classical Black-Scholes model we use the lending rate as interest rate. The
resulting Black-Scholes option price serves us as benchmark. The presence of funding costs
and margin requirements causes a sizable increase in the option prices over those implied by
the Black–Scholes model. The relative price difference is convex and increasing in the strike
price for call options and decreasing in put options. This effect is most pronounced for OTM
options. Among the three margin rules we consider, the price increase is largest for strategy-
based margins for a naked short sale, echoing the fact that they are the most stringent margin
rules. For call options with moneyness K /S = 1.2, the price given by our model is 32% higher
than the Black–Scholes price. For put options with moneynessK /S = 0.8, the relative increase
due to margin requirements amounts to roughly 270%. For portfolio margining rules, the two
types of margin rules generate very similar price increases, the magnitude of which is much
smaller than the price increase we observe for the strategy-based margin for a naked short
sale. However, for OTM calls the difference is still around 5 percent for moneyness K /S = 1.2
and 13 percent for put options with moneyness K /S = 0.8. Therefore, even under normal
market conditions, funding costs and margin requirements have a non-negligible effect on
option pricing bounds.
The relatively large impact of margin requirements on OTM options in Figure 2.2 arises be-
cause, in absolute terms, the collateral requirement could be substantial for deep OTM op-
tions, which have only small market value. For example, the margin specified by the CBOE for
calls under the strategy-based margin rules satisfies C (t )≥ a2S(t )+V (t ). Under the portfolio
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FIGURE 2.2: Impact of margin requirements and funding costs on option price upper bounds.
We plot the percentage price differences between the Black–Scholes model and upper bounds derived
from the margin model for call options (Panel A) and put options (Panel B) traded on the CBOE. Panels
C and D show the price impact ratio defined in equation (2.7) for call options and put options, respec-
tively. The parameter values with 30 bps funding cost are rb = 0.026, rl = 0.023, σ = 0.15, a1 = 0.15,
a2 = 0.1, T = 0.25. To generate 60 bps funding cost, we hold the lending rate constant and increase
the borrowing rate to rb = 0.029. Furthermore, the underlying index level is assumed to be 1000. Per
contract minimum margin 37.50 is applied for options with a multiplier of 100.
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margining rule, C (t )≥ 37.50+V (t ). Therefore, the size of the collateral relative to the option
price may become substantial for small option values.
To give a more symmetric depiction of the impact of margin requirements on the component
of an option’s value that is determined by volatility, we remove the option’s intrinsic value
from our analysis and define the following quantity, which we call the price impact ratio:
Price impact ratio= Option price upper bound−Black-Scholes Price
Black-Scholes Price−Option’s intrinsic value , (2.7)
where the intrinsic value is defined as max{0,S −Ke−r t } for calls and max{0,Ke−r t − S} for
puts. In Panels C and D of Figure 2.2 we plot the price impact ratio for calls and puts. The
price impact ratio is a decreasing function of strikes for call options and a convex function
for put options. Margin requirements have the highest impact on options with low strikes.
For call options with moneyness K /S = 0.8 , accounting for margin requirements generates
a price impact ratio between 35 and 40, depending on the type of margin requirement. For
put options with moneyness K /S = 0.8, the price impact ratio increases to 2.8 for the strategy
margin, while for portfolio margin requirements the ratio increases to 0.12 only.
To examine the sensitivity to funding costs, Figure 2.2 also plots the resulting option price
upper bounds when funding costs rise to 60 bps for the strategy-based margin for a naked
short sale. An increase in funding costs leads to a larger price increase across all levels of
moneyness. The assumption of a spread as large as 60 bps might seem excessive. However,
we recall that during the recent crisis, the Libor–OIS spread peaked significantly over 300 bps
and averaged nearly 100 bps between August 2007 and March 2009.
2.4.2 Margin Requirements and Implied Volatilities
So far, our results have demonstrated that funding costs and margin requirements have a siz-
able impact on the upper bounds for option prices. We now investigate the potential impact
of these market frictions on the volatility smile. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between IV and option prices, the no-arbitrage band derived in Section 2.3 implies a no-
arbitrage region for implied volatilities. Our aim is to find out whether market frictions such
as funding costs and margin rules provide room for rationalizing volatility smile patterns doc-
umented in the literature, even under the assumption of constant volatility.
Panel A, C, and E in Figure 2.3 show the call options’ IV bounds when the three different
CBOE margin rules are taken into account. We choose options with maturities of one, three,
and six months. The lower IV bound degenerates to a constant, as it is given by the standard
Black–Scholes IV using the lending rate, our benchmark Black-Scholes price.
The upper IV bound for calls is a decreasing function of the strike price for ITM options. For
short-dated options, implied volatility starts to increase again when the option turns OTM.
Hence, the IV bound for calls exhibits skew and smile patterns as observed in the market.
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FIGURE 2.3: No-arbitrage bounds for implied volatility (IV) curves.
We plot the upper and lower bounds of the IV for options traded on the CBOE with one-month, three-
month and six-month maturities for strategy-based margin requirements for a naked short sale, the
portfolio margining requirements for a naked short sale and minimum portfolio margining require-
ments. Parameters rb = 0.026, rl = 0.023, σ= 0.15, a1 = 0.15, a2 = 0.1. We plot IV curves for calls in the
left column and puts in the right column. For call options, the lower bounds collapse to a constant,
i.e., to σ= 0.15, for all maturities and levels of moneyness.
24 Chapter 2. Collateral Smile
Furthermore, consistent with previous empirical findings, IV curves generated by the model
are steepest for one-month options, and gradually flatten out as maturity increases. Compar-
ing the IV curves for the three margin rules, we find only small difference. The reason is that
for call options, the price increase due to the replicating strategy involving buying is much
more pronounced unless call options go deeply OTM. Therefore, the IV curves exhibit similar
skew for three types of margin in our study.
For put options, the IV bounds exhibit a different pattern. In Panel B, D, and F of Figure 2.3,
we plot the IV region for put options. The lower bound for puts is the Black–Scholes price
using the borrowing rate. Hence, the lower bound is below the classical Black–Scholes price
when the lending rate is used. Therefore, we obtain a downward sloping lower bound for IV,
which becomes smaller than the value we fixed for the Black–Scholes volatility (σ = 15%).
For the upper bound, we also observe a volatility smile, which gradually flattens out as the
maturity increases. Furthermore, the effects seem to be more sensitive to the margin rules
applied. The slope accounting for the strategy-based margin is the steepest, while the two
types of portfolio margin rules generate similar smile patterns.
The observed IV shape for call and put options is consistent with Panels C and D of Figure
2.2. Low strike options have higher price impact ratios. The price impact ratio measures
the fraction of the upper bound price increase from the Black-Scholes price compared to the
option’s time value. Since the time value of options is largely affected by volatility, a higher
price impact ratio is associated with a larger change in IV.
In Figure 2.3, we observe that the impact of funding costs on the upper bound of the IV sur-
face is less pronounced for puts than for calls for the three types of margin requirements
considered. This property is induced by the lower impact of funding costs on put options.
Compared to a call, less borrowing is involved in replicating a put. Even though for both
types of options the amount V (t )−C (t ) is borrowed from the debt account, the strategies on
the underlying are different. For calls, investors borrow to purchase the underlying. In con-
trast, for put options, investors actually profit from selling the underlying short. Therefore,
funding costs increase the replicating cost of calls to a greater extent than for put options.
We recall that the plots in Figure 2.3 represent upper and lower bounds. Hence, our results do
not suggest that collateral requirements will indeed lead to higher IV for call options than for
put options. We would have to add more structure to the model to provide sharper bounds.
However, such extensions are beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, it is worth
mentioning that Bollen and Whaley (2004) find that there is more demand for OTM index put
options than OTM index call options. Consequently, market makers are likely to have larger
net short positions in OTM put options. As portfolio margin rule uses as collateral the high-
est possible loss for the whole portfolio, selling put options is likely to put more collateral
constraints on market makers. In contrast, selling call options might incur only the mini-
mum collateral requirement. Therefore, the impact of collateral on OTM put options could
be higher than on call options leading to higher IV of put options. Moreover, as put-call parity
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FIGURE 2.4: No-arbitrage bounds for implied volatility (IV) curves.
We plot the upper and lower bounds of the IV for options without margin requirements as predicted
by Bergman (1995). Parameters rb = 0.026, rl = 0.023, σ = 0.15. We plot IV curves for calls in the left
column and puts in the right column. In case of call options, the lower bounds collapse to a constant,
i.e., to σ = 0.15, for all maturities and levels of moneyness. For put options, the upper bounds are
constant at σ= 0.15.
does not necessarily hold in the empirical data (see Kamara and Miller (1995) for example),
we do not expect call and put options with the same strike to have exactly the same IV.7
For comparison, in Figure 2.4, we plot the IV curves when only funding costs but no margin
requirements are taken into account as in Bergman (1995). Excluding margin requirements,
we can still observe a smile for call options. But for put options, the upper bound is exactly the
benchmark Black-Scholes price. Thus, the upper bound degenerates to a constant. Hence, in
a setting with constant volatility and funding costs, but without collateral requirements as in
Bergman (1995), there is no way to explain the typical smile pattern observed for put options.
2.5 The Impact of Collateral under Stochastic Volatility
In the previous analysis, we have assumed constant volatility for the underlying price process.
To allow for a richer dynamic process, we can analyze an obvious extension of our model and
introduce stochastic volatility as in Heston (1993). Specifically, we assume that the asset price
7Applying put-call parity by recognizing the effect of margin requirements and funding costs gives another
price bound. For example, given the model-implied call price bound, we can use put-call parity to obtain an-
other put option price bound. The intersection of the put option price bound derived from the model and
put-call parity gives a new bound. Numerical results show that this bound is wider than the options’ own
model-implied price bound. Therefore, put-call parity does not imply a sharper bound. The reason is that
under funding costs and margin requirements, put-call parity generates two different inequalities.
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follows:
dS(t ) = µS(t )dt +S(t )
√
v(t )dW 1(t ),
dv(t ) = κ(θ− v(t ))dt +ξ
√
v(t )dW 2(t ), dW (t )1dW (t )2 = ρdt .
Since we rely on a replication argument for deriving our option price bounds under collateral
requirements, we need to introduce an additional volatility-sensitive asset, which we denote
by g (t ). For simplicity, we assume that g (t ) is a variance swap. Hence, the replicating trading
strategy is a five-dimensional process, which we denote by (α(t ),β(t ),λ(t ),δ(t ),γ(t )) to cap-
ture the holding of the stock, the cash borrowed, the cash deposited, the collateral, and the
holding of the variance swap.
The collateral imposed on the hedging strategy depends on the riskiness of the whole strat-
egy, and thus also on the variance swap. Since we do not know the exact form of the collateral
requirement of the trading strategy, we can only make an educated guess about the actual
size of collateral requirements. The fact that option buyers do not need to post collateral sug-
gests that the lower bounds of option prices are not affected by the margin requirement of
options. However, trading the variance swap might incur collateral, which has an impact on
the option’s lower bounds. For the sake of simplicity, for the lower bound we do not consider
the collateral of the variance swap. Thus the collateral for the whole strategy is set at zero for
lower bounds. Since posting collateral is always costly in the presence of funding costs, the
collateral on the variance swap will decrease the lower bounds.
For the upper bound, selling options incur margin requirements. Santa-Clara and Saretto
(2009) estimate the margin imposed on selling an option is usually more than 3.6 times and,
for OTM options, up to 108 times the option value. Therefore, in order to have a conservative
estimate of the impact of collateral and funding costs, we assume in our numerical example
that the collateral for the whole trading strategy is twice the value of option prices.8
The option price bounds are derived by solving similarM− andM+ problems as in Section
2.3, but with more involved spot price dynamics and an additional hedging instrument in
the replicating portfolio to hedge against changes in volatility. Solving similar PDEs as in
the standard Heston model, we obtain the option price bounds in the presence of collateral
requirements. We present the derivation of the PDE in Appendix 2.C. To solve the model
numerically, we use finite difference methods.
Figure 2.5 plots the upper and lower bounds for a given set of parameters. The IV upper
bounds for calls (Panel A) and puts (Panel B) suggest that collateral and interest spreads
could drive up the IV significantly. The lower bound of call options corresponds exactly to
the standard Heston model (Heston IV). However, for put options the Heston model does not
8Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009)’s estimates are based on strategy margin. But even in the presence of port-
folio margin, the margin would exceed the value of the option. Therefore, C (t ) = 2V (t ) is still a conservative
estimate.
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FIGURE 2.5: IV no-arbitrage bounds when the underlying has stochastic volatility
We plot the upper and lower bounds of the IV for options with six-month maturities. We fix the pa-
rameters as rl = 0.023, rb = 0.026, ξ= 0.1, θ = 0.01, κ= 3, ρ =−0.5, v0 = 0.25, C (t )= 2V (t ), and m∗ = 2.
We plot IV curves for calls in the left column and puts in the right column. For calls, the lower bounds
are the same as for the standard Heston model (Heston IV).
coincide with the lower bound. The prices of the Heston model lie in the region spanned by
the lower and upper bound. Moreover, we observe a slightly higher IV upper bound for call
options than put options. This observation is consistent with the case of constant volatility
and is due to the fact there is more borrowing involved in replicating a call option.
The asymmetry between margin requirements for long and short positions has a large impact
on the option bid-ask spreads. Market makers post little margin when buying an option from
someone who sells at the bid. However, they have to post substantial margin when selling an
option to someone who buys at the ask. To some extent, we can interpret the upper and lower
bounds as option bid-ask spreads implied by our model. Under the assumption of stochastic
volatility, our model shows a similar IV shape observed in the market that both bid and ask
price yield a smile, with a stronger smile for ask prices.9
Since margin requirements have no impact on the lower bound, we analyze the sensitivities
of upper bounds to changes in collateral and interest spreads.10 In Figure 2.6, we report the
IV upper bounds when the borrowing rate rb varies (Panels A and B) and when the collat-
eral C (t ) varies (Panels C and D). As expected, IV upper bounds increase with the borrowing
rate and collateral requirements. When the spread of interest rates is as high as 3 percent, a
typical value during the recent financial crisis, collateral requirements could increase the IV
9In contrast to the constant volatility case, both upper and lower bounds in the stochastic volatility model
exhibit a typical IV smile pattern. However, our model does not necessarily imply that bid-ask spread across
moneyness must have a shape as in Figure 2.5, since we used a simple uniform haircut for all levels of money-
ness.
10Option price bounds are not very sensitive to changes in the other parameters. Hence, we do not plot the
changes of the upper bounds due to changes in the other parameters.
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FIGURE 2.6: IV upper bounds under different borrowing rates and margin requirements
In Panels A and B, we plot the upper bounds of the IV for options with six-month maturities when
the borrowing rate changes. In Panel C and D, we plot the upper bounds of the IV for options with
six-month maturities when the margin requirement changes. For the parameters, we use rl = 0.023,
rb = 0.026, ξ= 0.1, θ = 0.01, κ= 3, ρ =−0.5, v0 = 0.25, C (t )= 2V (t ), and m∗ = 2. We plot IV curves for
calls in Panels A and C, and puts in Panels B and D.
2.6. Empirical Application 29
substantially. For ITM call options with moneyness 0.8, the IV can jump from around 31.5%
for the standard Heston model to around 42%. For put options, the increase is less dramatic.
For a moneyness of 1.2, the IV jumps from under 30.5% to around 32%.
If we compare the volatility increase across different levels of moneyness, we see that for
put options the presence of collaterals may even lead to a veritable volatility smile in that the
upper bounds are higher for ITM puts than for ATM puts. When we assume an extreme wedge
between borrowing and lending rate, the ITM IVs may be even higher than the OTM IVs.
This feature follows from our assumption about the collateral. We assume a constant margin
haircut across moneyness measured as the margin requirement divided by the value of the
option. Santa-Clara and Saretto (2009) find that OTM options have a much higher margin
hair cut, i.e., the ratio of the margin requirement to the value of the option is much higher for
OTM put options. If we were to impose this more realistic margin requirement, we would see
again an IV upper bound for put options that decreases with increasing moneyness.
We remark that the bounds derived for the stochastic volatility setting are only approximative.
Given the parameter choice, our estimators are conservative in that they underestimate the
effect of collateral requirements. As we require an additional instrument in building up our
replicating strategy, we have no idea about the sign of the cash flow. We can only approximate
the upper bound by applying the borrowing rate to the cash flows of the hedging portfolio.
Therefore, our model’s upper bound must be below the true upper bound.
In contrast to the stochastic volatility model, the assumption of constant volatility allows us
to fully account for the impact of collateral and funding costs, since we can apply the proper
interest rates to every trade in the replication strategy. Given these obstacles of the stochastic
volatility model, we decide to focus on the constant volatility case for our empirical applica-
tion. By doing so, we also circumvent the problem of estimating the dynamics of the variance
swap and the specification of the variance swaps’ collateral requirement. We leave these chal-
lenging questions for future research.
2.6 Empirical Application
Our intention was to build a simple model to isolate the effect of funding costs and collat-
eral requirements. As the volatility surface could be characterized by IV slopes and levels, we
could challenge our model by comparing these quantities with the ones implied by the upper
price bounds. Since it is clear from the analysis in the previous section that the effect of fund-
ing costs shows up prominently across the moneyness dimension, we will only conduct an
empirical analysis on IV slopes but not IV levels. If our model could add additional explana-
tory power to the factors previously used in the finance literature for describing the IV slope,
our finding would provide a strong argument to incorporate funding costs and differential
interest rates in option pricing models.
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2.6.1 Data Processing
We use data for options written on SPX from Ivy DB OptionMetrics for the sample period
ranging from January 2002 to August 2010.11 Our data covers the period of the financial crisis.
The high funding costs during this period provide ideal data points for our test. End-of-day
bid and ask quotes, open-interest, volume, exercise price, IV, delta, gamma, dividend yield,
and expiration dates on every call and put option are all provided by OptionMetrics.
Several filtering rules have been applied to obtain a clean data set. Firstly, we eliminated
options with maturities less than eight days or more than 150 days to exclude any liquidity-
related bias. Secondly, we included only options with a positive trading volume, positive open
interest, and positive bid prices. Finally, mid quotes lower than 0.375, bid–ask spreads more
than 1.5 times the mid-quotes, and strike over spot prices less than 0.7 or more than 1.3 were
also excluded. This data contains in total 153,926 calls and 198,775 puts.
The lending rate is proxied by the US OIS rate and the US interbank borrowing rate is captured
by the Libor rate. The interest rates are obtained from Bloomberg.12 To obtain the interest
rates at different maturities we use linear interpolation.
As an alternative, we could also use the put-call parity (PCP) to back out the borrowing and
lending rate from options on SPX as was done, e.g., in Brenner and Galai (1996), Jackwerth
and Rubinstein (1996), and Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2009), among others.
However, in untabulated results, we find that our analysis and findings do not change and are
robust to different specifications of the interest rates. As a further model input, we require a
proxy for volatility, for which we use the VIX.13
As our model predicts different shapes for the put and call IV curve, we estimate the empirical
slopes for puts and calls separately. When computing the IV, the midpoint of the best closing
bid price and best closing offer price for the option is used. Following the standard method-
ology of BKM (2003), we derive the slope estimates weekly by pooling all the IV data in any
given week (449 weeks) from Wednesday to Tuesday. We then sort the options according to
their time-to-maturity into two groups, short-term options (maturity of less than 60 days)
and medium-term options (maturity between 60 and 150 days).
In addition to analyzing the whole sample period from January 2002 to August 2010, we also
perform our tests on two subperiods including the pre-crisis period January 2002 to July 2007
and the crisis period August 2007 to July 2009. The results for these subperiods are similar to
11We focus on options on the SPX, as they are European options. Exchange-traded single stock options are
of the American type and, hence, would complicate our analysis.
12Note that even though OptionMetrics provides index put options prices traded from 1996, the OIS rate from
Bloomberg is only available since the end of 2001. Therefore, we select the data sample from 2002. Furthermore,
using other proxies for the lending rate such as US Treasury rates produces similar results. The US Government
began issuing four-week Treasury bills in mid 2001. Therefore, using the Treasury rate as the lending rate would
not significantly extend our sample period.
13Initially, we considered three distinct volatility measures: 30-day historical volatility, VIX, and the IV of the
closest ATM 1-month options. The key results are robust and remain unchanged for these different measures.
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the whole sample. Therefore, they are omitted for brevity but can be obtained by the authors.
2.6.2 Regression Results for IV Slopes
To derive the slope estimate, different measures for the slope of the IV curve have been sug-
gested in the literature. Here, we follow BKM (2003). They estimate the slope coefficient Π
using the regression equation
ln(σi v (y j ))=Π0+Π ln(y j )+ε j , j = 1, ..., J , (2.8)
where y denotes the moneyness K /S, σi v denotes the Black–Scholes IV and J is the number
of options available in the week. We perform the regression in (2.8) for each maturity group
of call and put options to obtain weekly slope estimates.
Table 2.1 reports the estimated slope coefficients and the corresponding R2 for each option
category. The slopes are negative and more pronounced for short-term options with slightly
more negative slopes for calls than for puts. For each option group, the regression in equation
(2.8) captures between 70-90% of the variation in the IV slope. The slope for call options
seems to be more negative than for put options, a result which is due to log transformation in
regression (2.8). Indeed, not taking the logarithm in (2.8) or using other definition of slopes
such as, e.g., in Han (2008), gives more negative slopes for puts.14 The empirical slopes we
obtained show a strong persistence over time. Running augmented Dickey-Fuller test and
choosing the number of lags by the Akaike information criterion suggests that slopes for all
categories are non-stationary I(1) processes.
[Table 2.1 about here]
To obtain our model-implied slope Πmodel under constant volatility, we first compute the
upper bounds of put and call options at nine different equally-spaced moneyness levels K /S
ranging from 0.8 to 1.2. We convert these prices to Black-Scholes IVs, which we then use for
running the regression in equation (2.8). We use three types of margin rules to obtain the
option upper bound and derive model-implied slopes. The following analysis is conducted
for slopes derived using three margin rules.
To avoid the problem of spurious regression, we take the differences of all variables for the
regression. Firstly, we run the ∆Πt on its lag ∆Πt−1 as follows
∆Πt =β0+β1∆Πt−1+εt . (2.9)
To see whether our model-implied slopes could explain the time variation of the empirical
14In unreported regressions, we also used the slope definition from Han (2008), where the slope is measured
as the negative of the average OTM put IV over the average ATM put and call options IV. The results are similar
to what we find using the BKM (2003) slope definition.
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slopes, we regress the empirical slope change on the model-implied slope change
∆Πt =β0+β1∆Πmodelt +β2∆Πt−1+εt , (2.10)
where the lagged slope difference ∆Πt−1 is included in the regression to correct for the auto-
correlation in the dependent variable. We present the results from regressions (2.9) and (2.10)
in Table 2.2 for different option groups.
[Table 2.2 about here]
Table 2.2 gives us several interesting findings. The lagged empirical slope difference, although
always significant, can only explain a small portion of the evolution of ∆Πt with average R2
around 5 percent. For regression (2.10), we find that the coefficient for∆Πmodelt for all margin
rules is always positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating a positive link between the
empirical slope difference and our model-implied slope difference. The coefficients for the
put options are larger than those for the call options. This observation is in line with the
findings of our numerical investigation in Section 2.4, where we find a steeper IV curve for
calls as they are more sensitive to funding costs. The coefficient for calls does not differ much
for different margin rules, which is again consistent with the finding in Section 2.4 that similar
smiles are observed for call options.
For puts, however, we do observe quite different coefficients. As shown in our numerical
analysis in Section 2.4, strategy-based margins tend to generate a steeper IV smile. Therefore,
the coefficient is relatively small for strategy-based margins. Moreover, the coefficient for the
minimum portfolio margins is also small compared to the portfolio margin for a naked short
sale. The minimum portfolio margin tends to increase OTM IVs much more than ITM IVs, as
the per contract minimum is substantial only for OTM options. In contrast, the naked short
sale portfolio margin rules raise the IV of options across all moneyness levels, giving rise to a
flatter smile. Therefore, the coefficient for the naked short sale portfolio margining is much
higher than for the other two margin rules.
Finally, we see that for both puts and calls our model-implied slope can generate adjusted
R2-values around 23.6 percent for short-term options and around 39.1 percent for medium-
term options. These findings provide evidence that our model helps to explain a substantial
part of the time variations of empirical IV slope differences.
2.6.3 Regression Results Including Control Variables
To compare the performance of regression (2.10) with those of other models, we also provide
a regression analysis including other control variables. As a first set of control variables we
consider the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. As shown by BKM (2003), the second and
third moments of risk neutral distribution of returns have significant explanatory power in
describing the time variation of empirical slopes.
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As a second set of control variables, we consider the following three commonly used vari-
ables. We include the VIX as a proxy for market volatility, the previous six-month returns to
capture stock market momentum, and a relative demand factor to control for demand im-
pact.15 In addition, since our model implies that funding costs matter for the slope of IV
curves, we also include Libor–OIS spreads in our regression.
We start with the following specification of the regression equation based on risk-neutral pa-
rameters:
∆Πt =β0+β1∆Skewnesst +β2∆Kurtosist +β3∆Πt−1+εt . (2.11)
As an additional exercise, we combine our model-implied slopes with risk-neutral parame-
ters in one single regression as follows:
∆Πt =β0+β1∆Skewnesst +β2∆Kurtosist +β3∆Πmodelt +β4∆Πt−1+εt . (2.12)
We run this regression for all of the three types of margin rules discussed in Section 2.2. We
report the results for regressions (2.11) and (2.12) in Table 2.3.
[Table 2.3 about here]
For regression (2.11), we observe in Table 2.3 that the risk-neutral skewness is not significant
at the 5 percent level for any option group. The risk neutral kurtosis becomes significant for
the medium-term option group only. The lagged slope difference is always significant at any
reasonable statistical level. However, using risk neutral factors alone gives quite low R2 val-
ues. In the combined regression (2.12), we observe that the model-implied slope differences
are significant at the 1 percent level for all types of margin rules and all option groups. The
risk neutral factors remain insignificant for all option groups. The adjusted R2 values have
improved considerably by adding model-implied slope differences.
For the second set of control variables, we first run the following regression with control vari-
ables only,
∆Πt = β0+β1∆LiborOISt +β2∆VIXt +β3∆IndexReturnt
+β4∆RelativeDemandt +β5∆Πt−1+εt . (2.13)
15These variables are used to explain the time variations of the slope of the IV curves by, e.g., Amin, Coval,
and Seyhun (2004), Li and Pearson (2005), Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman
(2009). Unfortunately, we do not have access to the data to measure the demand impact of end users as in
Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009). We follow Han (2008) to measure the demand impact by the ratio of
total open interest for OTM index put options (defined by− 38 <∆P ≤− 18 where∆P is the delta of put options ) to
that for near and ATM index options (defined as call options with 38 <∆C ≤ 58 and put options with− 18 <∆P ≤− 38
where ∆C denotes the delta of call options).
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Analogously, we also run a combined regression as follows,
∆Πt = β0+β1∆LiborOISt +β2∆VIXt +β3∆IndexReturnt
+β4∆RelativeDemandt +β5∆Πmodelt +β6∆Πt−1+εt . (2.14)
We report the results for regression (2.13) and regression (2.14) in Table 2.4 for different op-
tions groups.
[Table 2.4 about here]
Referring to Table 2.4, we find that in regression (2.13), ∆VIXt is significant at the 5 percent
level for all option groups. The demand factor is only significant for short-term calls. All
other control variables are not significant at the 5 percent level. In the combined regression
(2.14), ∆LiborOISt and ∆VIXt are not always significant. Their coefficients switch signs for
different option groups. However, the significance of ∆Πmodelt remains at the 1 percent level,
even after controlling for other variables. ∆Πmodelt changes from one week to the next be-
cause LiborOISt and VIX change. As a non-linear function of LiborOISt and VIX, changes
in Πmodelt have additional power beyond that provided directly by changes in LiborOISt and
VIXt . Indeed, when we include the model-implied slopes, we can substantially increase the
explanatory power. The residual effect of our model-implied slope after controlling for VIX
and the Libor–OIS spread is positive, indicating that a higher implied slope change is fol-
lowed by a higher empirical slope change. We remark that the above results are invariant to
different margin requirements and hold for all option groups.
2.7 Conclusion
We presented a tractable option pricing model that accounts for margin requirements on ex-
changes and market participants’ funding costs. In a dynamically incomplete market with
differential rates, we derived upper and lower bounds for option prices with margin require-
ments when the underlying follows a geometric Brownian motion. Since margin require-
ments are positive, the prices derived from the upper bounds exceed the classical Black–
Scholes option prices. For the margin rules of the world’s most important option exchange,
the CBOE, we derived upper price bounds for European call and put options. The relative
difference between these upper bounds and the original Black–Scholes option prices turns
out to be substantial, even under normal market conditions. Analyzing the funding costs
in volatility space, the no-arbitrage region we obtained for the IV provides enough flexibility
to allow volatility smiles and skews that are comparable in size to the empirically observed
IV patterns. Consistent with empirical findings, the IV curve flattens out as the maturity in-
creases. Hence, funding costs and collateral requirements offer an institutional explanation
of the volatility smile phenomenon without departing from the constant volatility assump-
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tion. As an additional analysis, we also investigate the impact of margin requirements and
funding costs when the underlying asset exhibits stochastic volatility. Our numerical analy-
sis confirms that there is still a significant increase in the IV upper bound from the Heston IV
due to margin requirements and funding costs.
The complexity of stock price processes and the variety of factors influencing option markets
makes an empirical test of our model a delicate task. However, our model highlights that
the slopes generated by the IV upper bounds under constant volatility assumption capture
important factors in the time variation of the empirical slope change. By fitting the change
of SPX option IV slopes, we found that our model-implied slopes are quite successful in ex-
plaining the empirical slopes, with average adjusted R2 around 30 percent. The performance
of our model-implied slope was compared with two regressions where risk-neutral factors
and other commonly used variables are taken as the regressors. Using our model-implied
slopes, we found that our institutional factors generate a level of adjusted R2 much higher
than the one generated by the commonly used factors. Furthermore, we ran a combined
regression where both the model-implied slope and control variables are included. The re-
gression results showed that our model-implied slopes remain significant and add significant
explanatory power to the regression. Therefore, we conclude that our model, albeit simple,
offers promising avenue for rationalizing the impact of margin requirements and funding
costs on option prices.
36 Chapter 2. Collateral Smile
APPENDIX
2.A Derivation of the Upper Price Bounds
We first derive the upper bounds for call options. We assume that the underlying price S(t )
follows a geometric Brownian motion with log-increments having constant volatility σ. Let
V (t ) denote the upper bound of the derivative contract price. Applying Ito’s lemma allows us
to find the dynamics of V (t ):
dV (t )=
(
V ′t (t )+
1
2
σ2S2(t )V ′′ss(t )
)
dt +α(t )dS(t ),
where α(t )=V ′s (t ). The option writer can construct a self-financing portfolio by holding α(t )
units of stocks and taking positions in the debt, cash, and collateral accounts. We denote
the corresponding amounts in these accounts by β(t ), λ(t ), and δ(t ). Hence, the replicating
strategy has a value U (t ) = α(t )S(t )+β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ), which should be equal to V (t ). As
self-financing implies no injection of external capital, the dynamics of the hedging portfolio
must be
dU (t )=α(t )(dS(t )+ rdS(t )dt )+ rbβ(t )dt + rlλ(t )dt + rlδ(t )dt .
The total value of the accounts is the difference between the value of the strategy and the
value of the purchased stocks, i.e., β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ) = V (t )−α(t )S(t ). In the classical Black–
Scholes setting, this value would grow at the unique risk-free rate. However, in our model the
lending rate determines the evolution of the cash and collateral account, while the borrowing
rate determines the evolution of the debt account. Therefore, we must carefully segregate the
positions into i) the collateral C (t ) required to be deposited in the cash account earning the
lending rate, ii) the quantityV (t )−C (t ) borrowed at the borrowing rate from the debt account
to finance the posting of the margin, and finally iii) α(t )S(t ) borrowed from the debt account
to finance the stock purchase.
Since the value of C (t ) is always greater than V (t ), the difference V (t )−C (t ) is negative and
needs to be borrowed from the debt account. Summing up all positions in the debt and cash
account and using the appropriate interest rates yields the following dynamics for the value
of the accounts:
d
(
β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ))= (rlC (t )− rb(C (t )−V (t ))− rbα(t )S(t ))dt .
Since the value of the replicating strategy equals the value of the derivative, the option value
must satisfy the PDE
V ′t (t )+
1
2
σ2S2(t )V
′′
ss(t )= rbV (t )− (rb − rl )C (t )− (rb − rd )α(t )S(t )
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which we can rewrite as
V ′t (t )+ (rb − rd )S(t )V ′s (t )+
1
2
σ2S(t )2V
′′
ss(t )= rbV (t )− (rb − rl )C (t ) (2.15)
with the boundary condition
V (T )= (S(T )−K )+. (2.16)
The continuity of C (t ) allows us to make use of the Feynman–Kac Theorem to represent the
solution to the PDE in (2.15) in terms of the following expectation:16
V (t )= EPbt
[
e−rb(T−t )V (T )
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+EPbt
[∫ T
t
e−rb(u−t )(rb − rl )C (u)du
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
. (2.17)
We note that the expectation in equation (2.17) is taken under that pricing measure Pb for
which the stock price discounted by rb − rd follows a martingale.
To replicate a put option, the investor has to short sell a certain amount of the underlying and
invest it in the cash account. Hence we have three positions: i) the collateral C (t ) deposited
in the cash account, ii) the quantity V (t )−C (t ) borrowed to finance the required margin,
and iii) the short sell proceeds α(t )S(t ) deposited in the cash account. For put options, the
option’s price is not sufficient to meet the margin requirement and V (t )−C (t ) needs to be
funded by borrowing. The relative size of α(t )S(t ) and V (t )−C (t ) is not known. Thus we
assume that the short selling proceeds α(t )S(t ) are saved in the cash account and could not
be used to satisfy the margin requirement. This assumption not only simplifies the model,
but is also consistent with market practice. Short sellers are generally required to leave the
short sale proceeds in an interest bearing account with their broker until the short position
is closed.17 The total growth of the cash, debt, and collateral account is then equal to
d(β(t )+λ(t )+δ(t ))= [rlC (t )− rb(C (t )−V (t ))− rlα(t )S(t )]dt .
Equating the replicating strategy value with the put option value V (t ) gives us the PDE for
V (t ):
V ′t (t )+ (rl − rd )S(t )V ′s (t )+
1
2
σ2S2(t )V
′′
ss(t )= rbV (t )− (rb − rl )C (t ), (2.18)
16We remark that the solution to equation (2.17) is indeed the solution to theM+ problem. It is the value of
a self-financing strategy satisfying the collateral requirement of the option writers. Its payoff at time T is equal
to the payoff of the call option. Furthermore, no simultaneous borrowing and lending in the debt and cash
account is involved in the replicating strategy. Therefore, the initial investment cost is minimized.
17 Bergman (1995) even discusses the case when brokers collect the interest rates to compensate for their
own monitoring costs. In such a case, the replicating costs for put options are even higher. However, as we only
consider two rates in our model, we keep the assumption that short selling earns the lending rate.
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with the boundary condition
V (T )= (K −S(T ))+. (2.19)
When C (t ) is continuous, we can alternatively represent the PDE by18
V (t )= EPlt
[
e−rb(T−t )V (T )+
∫ T
t
e−rb(u−t )(rb − rl )C (u)du
]
. (2.20)
We note that for put options, the underlying has a drift term rl−rd under the pricing measure
Pl , compared with rb − rd for calls. According to the Feynman–Kac formula, the drift term of
the underlying under the risk-neutral measure is determined by the coefficient of ∂V (t )
∂S in the
PDE. For puts, the short sale proceeds are invested at rl while for calls, longing the underly-
ing requires borrowing at rb . Therefore, for puts and calls, different drift terms adjusting for
dividends are applied to the underlying under the risk-neutral measure.
2.B Options under the CBOE Pricing Rule
We derive the call option price upper bound under the CBOE margin rule. The pricing formu-
las for put options can be computed similarly and are not given here. As described in Section
2.2, the margin rule for call options in the CBOE is the piece-wise linear function
C (t )=

a2S(t )+V (t ), S(t )≤ 11+a1−a2K
(1+a1)S(t )−K +V (t ), 11+a1−a2K < S(t )≤K
a1S(t )+V (t ), S(t )>K
We can rewrite equation (2.15) to get
V ′t (t )+ (rb − rd )S(t )V ′s (t )+
1
2
σ2S(t )2∂2V
′′
ss(t )= rlV (t )− (rb − rl )(C (t )−V (t )). (2.21)
Representing equation (2.21) as an expectation value, we obtain an alternative representation
of equation (2.17):
V (t )= EPbt
[
e−rl (T−t )V (T )+
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )(C (u)−V (u))du
]
. (2.22)
18Given our assumption that short selling profits earn the lending rate, the solution given by equation (2.20)
solves theM+ for put options for the same reasons that we gave for calls.
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Plugging the margin function into equation (2.22) yields
V (t ) = EPbt
[
e−rl (T−t )V (T )
]+EPbt [∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )a2S(u)1{S(u)≤ 11+a1−a2 K }du
]
+EPbt
[∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )((1+a1)S(u)−K )1{ 11+a1−a2 K<S(u)≤K }du
]
+EPbt
[∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )(rb − rl )a1S(u)1{S(u)>K }du
]
= EPbt
[
e−rl (T−t )V (T )
]+a2(rb − rl )∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )EPbt
[
S(u)1{S(u)≤ 11+a1−a2 K }
]
du
+(1+a1)(rb − rl )
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )EPbt
[
S(u)1{ 11+a1−a2 K<S(u)≤K }
]
du
−(rb − rl )K
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )EPbt
[
1{ 11+a1−a2 K<S(u)≤K }
]
du
+a1(rb − rl )
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )EPbt
[
S(u)1{S(u)>K }
]
du. (2.23)
The first term is just the Black–Scholes price under a different measure. To compute the
conditional expectations, for notational convenience, we let
d1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t ,
d∗1,2(u, t ) =
ln(S(t )(1+a1−a2)K )+ (rb − rd ± 12σ2)(u− t )
σ
p
u− t .
Under the probability measure Pb , we have dS(t )/S(t ) = (rb − rd )dt +σdW b(t ). Moreover,
W b(u)−W b(t ) is a zero-mean normal variable with variance u− t . The conditional expecta-
tions can be computed as follows:
E
Pb
t [S(u)1{S(u)≤ 11+a1−a2 K }
]
= EPbt
[
S(t )e(rb−rd−
1
2σ
2)(u−t )+σ(W b(u)−W b(t ))1{
W b(u)−W b(t )≤−d∗2 (u,t )
p
u−t
}]
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ −d∗2 (u,t )pu−t
−∞
eσye−
y2
2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ −d∗2 (u,t )pu−t
−∞
e−
(y−σ(u−t ))2
2(u−t ) + 12σ2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )e(rb−rd )(u−t )N
(
−d∗1 (u, t )
)
,
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EPb
[
S(u)1{ 11+a1−a2 K<S(u)≤K }
]
= EPb
[
S(t )e(rb−rd−
1
2σ
2)(u−t )+σ(W b(u)−W b(t ))1{−d∗2 (u,t )pu−t<W b(u)−W b(t )≤−d2(u,t )pu−t}
]
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ −d2(u,t )pu−t
−d∗2 (u,t )
p
u−t
eσye−
y2
2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ −d2(u,t )pu−t
−d∗2 (u,t )
p
u−t
e−
(y−σ(u−t ))2
2(u−t ) + 12σ2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )e(rb−rd )(u−t )
(
N
(
d∗1 (u, t )
)−N(d1(u, t ))),
E
Pb
t [1{ 11+a1−a2 K<S(u)≤K }
]
= EPbt
[
1{−d∗2 (u,t )
p
u−t<W b(u)−W b(t )≤−d2(u,t )
p
u−t }
]
= N
(
d∗2 (u, t )
)
−N
(
d2(u, t )
)
,
E
Pb
t [S(u)1{S(u)>K }]
= E
[
S(t )e(rb−rd−
1
2σ
2)(u−t )+σ(W b(u)−W b(t ))1{W b(u)−W b(t )>−d2(u,t )
p
u−t }
]
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ +∞
−d2(u,t )
p
u−t
eσye−
y2
2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )p
2pi(u− t )e
(rb−rd− 12σ2)(u−t )
(∫ +∞
−d2(u,t )
p
u−t
e−
(y−σ(u−t ))2
2(u−t ) + 12σ2(u−t )dy
)
= S(t )e(rb−rd )(u−t )N
(
d1(u, t )
)
.
Inserting these expectations into the call option value (2.23) yields
Vcal l (t ) = S(t )e(rb−rd−rl )(T−t )N (d1(T, t ))−Ke−rl (T−t )N (d2(T, t ))
+(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e(rb−rd−rl )(u−t )
(
a2N (−d∗1 (u, t ))+a1N (d1(u, t ))
)
du
+(1+a1)(rb − rl )S(t )
∫ T
t
e(rb−rd−rl )(u−t )
(
N (d∗1 (u, t ))−N (d1(u, t ))
)
du
−(rb − rl )K
∫ T
t
e−rl (u−t )
(
N (d∗2 (u, t ))−N (d2(u, t ))
)
du.
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2.C Option Pricing with Stochastic Volatility
We derive option price bounds when the underlying asset has stochastic volatility. First, we derive the
upper bounds for options. We hedge options with a hedging strategy U (t ). The hedging strategy is a
five-dimensional process (α(t ),β(t ),λ(t ),δ(t ),γ(t )), which captures the holding of the stock, the cash
borrowed, the cash deposited, the collateral, and the holding of the contingent claim. We require the
strategy to be self-financing. Therefore,
dU (t )=α(t )dS(t )+ rbβ(t )dt + rlλ(t )dt + rlδ(t )dt +γ(t )dg (t ).
Plugging the dynamics of S(t ) and g (t ), we have
dU (t ) = γ(t )
(
g ′t (t )+µS(t )g ′s(t )+
1
2
S2(t )v(t )g ′′ss(t )
)
dt
+
(
κ(θ− v(t ))g ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )g ′′vv (t )+ξS(t )v(t )ρg ′′sv (t )
)
dt
+µα(t )S(t )dt + rbβ(t )dt + rlλ(t )dt + rlδ(t )dt
+
(
γ(t )S(t )
√
v(t )g ′s(t )+α(t )S(t )
√
v(t )
)
dW 1(t )+ξγ(t )
√
v(t )g ′v (t )dW
2(t ).
Since the upper bound price equals the value of the hedging strategy, we have V (t ) =U (t ), and thus
dV (t )= dU (t ). Applying Ito’s formula to V (t ) yields
dV (t ) =
(
V ′t (t )+µS(t )V ′s (t )+
1
2
S(t )2v(t )V ′′ss(t )
)
dt
+
(
κ(θ− v(t ))V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )
)
dt
+S(t )
√
v(t )V ′s (t )dW
1(t )+ξ
√
v(t )V ′v (t )dW
2(t ).
Comparing the dynamics of V (t ) andU (t ), it must hold that
S(t )
√
v(t )V ′s (t ) = γ(t )S(t )
√
v(t )g ′s(t )+α(t )S(t )
√
v(t ),
ξ
√
v(t )V ′v (t ) = ξγ(t )
√
v(t )g ′v (t ).
Solving the equations and using the fact that the additional asset is a variance swap, we obtain
γ(t ) = V
′
v (t )
g ′v (t )
,
α(t ) = V ′s (t )−
V ′v (t )g ′s(t )
g ′v (t )
=V ′s (t ).
Assume that the margin requirement imposed on the whole trading strategy isC (t ). Then, δ(t )=C (t ).
To investigate the cash flow in the borrowing and lending account, fromV (t )=U (t )=α(t )S(t )+β(t )+
λ(t )+δ(t )+γ(t )g (t ), we obtain that β(t )+λ(t )=V (t )−α(t )S(t )−C (t )−γ(t )g (t ). We need to separate
the cases for put options and call options. Since the additional contingent claim is a variance swap,
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we have g ′s(t ) = 0. The risk in the underlying asset is hedged by trading the underlying asset. For
call options, α(t ) = V ′s (t ) > 0. Since the proceedings of selling call options is always required to be
posted as part of the collateral, we have C (t )≥V (t ) and therefore V (t )−α(t )S(t )−C (t )< 0. However,
β(t )+λ(t )=V (t )−α(t )S(t )−C (t )−γ(t )g (t ) can be positive or negative. We cannot determine the sign
of this amount. We can approximate it by applying the borrowing rate rb to this quantity.
19 When this
amount is negative, the borrowing rate should be applied. When this amount turns positive, it should
earn lending rate. Hence, applying the borrowing rate rb to this quantity underestimates the cost of
replicating. The call option upper bound should be larger than the price derived below. Comparing
the drift term ofU (t ) and V (t ) and noting that g (t ) is not related to S(t ), we derive the following PDE
V ′t (t )+µS(t )V ′s (t )+
1
2
S2(t )v(t )V ′′ss(t )+κ(θ− v(t ))V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )
= γt
(
g ′t (t )+κ(θ− v(t ))g ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )g ′′vv (t )
)
+α(t )µS(t )+ rbβ(t )+ rlC (t )
= V
′
v (t )
g ′v (t )
(
g ′t (t )+κ(θ− v(t ))g ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )g ′′vv (t )
)
+µV ′s (t )S(t )
+rb
(
V (t )−V ′s (t )S(t )−C (t )−
V ′v (t )
g ′v (t )
g (t )
)
+ rlC (t ).
By canceling and rearranging terms, we obtain
1
V ′v (t )
(
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S2(t )v(t )V ′′ss(t )+κ(θ− v(t ))V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rbV (t )
)
+ 1
V ′v (t )
(
rbV
′
s (t )S(t )+ (rb − rl )C (t )
)= 1
g ′v (t )
(
g ′t (t )+κ(θ− v(t ))g ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )g ′′vv (t )− rbg (t )
)
.
If we denote the right hand side term the modified variance risk premium and assume it is propor-
tional to v(t ), i.e. it equals to m∗v(t ), we obtain the following PDE
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S(t )2v(t )V ′′ss(t )+ (κ+m∗)
( κ
κ+m∗ θ− v(t )
)
V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )
+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rbV (t )+ rbV ′s (t )S(t )+ (rb − rl )C (t )= 0.
For put options, α(t ) = V ′s (t ) < 0, therefore the short sell proceed α(t )S(t ) is deposited in the cash
account and is kept by the broker. We also apply the borrowing rate to the amountV (t )−C (t )−γ(t )g (t )
as an approximation.20Again this approximation underestimates the cost of replicating and thus gives
19One can also use the lending rate rl to approximate the bound. Since using either the borrowing rate or
the lending rate would lead to an upper bound which is lower than the actual bound, we use the larger of the
two bounds, i.e. the one derived using the borrowing rate, to approximate the upper bound.
20 Using the lending rate also gives an approximation for the upper bound. But we use the borrowing rate to
derive an upper bound that is closer to the actual upper bound.
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an upper bound that is lower than the actual upper bound. We then obtain a similar equation
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S(t )2v(t )V ′′ss(t )+ (κ+m∗)
( κ
κ+m∗ θ− v(t )
)
V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )
+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rbV (t )+ rlV ′s (t )S(t )+ (rb − rl )C (t )= 0.
To derive the option price lower bound, we replicate the negative of the options payoffs with the lowest
possible capital. Note that the initial capital to hedge the opposite of the option payoff is less than
zero. The negative of the minimal initial capital is the lower bound of the option prices. In other
words, the highest possible benefit of replicating the opposite of the option payoffs gives the lower
bounds. We note that there is no collateral requirement for buying options. Therefore, δ(t )= 0. Similar
to solving the upper bound, we have γ(t ) = V ′v (t )g ′v (t ) and α(t ) = V
′
s (t ). For the borrowing and lending
account, β(t )+λ(t ) = V (t )−α(t )S(t )−C (t )−γ(t )g (t ) incurs the borrowing rate when it is negative
and the lending rate when it is positive. For call options, one short sells the underlying to hedge the
opposite of the calls, α(t ) = V ′s (t ) < 0. We apply the lending rate to V (t )−α(t )S(t )−γ(t )g (t ) as an
approximation which overestimates the benefit of replicating.21 Hence we approximate the lower
bound for call options by the solution to the following equation
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S(t )2v(t )V ′′ss(t )+ (κ+m∗)
( κ
κ+m∗ θ− v(t )
)
V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )
+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rlV (t )+ rlV ′s (t )S(t )= 0.
To replicate the opposite of puts, α(t )=V ′s (t )> 0. We apply the borrowing rate to β(t )+λ(t )=V (t )−
α(t )S(t )−γ(t )g (t ).22 The lower bound for puts then solves
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S(t )2v(t )V ′′ss(t )+ (κ+m∗)
( κ
κ+m∗ θ− v(t )
)
V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )
+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rbV (t )+ rbV ′s (t )S(t )= 0.
The actual lower bounds would be below the lower bounds we derived above. The upper and lower
bounds can be solved numerically using finite difference methods.
The upper and lower bounds are compared with the Heston price derived from the following equation
V ′t (t )+
1
2
S2(t )v(t )V ′′ss(t )+ (κ+m∗)
( κ
κ+m∗ θ− v(t )
)
V ′v (t )+
1
2
ξ2v(t )V ′′vv (t )
+ξS(t )v(t )ρV ′′sv (t )− rlV (t )+ rlV ′s (t )S(t )= 0.
21Using the borrowing rate gives a lower bound which is higher than the lower bound derived from the lend-
ing rate. Thus, the lending rate is used.
22The borrowing rate is chosen here, as it yields a lower lower bound.
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Call options Put options
exp(Π0) Π Adjusted R2 exp(Π0) Π Adjusted R2
Short-term 0.184 -3.381 0.730 0.191 -2.923 0.712
(-62.210) (-32.104) (-59.085 ) (-29.852)
Medium-term 0.186 -2.105 0.855 0.192 -1.957 0.920
(-68.913) (-37.549) (-67.193) (-43.247)
TABLE 2.1: Regression results for obtaining the empirical slopes for short-term andmedium-term op-
tions
The table displays the results for the regression (2.8) of implied volatility on moneyness for call
and put options with t-statistics in parentheses. We ran the regression for each week of our sam-
ple period from January 2002 to August 2010 for a total of 449 weeks. The term exp(Π0) repre-
sents the implied volatility for at-the-money options. The reported coefficients and adjusted R2
are time averages over all 449 weeks. The t-statistics are the time-series average of the weekly es-
timates divided by the standard deviation of the average adjusted for first-order autocorrelation
(BKM (2003)). Short-term options are those with maturities less than 60 days. Medium-term op-
tions have expirations between 60 to 150 days.
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Short-term Medium-term
only strategy portfolio minimum only strategy portfolio minimum
lag margin short portfolio lag margin short portfolio
Panel A: Call options
∆Πmodelt 3.253 2.569 2.592 1.763 1.536 1.551
(8.844) (9.540) (9.562) (13.704) (15.304) (15.341)
∆Πt−1 -0.238 -0.225 -0.222 -0.222 -0.286 -0.295 -0.288 -0.288
(-4.968) (-5.983) (-6.170) (-6.178) (-6.677) (-6.469) (-6.450) (-6.454)
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.227 0.257 0.258 0.080 0.408 0.421 0.421
Panel B: Put options
∆Πmodelt 6.603 10.679 5.066 3.988 8.409 4.128
(9.168) (5.244) (7.617) (13.052) (9.756) (12.600)
∆Πt−1 -0.312 -0.317 -0.306 -0.314 -0.195 -0.218 -0.163 -0.165
(-5.201) (-6.009) (-5.578) (-5.983) (-7.131) (-6.251) (-5.543) (-5.385)
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.238 0.200 0.238 0.036 0.463 0.277 0.357
TABLE 2.2: Regression results for changes of empirical IV slopes on changes of model-implied slopes.
The table reports the estimated coefficients from regressing the differences of empirical IV slope
on the lagged differences and also on differences of model-implied slopes. We give corresponding
t-statistics in parentheses. Panel A shows the results for both short-term and medium-term call
options. Panel B reports the results for short-term and medium-term put options. For each option
category, we report the results of the regression using the lagged dependent variable alone and also
for the combined regression using three margin rules, namely strategy margins for a naked short
sale, the portfolio margins for a naked short sale, and minimum portfolio margin requirements.
The standard errors used to compute the t-statistics are the Newey–West estimates with a lag length
of 5.
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Short-term Medium-term
only strategy portfolio minimum only strategy portfolio minimum
controls margin short portfolio controls margin short portfolio
Panel A: Call options
∆Πmodelt 3.276 2.586 2.609 1.706 1.496 1.510
(8.839) (9.518) (9.541) (12.017) (13.597) (13.638)
∆Skewnesst 0.108 0.177 0.194 0.194 -0.222 -0.034 0.012 0.014
(0.371) (0.695) (0.788) (0.790) (-1.585) (-0.300) (0.109) (0.128)
∆Kurtosist 0.007 0.023 0.025 0.177 -0.078 -0.019 -0.012 -0.011
(0.203) (0.743) (0.824) (0.824) (-2.544) (-0.793) (-0.526) (-0.514)
∆Πt−1 -0.237 -0.227 -0.224 -0.224 -0.300 -0.300 -0.291 -0.291
(-4.850) (-5.955) (-6.155) (-6.163) (-6.455) (-6.258) (-6.205) (-6.205)
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.225 0.255 0.207 0.126 0.409 0.422 0.422
Panel B: Put options
∆Πmodelt 6.684 10.723 5.106 3.889 7.907 3.955
(9.056) (5.295) (7.641) (11.549) (8.235) (12.178)
∆Skewnesst 0.228 0.344 0.270 0.317 -0.300 -0.055 -0.101 -0.070
(0.942) (1.725) (1.409) (1.651) (-0.168) (-0.561) (-0.851) (-0.644)
∆Kurtosist 0.021 0.038 0.025 0.034 -0.075 -0.016 -0.033 -0.025
(0.869) (1.839) (1.248) (1.695) (-3.139) (-0.968) (-1.453) (-1.222)
∆Πt−1 -0.313 -0.314 -0.307 -0.312 -0.172 -0.221 -0.172 -0.171
(-5.199) (-5.894) (-5.575) (-5.885) (-5.667) (-6.243) (-5.667) (-5.566)
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.239 0.199 0.239 0.089 0.463 0.288 0.335
TABLE 2.3: Regression results for changes of empirical IV slopes on changes of risk-neutral parame-
ters.
The table reports the estimated coefficients for regressions explaining the difference of slopes using
the difference of risk-neutral parameters. Panel A shows the results for call options and Panel B for
put options. We analyze short-term and medium-term options separately. Column only controls
shows the regression where only control variables are employed. We also run combined regressions
using implied slopes. Results for regressions incorporating slopes derived from each type of margin
rule are shown in the column labeled according to the margin rule. The standard errors used to
compute the t-statistics are the Newey–West estimates with a lag length of 5.
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Short-term Medium-term
only strategy portfolio minimum only strategy portfolio minimum
controls margin short portfolio controls margin short portfolio
Panel A: Call options
∆Πmodelt 3.374 2.627 2.648 1.725 1.484 1.495
(8.709) (9.080) (9.093) (10.224) (13.705) (13.752)
∆LiborOISt -0.207 0.524 0.536 0.530 -0.081 0.261 0.231 0.226
(-0.714) (1.929) (1.210) (2.138) (-0.649) (1.676) (2.129) (2.114)
∆VIXt 0.075 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 0.044 0.004 0.007 0.007
(3.500) (-1.837) (-1.070) (-1.673) (4.472) (0.941) (1.584) (1.681)
∆IndexReturnt -0.277 -0.428 -0.522 -0.525 0.020 -0.154 -0.172 -0.173
(-0.289) (-0.452) (-0.409) (-0.555) (0.060) (-0.469) (-0.522) (-0.527)
∆RelativeDemandt -0.356 -0.273 -0.237 -0.237 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.003
(-2.700) (-2.215) (-2.285) (-1.954) (0.075) (0.227) (0.089) (0.084)
∆Πt−1 -0.221 -0.218 -0.217 -0.217 -0.286 -0.299 -0.291 -0.291
(-4.956) (-5.754) (-5.959) (-5.307) (-7.301) (-6.720) (-6.712) (-6.717)
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.235 0.262 0.263 0.159 0.409 0.424 0.424
Panel B: Put options
∆Πmodelt 5.995 9.625 4.600 3.755 8.276 3.903
(7.229) (4.619) (6.137) (11.895) (9.865) (11.962)
∆LiborOISt -0.262 0.121 -0.201 0.050 -0.112 0.015 -0.142 -0.064
(-0.808) (0.505) (-0.806) (0.238) (-0.997) (0.230) (-1.357) (-0.747)
∆VIXt 0.083 0.026 0.062 0.041 0.036 0.017 0.034 0.028
(3.430) (2.282) (3.516) (3.054) (4.298) (3.627) (4.538) (4.200)
∆IndexReturnt -0.986 -1.242 -1.427 -1.448 0.040 -0.159 -0.019 -0.069
(-1.156) (-1.563) (-1.749) (-1.732) (0.128) (-0.522) (-0.064) (-0.221)
∆RelativeDemandt -0.029 0.063 0.051 0.089 0.023 0.025 0.006 0.006
(-0.231) (0.535) (0.431) (0.737) (0.584) (0.883) (0.201) (0.220)
∆Πt−1 -0.322 -0.323 -0.316 -0.322 -0.204 -0.225 -0.170 -0.174
(-5.634) (-6.246) (-5.952) (-6.316) (-7.160) (-6.239) (-5.940) (-5.574)
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.241 0.230 0.252 0.127 0.484 0.362 0.412
TABLE 2.4: Regression results for changes of empirical IV slopes using the second set of control vari-
ables.
The table shows the estimated coefficients from regressing the changes of empirical slopes on
changes of the second set control variables. Panel A reports the results for calls, Panel B those for
puts. We analyze short-term and medium-term options separately. Column only controls shows
the regression where only control variables are employed. We also run combined regressions using
implied slopes. Results for regressions including slopes derived from each type of margin rule are
shown in the column labeled according to the margin rule. The standard errors used to compute
the t-statistics are the Newey–West estimates with a lag length of 5.

Chapter 3
How Index Futures and ETFs Increase
Stock Return Correlations
Abstract
This paper examines whether increased trading activity in index futures and exchange traded
funds (ETFs) is associated with higher equity return correlations. We build a simple model
to analyze how demand shocks for index ETFs and futures are transmitted to the underlying
stocks through arbitrage. Our model predicts that demand shocks to ETFs and the futures
market lead to a stronger price comovement not only for index stocks but also for non-index
stocks. Moreover, demand shocks to index ETFs have a higher impact on stock return cor-
relations than demand shocks to futures. We confirm the model predictions by studying the
average pairwise correlation of S&P 500 stocks after the inception of S&P 500 futures. Con-
trolling for several factors, we show that trading activity in futures and ETFs explains the time
variation of the average S&P 500 stock return correlation, with ETFs exhibiting a significantly
stronger explanatory power. An examination of the relationship between current and lagged
returns suggests that at least some of the return comovement is excessive. Furthermore, we
confirm that futures and ETF trading activity is also associated with higher return correla-
tions among non-index stocks.
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and discussions and participants in the Brown bag seminar at the University of Zurich for feedback. Financial
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3.1 Introduction
Covariances between asset returns are a key variable in risk management, portfolio selection
and tests of asset pricing models. The covariance between assets can change due to changes
in volatilities or changes in correlations. Both volatilities and correlations between assets vary
substantially over time. Previous work documents that correlations between international
equity returns change over time (see, for example, Longin and Solnik (2001), Goetzmann, Li,
and Rouwenhorst (2005) and Ang and Bekaert (2002)). There is also evidence that correla-
tions among stock returns in the US vary considerably over time (see, for example, Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)). Typically, correlations rise in periods of financial crises and
high volatility.
In traditional theory, asset returns are correlated because changes in their fundamentals are
correlated. However, the asset correlations observed in the data sometimes exceed the level
predicted by fundamentals. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) select stocks from unrelated lines
of business and find excess comovement in returns. Moreover, many researchers find that the
addition and removal of a stock from the index affects its correlation with the index, although
the addition and removal itself might not convey new information above and beyond stock
fundamentals (Vijh (1994), Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), Greenwood (2005)).
This paper investigates the impact of trading activity in index ETFs and futures on asset re-
turn correlations. Index or sector ETFs and futures have gained increasing popularity among
investors. However, the consequences of this increase in trading opportunities for market
correlation are not well understood at a theoretical or empirical level. Increased trading in
ETFs and futures might increase stock return correlations due to the no-arbitrage relation
between the derivative and the underlying assets. The idea is simple: when a demand shock
hits the index derivative, the price of the derivative will move away from the price implied by
the underlying basket. However, the no-arbitrage relation between the index derivative and
the underlying baskets leads arbitrageurs to attempt to exploit the mispricing by buying the
under-priced asset and selling the over-priced asset. Because this arbitrage involves simulta-
neous trades in the index constituents, correlations among stocks are likely to increase.
To demonstrate how trading activity in ETFs and futures affects the correlations among as-
sets, we build a simple two-period model. Investors trade in the first period and consume the
liquidation value of all assets in the second. The economy consists of three types of assets:
a riskless asset, N risky assets and index derivatives, i.e., futures and physically replicating
ETFs. We introduce quadratic transaction costs in our model so that index derivatives are not
redundant and arbitrage is costly. The model features three types of investors, namely stock
investors, index traders and arbitrageurs. We show that given an exogenous demand shock
from index traders, arbitrageurs, as the only type of investors present in both the derivative
and stock markets, provide the derivatives to index investors while hedging themselves by
taking positions in the stock market. Thus, demand shocks from index derivatives are trans-
mitted to the stock market through arbitrageurs. In equilibrium, demand shocks from index
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traders also play a role in determining stock prices. Hence, in addition to fundamental corre-
lations, stock prices can also be correlated through exposures to demand shocks. The model
predicts that demand shocks to physically replicated ETFs have a higher impact on correla-
tions than demand shocks to futures, a prediction that is borne out in the data.
To test for a relationship between index trading and stock return correlation in the data, we
investigate the impact of S&P 500 futures, E-mini futures and S&P 500 ETFs on average stock
return correlations. Our data range from January 1982 to December 2012. We use the monthly
value-weighted return correlations among S&P 500 stocks as well as non-S&P 500 stocks as
the dependent variables. As a proxy for the demand shocks to ETFs (futures), we use the ratio
of ETFs (futures) dollar trading volume and aggregate S&P 500 stock dollar trading volume.
Consistent with the model predictions, we find that the demand shock proxy significantly
explains the time variation of both S&P 500 and non-S&P 500 stock correlations. The R2 in-
creases substantially when the demand shock proxy is added to the regression. The results
remain robust when controlling for the current month return, realized volatility and many
other factors. Notably, in line with the model predictions, we find that ETF trading activity
has a larger impact on correlations than futures trading activity. We also compare the impact
of index demand shocks on the correlations of index and non-index stocks by pooling all
correlations in one regression. In line with our intuition, index demand shocks have a larger
impact on index stocks. As trading activity in index products increases, the average stock cor-
relation increases. A natural question is whether such an increase in correlations is excessive
or whether it reflects information that is transmitted from the index derivatives market to
the stock market. To answer this question, we test whether higher levels of stock market re-
turn reversals are associated with higher correlations. Return reversals measure how the daily
returns are linked with the lagged daily returns. A stronger negative relationship between to-
day’s and the previous day’s returns indicates more return reversals. By value weighting the
return reversals of all index stocks, we are able to derive a return reversal measure for the
index. We test the excessiveness of the correlation by regressing the return reversals on the
correlations. The regression results confirm that a higher correlation is significantly associ-
ated with larger return reversals. Hence, at least part of the correlation is excessive.
Our paper is related to three strands of the literature. The first strand of research investigates
whether correlation risk is priced. Krishnan, Petkova, and Ritchken (2009) document that the
time-varying correlation between individual stocks carries a significant price of risk in the
cross-section of stock returns. Investors pay a premium for securities that perform well in
high correlation regimes. In the options market, Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2009) show
that incorporating a stochastic correlation between asset returns can explain the steepness of
the implied volatility curves of index options. Index options are sold at a premium compared
to equity options because they can be used to hedge correlation risk. Schürhoff and Ziegler
(2011) decompose total variance risk into systematic and idiosyncratic variance and find that
both carry risk premia but with different signs. Correlation risk premia are a combination of
the risk premia on systematic and idiosyncratic variances.
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Our paper is also related to the literature that analyzes the impact of index product trading
on the underlying equity market. Papers that study futures trading activity and its impact
on stock market volatility find inconsistent results (see, for example, Edwards (1988) and
Bessembinder and Seguin (1992)). The empirical evidence on the link between equity futures
trading and an increase in stock market volatility is mixed. For ETFs, Ben-David, Franzoni,
and Moussawi (2012) show that shocks to ETF prices are passed down to the underlying secu-
rities via the arbitrage between the ETF and underlying stocks. They find that ETFs increase
the volatility of the underlying securities.
Our paper is most closely related to the literature that investigates the link between ETFs
and the correlation between their constituents. Da and Shive (2012) and Staer (2012) study
empirically whether an increase in the trading volume of an ETF leads to an increase in the
correlations of the ETF component stocks. Staer (2012) studies this relationship using high-
frequency data, while Da and Shive (2012) test this hypothesis using daily data. Both papers
conclude that due to the trading pressure induced by arbitrageurs, trading activity in ETFs
indeed results in higher stock return correlations.
The main innovation of our paper compared to the literature is three-fold. Firstly, we build
a theoretical model that allows us to obtain a number of predictions that we are also able to
confirm in the data. Other papers only provide empirical evidence on the impact of ETFs on
stock volatility and correlations. Secondly, we consider both futures and ETFs and compare
their impact on correlations. To our knowledge, futures, as another popular exchange-traded
index product that has a much larger trading volume and a much longer history than ETFs,
have not been considered to date in the context of return correlations. Furthermore, our
model predicts and we confirm in the data that demand shocks coming from physically repli-
cating ETFs have a higher impact than shocks associated with futures trading. Thirdly, our
model implies that index demand shocks initiated from index derivatives might not only in-
crease return correlations for index stocks but also induce higher correlations for non-index
stocks. Previous work does not consider the impact from trading activity in index products
on non-index stocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the
futures and ETF markets. Section 3.3 presents a simple equilibrium model demonstrating
how demand shocks to index products affect correlations between the underlying stocks.
Section 3.4 describes our empirical hypotheses, the data and the primary results of our em-
pirical tests. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
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3.2 An Overview of Futures and ETF Markets
3.2.1 Description of the Instruments
S&P 500 index futures were introduced by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) on April
21, 1982. One futures contract was 500 times the value of the S&P 500 stock index. The CME
reduced the size of its S&P 500 futures contract by reducing the multiplier from 500 to 250
on November 3, 1997. Futures use the open outcry pit trading method during main market
hours. At maturity, there is no physical delivery of the underlying asset. Futures are settled
in cash to the spot value of the index. S&P 500 futures are listed in a quarterly cycle, with
contracts expiring in March, June, September, and December.
E-mini futures were launched on September 9, 1997, because the contract size of the S&P 500
futures contract was too large for small investors. As the name suggests, E-mini futures have
a much smaller contract size than legacy S&P 500 index futures. One E-mini S&P 500 future
contract is 50 times the value of the S&P 500 stock index. Like other CME stock index futures,
E-mini futures are cash settled. CME E-mini contracts are offered exclusively on the CME
Globex electronic trading platform and can be traded almost 24 hours per day.
ETFs, as another important type of index derivative, are created by placing assets or total
return swaps into a trust. The trust then issues certificates or fund shares that are listed on an
exchange. Unlike standard equity mutual funds, ETFs trade like individual stocks and can be
bought or sold throughout the trading day, not just at the closing price of the day. Stock index
ETF share prices typically represent a certain fraction of their underlying index. For example,
the SPDR S&P 500 (SPY), the largest ETF in the market, is valued at approximately one-tenth
the value of the index. There are two other ETFs that also track the S&P 500 index, namely the
iShares S&P 500 Index (IVV) and the Vanguard 500 Index Fund (VOO).
There are two ways in which an ETF tracks an index or a sector. The first (and most common)
method is known as physical replication, where the fund owns the securities represented by
the index, providing investors with actual ownership of the securities. Almost all ETFs that
track an index or a sector in the United States are physical ETFs.1 While some funds hold the
stocks in the weighting defined by the index, called full replication, others own a proportion
of shares in the underlying index to increase efficiency and lower cost, an approach referred
to as optimized replication. Optimized replication is usually used for very broad-based in-
dices such as the Russell 1000 or Russell 2000. In our study, the three main S&P 500 index
ETFs, i.e., SPY, IVV and VOO hold index constituent stocks with weights that are very close
1The physical replication of ETFs can be confirmed by checking the asset holdings of equity ETFs in the
Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings data. The ETF database provides easy access to the holding of top
ETFs and thereby confirms physical replication (http://etfdb.com/compare/market-cap/). Vanguard mentions
that “nearly all ETF products in the United States are physical ETFs”. iShares, the largest ETF provider, writes in
its investors’ guide that “Indeed, almost 100% of currently offered iShares ETFs are physically-replicated.” SPDR
also mentions that “To date, all State Street Global Advisors’ (SSgA) SPDR ETFs across the globe are supported
by the physical replication model using either full or optimised replication.”
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to the weights in the S&P 500. These three ETFs can be considered to be fully replicating the
index. The second method for constructing an ETF is known as synthetic (or swap-based)
replication. These funds use swaps and other derivative products to obtain market access.
Synthetic ETFs are more popular in Europe. They are more commonly used in real estate,
commodities and money markets. Because the focus of our study is the US equity market,
we can safely assume physical replication.
3.2.2 Growth in ETFs and Futures
Trading activity in S&P 500 stocks and derivatives has increased over time. Panel A of Figure
3.1 shows that over the past three decades, trading in S&P 500 stocks as measured by aggre-
gate dollar trading volume has expanded almost exponentially.
Accompanying the growth of stock trading is an increase in futures and ETF trading. At first
glance, ETFs and futures appear to be highly redundant and incapable of significantly ex-
panding investors’ opportunity sets. However, these products are a more cost-effective way
of gaining access to an entire market than buying the individual index constituents. There-
fore, in terms of dollar trading volume, they are highly successful.
Since the inception of futures contracts in 1982, floor-based futures have been a popular
venue for index trading. After the introduction of E-mini futures, trading in traditional futures
has trended down as part of the trading has been replaced by trading in E-mini futures. E-
mini stock index futures debuted in 1997 and have become the fastest-growing futures prod-
ucts in history. Studies of comparative market quality by Domowitz and Steil (1999) find that
electronic markets tend to offer liquidity similar to that of floor markets but at a lower cost.
These cost advantages might be one of the reasons, aside from the flexible trading hours and
smaller contract size, that E-mini futures have replaced floor-based futures to be the most
traded index product. The sum of total futures trading volumes (legacy plus E-mini) remains
high, at a level that exceeds the total dollar trading volume in S&P 500 stocks.
The first ETFs were introduced in the early 1990s, but only achieved good market penetration
in the mid- to late-90s. In recent years, ETFs have experienced remarkable growth over a
relatively short period. In Panel A of Figure 3.1, we report the total dollar trading volume of
three ETFs that track the S&P 500 index, i.e., SPY, IVV and VOO.
To compare futures and ETF trading activity with the underlying cash market, Panel B of Fig-
ure 3.1 reports the ratio of the dollar trading volume of various products to the aggregate
trading volume of S&P 500 stocks. Originally, traditional futures had a much larger trading
volume than the cash market. After the inception of E-mini futures, legacy futures lost their
popularity. E-mini futures trading volume is 1.5 times the volume on the cash market. Hence,
the total volume of legacy futures and E-mini futures usually exceeds that of S&P 500 stocks
and is sometimes twice as large. ETFs are not traded as often as their underlying stocks. Their
dollar trading volume is generally around 20% of the total dollar trading volume of the under-
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FIGURE 3.1: Trading activity in S&P 500 stocks, ETFs, legacy futures and E-mini futures over time.
Panel A depicts the monthly dollar trading volume of S&P 500 stocks, futures and ETFs over time. S&P
500 dollar volume is the aggregate dollar volume of S&P 500 index constituents. ETF volume is the
sum of SPY, IVV and VOO dollar trading volume. Futures volume is the sum of S&P 500 futures volume
across all maturities. Panel B shows the ratio of the dollar trading volume of various products to the
aggregate trading volume of S&P 500 stocks.
lying stocks.
3.2.3 Why ETFs and Futures Might Increase Stock Return Correlations
ETFs and futures, as derivatives based on an index, must satisfy a no-arbitrage relationship
with the index. When the prices of ETFs and futures move away from the prices implied by the
cash market, arbitrageurs can buy the over-priced and sell the under-priced to make a profit.
As reaping the arbitrage benefit involves the simultaneous trading of all index constituents,
correlations of stocks returns are likely to increase.
Of course, futures and ETFs are not the only instruments whose value depends on that of the
underlying basket. Mutual funds and options are also often index-based. Although a large
demand shock to index options might also lead to arbitrage between the options and the
underlying stocks, the no-arbitrage relation between the index and index options is more dif-
ficult to maintain because option prices also depend on (stochastic) volatility. Index mutual
funds are another important way to invest in the index, and their capitalization by far exceeds
that of ETFs. However, index mutual funds lack a liquid secondary market and can be traded
only at the close of the day. Cash inflows and outflows to the mutual fund are likely to have
an impact on the correlation of the underlying stocks. Da and Shive (2012) find that mutual
fund holdings also explain part of stock return correlations, but their coefficient is only one
third that of ETF holdings. This is evidence that ETFs have a higher impact on correlations
than mutual funds. In this paper, we focus on the impact of index products that have a liquid
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secondary market; thus, we do not include index mutual funds in our analysis.
3.3 Model
Our formal analysis is conducted using a simple two-period model that allows us to derive
a unique equilibrium. Investors trade at t = 1 and then consume the liquidation value of
all assets at t = 2. The setup we use builds on the work of Fremault (1991), who solves for
equilibrium with competitive stock and futures markets. In her paper, there are no demand
shocks for the derivative; as a result, she does not analyze how demand shocks on the deriva-
tive market affect stock return correlations. Moreover, she does not examine the differences
between futures and ETFs.
3.3.1 Financial Assets
The economy consists of three types of assets. There is a riskless asset that has a perfectly
elastic supply with a gross rate of return normalized to 1. The economy also contains a fixed
supply Q of N risky assets. The third type of assets are derivatives written on an index. The
weight of the stocks in the index is b, with bT 1= 1. In line with market practice, only a subset
of the stocks is included in the index. We assume that the first k stocks out of N are included
in the index. Obviously, bi 6= 0 for stock i with 1≤ i ≤ k. The index itself cannot be traded, but
the derivatives written on it can. We consider two types of derivatives written on the index,
i.e., a futures contract and an ETF.2 Both the futures and the ETF are assumed to be in zero net
supply.3 The payoffs of the two derivatives are different. The futures contract is cash settled;
its payoff is equal to the difference between the index value at t = 2 and the futures price at
t = 1.4 The ETF in our model is assumed to physically replicate the index. Therefore, it is
a basket of stocks. Trading in the ETF is identical to trading a basket of stocks with weights
equal to the index weight b. At t = 2, the ETF gives the exact same payoff as holding the index.
Trading stocks, ETFs and futures contracts is not costless in our model. The transaction costs
can be interpreted as the commissions and the cost of immediacy. Although commissions
are quite low for large institutional investors, the cost of immediacy can be sizable even for
institutional investors. Without transaction costs, index derivatives are redundant because
the payoffs of these securities can be replicated easily and costlessly by investors. In a mar-
ket with frictions such as trading costs, the existence of ETFs and the futures market allows
traders to generate larger order flows at lower costs. To obtain a closed-form solution, we as-
2It is worth noting that although we assume that the futures and ETFs are based on a broad index, the same
results can be applied to sector-based products such as sector ETFs and futures.
3This assumption is not crucial to the model but is imposed for simplicity. To allow for non-zero net supply,
we can assume that liquidity providers have a non-zero initial endowment in ETFs and futures.
4Because our model has only two periods, there is no mark-to-market between the time the position is
entered and the final settlement. The futures contract resembles a forward contract in our setting.
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sume quadratic transaction costs. Quadratic transaction costs are not unreasonable and are
assumed in many papers for analytical convenience (See Fremault (1991) and Garleanu and
Pedersen (2013), for example). In our model, trading costs for stocks are captured in a matrix
C . To trade X stocks, the associated trading costs are 12X
TCX . The non-diagonal elements
ofC measure how assets’ liquidity is linked. We denote the futures trading cost coefficient by
c f ; to trade y futures, the cost is
1
2c f y
2. Similarly, denoting the ETF trading cost coefficient by
cet f , it costs
1
2cet f z
2 to trade z ETFs.
3.3.2 Investors and Beliefs
We model three types of investors: stock investors, index traders and liquidity providers. We
assume Ns identical stock investors who are restricted to trade only in stocks and the risk-
less asset. Before trading starts at t = 1, they receive an equal endowment of QNs stocks and
BS0 riskless assets. Index traders are assumed to generate exogenous demand shocks for in-
dex products. We let q f denote the exogenous demand for futures and qet f the exogenous
demand for ETFs. Demand shocks are taken as given. Finally, there are liquidity providers
(arbitrageurs) that trade in both the ETF (futures) market and the stock market. There are
N1 identical futures providers and N2 identical ETF providers that act competitively in that
they do not take into account the price impact of their trades. As the only investors present in
both the derivative and the stock markets, liquidity providers not only reap arbitrage profits
but also provide liquidity to accommodate exogenous demand shocks. Liquidity providers do
not have an initial endowment in risky assets. We assume that each futures and ETF provider
has an initial endowment B10 and B
2
0 in the riskless asset, respectively. The market structure
is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Stock investors and liquidity providers have identical prior beliefs about stocks’ payoff f in
the second period, where f ∼ N (µ,Σ). At t = 1, they observe an unbiased public signal η =
f + eη, where eη ∼ N (0,Ση). Aside from the public signal, futures and ETF demand shocks
might also contain some information about the payoff in the second period. Specifically, we
assume that the futures demand shock is given by q f = τ1 f + e f , where e f ∼ N (0,σ2f ), and
the ETF demand shock by qet f = τ2 f +eet f , where eet f ∼N (0,σ2et f ). We further assume that
τ1 and τ2 are known to all agents, in particular to stock investors and liquidity providers.
Obviously, when τ1 and τ2 are zero, demand shocks are pure noise. When τ1 and τ2 are
non-zero, however, index traders possess superior information about future returns. Hence,
demand shocks provide valuable information about the payoff in the second period. Stock
investors and liquidity providers combine all of the information observed in the first period
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FIGURE 3.2: Market structure of the model.
This figure shows the structure of the model. There are three markets: the stock market, the ETF
market and the futures market. There are three types of investors. Index traders, assumed to be ex-
ogenous, generate demand shocks to the index derivatives market. Stock investors participate only
in the stock market. Futures and ETF liquidity providers (arbitrageurs) trade in both the stock market
and the derivatives market.
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Public signal is observed 
Demand shocks are observed 
New beliefs are formed 
Portfolio choices are made 
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FIGURE 3.3: Time line of the model.
This figure shows the sequence of events in the model. Before trading starts, investors have prior
beliefs about asset payoffs in the second period. In period 1, investors observe both the public signal
and the demand shocks, from which a new belief about the payoff in period 2 is formed. Investors
then build their portfolio based on their new beliefs. The equilibrium is reached in period 1, while the
payoffs are realized in period 2.
to form posterior beliefs. Applying Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief is f ∼N (µˆ,Σˆ), where
µˆ = Σˆ−1
(
Σ−1µ+Σ−1η η+
τ1
σ2f
q f +
τ2
σ2et f
qet f
)
,
Σˆ =
(
Σ−1+Σ−1η +
τ1τ
T
1
σ2f
+ τ2τ
T
2
σ2et f
)−1
.
After forming their posterior beliefs, investors select the portfolio that maximizes their utility.
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 3.3.
3.3.3 Investors’ Portfolio Choices
The stock prices in the first period are denoted by P . Let P f denote the futures price and Pet f
denote the ETF price in the first period. These are the prices that need to be determined in
equilibrium. We assume investors’ utility is exponential in terminal wealth W2,
U = E (exp(−γW2)) ,
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion. We assume the risk aversion for stock investors,
futures providers and ETF providers to be respectively γs , γ1 and γ2. Let Us , U1, U2 denote
the utility functions of these investors. As the payoffs of stocks and derivatives are normally
distributed, investors’ wealth as a linear combination of assets is also normally distributed.
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Accordingly, all investors’ utility is equivalent to a mean-variance utility:
U = E [W2]− γ
2
Var [W2] .
To determine equilibrium stock, futures and ETF prices, we solve the portfolio choice prob-
lem for each type of investor and then require markets to clear.
Let Xs denote stock investors’ stock holdings and B s1 their riskless asset holdings at t = 1.
Stock investors only trade stocks and bonds at t = 1. Their wealth must satisfy
W1 = PT Xs +B s1 =B s0+
PTQ
Ns
− 1
2
(Xs − Q
Ns
)TC (Xs − Q
Ns
), (3.1)
W2 = f T Xs +B s0−PT Xs +
PTQ
Ns
− 1
2
(Xs − Q
Ns
)TC (Xs − Q
Ns
). (3.2)
In the first period, in equation (3.1), the value of the portfolio (stocks and bonds) equals the
initial endowment minus trading costs, while in equation (3.2) in period 2, the value of the
portfolio is the sum of the stock price (which equals its payoff) and the value of bonds. Be-
cause the gross interest rate is assumed to be 1, the value of the bonds in the second period is
equal to their value in the first period and can be easily solved in equation (3.1) in terms of Xs
and P . Inserting W2 into the utility function and taking expectations using posterior beliefs
yields the following objective function for stock investors:
Us = µˆT Xs +B s0−PT (Xs −
Q
Ns
)− 1
2
(Xs − Q
Ns
)TC (Xs − Q
Ns
)− γs
2
X Ts ΣˆXs . (3.3)
The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to Xs is
∂Us
∂Xs
= µˆ−P −C (Xs − Q
Ns
)−γsΣˆXs = 0. (3.4)
Solving, the optimal investment in stocks is
X ∗s = (C +γsΣˆ)−1(µˆ−P +
1
Ns
CQ) . (3.5)
Stock investors take more aggressive positions in stocks when their expected return is high,
their price is low and their variance is low. In the presence of non-zero transaction costs, the
initial endowment Q also plays a role in determining optimal stock holdings. The higher the
transaction costs are, the closer the optimal position is to the initial holdings.
Consider now futures arbitrageurs’ portfolio choice. Let X1 denote their stock holdings, y
their futures holdings and B11 their riskless asset holdings in the first period. We further as-
sume that X1 = −bx, i.e., futures providers hedge their position by trading stocks in propor-
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tion to the index weight.5 Because futures represent an unfunded position, there is no cash
flow at t = 1. In period 2, the payoff per contract is f Tb−P f . Hence, futures traders’ wealth
satisfies
W1 = PTbx+0y +B11 =B10 −
1
2
bTCbx2− 1
2
c f y
2, (3.6)
W2 = f Tbx+ ( f Tb−P f )y +B10 −
1
2
bTCbx2−PTbx− 1
2
c f y
2 . (3.7)
In the first period, in equation (3.6), the value of the portfolio (stocks, bonds and futures)
equals the initial endowment minus trading costs. In equation (3.7), the wealth in period
2 is the sum of stocks’ payoff, the futures payoff ( f Tb −P f ) and the value of bonds. Using
posterior beliefs, futures providers try to maximize
U1 = (µˆ−P )Tbx+ (µˆTb−P f )y −
1
2
bTCbx2− γ1
2
bT Σˆb(x+ y)2− 1
2
c f y
2. (3.8)
The FOCs with respect to x and y are
∂U1
∂x
= (µˆ−P )Tb−bTCbx−γ1bT Σˆb(x+ y) , (3.9)
∂U1
∂y
= (µˆTb−P f )−γ1bT Σˆb(x+ y)− c f y . (3.10)
Solving and using the fact that X1 = bx, the optimal positions in stocks and futures are
X ∗1 =
c f µˆ
Tb+γ1bT ΣˆbP f − (γ1bT Σˆb+ c f )PTb
c f bTCb+ (bTCb+ c f )γ1bT Σˆb
b, (3.11)
y∗ = −(γ1b
T Σˆb+bTCb)P f +bTCbµˆTb+γ1bT ΣˆbPTb
c f bTCb+ (bTCb+ c f )γ1bT Σˆb
. (3.12)
The optimal positions in index futures and stocks are driven not only by their expected pay-
off µˆ but also by the price difference between futures and their underlying basket. When
stocks’ expected payoff is high, investors tend to buy more futures and stocks. When stocks
are overpriced compared to futures, investors take more aggressive long positions in futures
and short stocks more aggressively, and vice versa. Moreover, transaction costs also play a
role in determining the size of positions. Higher transaction costs for stocks lead to less ag-
gressive positions being taken in stocks, while higher futures’ trading costs result in less ag-
gressive holding in futures.
Turning to ETF traders, let X2 denote their stock holdings, z their ETF holdings and B21 their
riskless asset holdings in the first period. Because the ETF physically replicates the index, we
5This assumption simplifies the solution to the optimal choice problem. It is not a critical assumption.
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have X2 =−bz. For example, when ETF traders sell z units of the ETF to index investors (with
z < 0), they must buy −zb stocks to build the ETF. This assumption is in line with current
market practice in which most index ETFs physically replicate the index. Unlike writers of fu-
tures and other derivatives who can choose to hedge their positions only partially by trading
stocks, the full replication characteristic of ETFs implies a strict relationship between ETFs
and stock holdings for ETF traders. Accordingly, the wealth of ETF traders must satisfy
W1 = −PTbz+Pet f z+B21 =B20 −
1
2
bTCbz2− 1
2
ce f t z
2, (3.13)
W2 = B20 −
1
2
bTCbz2− 1
2
ce f t z
2+PTbz−Pet f z. (3.14)
In the first period, the budget constraint (3.13) requires portfolio holdings to be equal to the
initial endowment minus trading costs. In the second period, the payoffs of the stocks and
the ETF are identical. Because ETF providers take offsetting positions in the ETF and the
stocks, these two terms cancel out in equation (3.14). The wealth in the second period equals
the value of the bond holdings. ETF providers maximize
U2 =−(Pet f −PTb)z−
1
2
bTCbz2− 1
2
ce f t z
2. (3.15)
Because stocks’ payoffs offset the payoff of the ETF, posterior beliefs do not enter the objective
function.
The FOC with respect to z is
∂U2
∂z
= −Pet f −PTb− (bTCb+ ce f t )z . (3.16)
The optimal positions in stocks and the ETF are
X ∗2 =−
PTb−Pet f
bTCb+ cet f
b, (3.17)
z∗ = P
Tb−Pet f
bTCb+ cet f
. (3.18)
Optimal holdings in stocks are the optimal ETF holding multiplied by the index weight b.
Both ETF and stock holdings are determined by the price difference between these two assets.
When stock prices are high, ETF providers take more aggressive short positions in stocks and
a long position in the ETF and vice versa. Higher trading costs for stocks or the ETF decrease
the position size in both stocks and the ETF.
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3.3.4 Equilibrium Prices
Having solved the portfolio choice problems for all three types of investors in the previous
subsection, we can derive the equilibrium prices by requiring that the stock, futures and ETF
markets clear, i.e.,
NsX
∗
s +N1X ∗1 +N2X ∗2 =Q , (3.19)
N1y
∗+q f = 0, (3.20)
N2z
∗+qet f = 0. (3.21)
Inserting the optimal portfolio choice for all investors presented in equations (3.5), (3.11),
(3.12), (3.17) and (3.18) in the market clearing conditions, we show in Appendix 3.A that equi-
librium stock prices are given by:
P = µˆ+αD−1bq f +D−1bqet f +D−1
(
(C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I
)
Q , (3.22)
where D =Ns(C +γsΣˆ)−1+λbbT , α= γ1b
T Σˆb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb and λ=N1
(
c f + γ1b
T ΣˆbbTCb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
)
/a.
Equilibrium stock prices increase one for one with their expected payoff µˆ at t = 1 . In ad-
dition to expected stock returns, stock prices are affected by q f and qet f . Comparing the
coefficients for q f and qet f , we can see immediately that the impact of ETF and futures de-
mand shocks is the same up to scaling. Moreover, because 0≤α≤ 1, futures demand shocks
q f have a smaller impact on stock prices than ETF shocks q f . When there are transaction
costs, futures providers do not hedge their futures position completely with stocks, while ETF
providers are required to fully hedge their ETF holdings because of the full physical replica-
tion property. When there are no transaction costs for stocks (C = 0), futures traders also
hedge their futures positions perfectly using stocks. In this case, α = 1 and demand shocks
from the futures market and ETFs have the same price impact on stocks. However, whenever
C 6= 0, α< 1 and ETF demand shocks have a larger price impact than futures demand shocks.
We now investigate whether demand shocks affect both index and non-index stock prices.
We distinguish two cases. In the special case when stocks have independent liquidity (C is a
diagonal matrix) and independent posterior beliefs (Σˆ is a diagonal matrix), demand shocks
only impact index stocks. Non-index stock prices are the same as in the case without demand
shocks. When the demand shock is positive, the prices of all index stocks increase and vice
versa. This result is proved in Appendix 3.B. However, if the liquidity or posterior beliefs of
non-index stocks are correlated with those of index stocks, demand shocks may also affect
the prices of non-index stocks. For example, for a stock i (> k) that is not in the index, bi = 0.
However, the i th element of the vector D−1b could be non-zero; this could happen when
stock i has a non-zero cross term with one or more index stocks in matrices C , Σ or Ση. In
such a case, although stock i is not in the index, its price is also influenced by demand shocks
64 Chapter 3. How Index Futures and ETFs Increase Stock Return Correlations
that hit the index market. It is difficult to make a general statement about which non-index
stocks are affected. However, as long as the submatrix formed by taking the first k columns
and last N−k rows of matrixD−1 have non-zero elements,D−1b will have a non-zero element
for non-index stocks, and non-index stocks will also be affected by demand shocks in the ETF
and futures markets.
We now analyze the impact of demand shocks on risk premia. Risk premia are defined as
expected payoffs minus the prices growing at the risk-free rate. Plugging the equilibrium
price into equation (3.22) and using the fact that r = 1, we obtain the following expression for
risk premia:
E[ f −Pr ] = −αD−1bτT1 µˆ−D−1bτT2 µˆ−D−1
(
(C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I
)
Q . (3.23)
In the special case where liquidity and posterior beliefs are a diagonal matrix, index stocks
offer lower premia than in the case without demand shocks, while risk premia on non-index
stocks are unaffected. These premia respond differently because although stock investors
require risk premia to hold index stocks, arbitrageurs do not require risk premia from index
stocks when they trade stocks to reap arbitrage profits. Hence, risk premia offered by index
stocks decrease. Because non-index stocks do not play a role in arbitrageurs’ portfolio, both
stock investors and arbitrageurs require risk premia to hold non-index stocks. Thus, risk pre-
mia for non-index stocks are unaffacted. However, when non-index stocks have correlated
liquidity or fundamentals with index stocks, we cannot make a general statement regarding
the direction of the risk premia. Risk premia of non-index stocks are likely to be affected by
demand shocks as well.
3.3.5 Impact on Volatility and Correlations
When there are no demand shocks, equilibrium stock prices can be derived simply by setting
q f = 0 and qet f = 0 in equation (3.22). Denote P¯ the equilibrium stock price and µ¯ the pos-
terior belief without demand shocks. Equilibrium stock prices without demand shocks are
given by
P¯ = µ¯+D−1 ((C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I )Q . (3.24)
As can be seen in equation (3.22), in the presence of demand shocks, there are more sources
of uncertainty in equilibrium stock prices. However, the impact of these shocks on price
volatility and correlation is not obvious. First considering volatility, stock price volatility with-
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out and with demand shocks is given by
V (P¯ ) = V (µ¯) , (3.25)
V (P ) = V (µˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+α2σ2fD−1bbTD−1+σ2et fD−1bbTD−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+αCOV (µˆ,D−1bq f )+COV (µˆ,D−1bqet f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C )
.
(3.26)
Price volatility with demand shocks has three components. Part (A) represents the uncer-
tainty from the posterior belief. Part (B) is the uncertainty due to the variance of demand
shocks. Part (C) is the covariance between beliefs and demand shocks. It is not immediately
obvious which of the two volatility expressions in equations (3.25) and (3.26) is larger. We
can, however, compare these two quantities in the special case when demand shocks contain
pure noise, i.e., when τ1 and τ2 are zero. Because demand shocks do not convey information
about future payoffs, only the public signal is useful for updating the belief. Accordingly,
stock investors and arbitrageurs update their beliefs using
µˆ= Σˆ−1
(
Σ−1µ+Σ−1η η
)
.
It is obvious that in this special case, the posterior belief µˆ is equal to the posterior belief µ¯ in
the case where there are no demand shocks . Because demand shocks play no role in deter-
mining poster beliefs, COV(µˆ,D−1bqet f )= 0 and COV(µˆ,D−1bq f )= 0. Hence, we obtain the
following:
V (P )=V (P¯ )+α2σ2fD−1bbTD−1+σ2et fD−1bbTD−1 . (3.27)
Because α2σ2fD
−1bbTD−1 and σ2et fD
−1bbTD−1 are positive definite, the diagonal elements
of V (P ) are larger than those of V (P¯ ). Demand shocks simply add more noise to the price
when they contain no information, i.e., stock prices with demand shocks have higher volatil-
ity than prices without demand shocks.
However, if demand shocks contain some information about the payoff at t = 2, we cannot
make a definite statement about the direction of the volatility change because the additional
precision from having more information may compensate for the noise that demand shocks
add to stock prices. In other words, part (A) of the variance might decrease in the presence
of demand shocks, although part (B) of the variance is higher compared to the case without
demand shocks.
Turning now to correlations, without demand shocks on index products, stock prices are only
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correlated due to correlations in posterior beliefs about their payoffs. To be more precise,
COV (P¯i , P¯ j )=COV (µ¯i , µ¯ j ) . (3.28)
When the posterior expectations for stocks i and j are correlated, their prices are correlated.
Because posterior beliefs combine both ex-ante beliefs and the public signal, and µ is con-
stant, the covariance between µ¯i and µ¯ j is determined by the public signal.
In the presence of demand shocks, correlations are also driven by stocks’ exposures to de-
mand shocks. However, it is not clear whether demand shocks cause correlations to increase
or decrease because demand shocks not only enter as additional factors in equilibrium prices
but also affect posterior beliefs. We can only make unambiguous predictions in the special
case when Σ−1 and Σ−1η are diagonal matrices and the demand shocks are composed of pure
noise. Formally, in this case, the prices of two stocks i and j can be written as
Pi = µi +a2ηi +a3q f +a4qet f +a5Q , (3.29)
P j = µ j +b2η j +b3q f +b4qet f +b5Q . (3.30)
Because ηi and η j are not correlated, correlation only arises from the common exposure to
q f and qet f . If both stocks have positive (negative) loadings on demand shocks, then both
stocks have a correlation that exceeds the correlation without demand shocks (which is zero
because the fundamentals are uncorrelated). Otherwise, they will be negatively correlated.
3.4 Empirical Tests
The model in Section 3.3 demonstrates that demand shocks to index ETFs and futures affect
stocks’ equilibrium prices and their correlations. Hence, demand shocks should also play a
role in the correlation structure of stock returns. In this section, we investigate the relation-
ship between futures and ETF demand shocks and stock return correlations. Because broad-
based futures and ETFs are likely to affect stock return correlations as a whole, we focus on
their impact at an aggregate level rather than on specific pairwise correlations.
3.4.1 Data
We obtain the composition of the S&P 500 index from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Daily S&P 500 constituents’ stock prices, shares outstanding and trading vol-
ume are also from CRSP. For non-S&P 500 stocks, we use those stocks for which CRSP pro-
vides beta estimates and that have a market capitalization of at least 100 million dollars and
a share price of at least 5 dollars. Our sample comprises 5880 stocks. We also obtain price,
trading volume and shares outstanding from CRSP for the three largest ETFs that track S&P
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500 stocks, namely SPY, IVV and VOO. For futures, we collect daily futures prices and trading
volume from Bloomberg. Because futures were first introduced on April 21, 1982, we choose
the period from April 1982 to December 2012 for the analysis considering all futures. For the
analysis based on legacy futures, we consider the period from April 1982 to August 1997, as
legacy futures were gradually replaced by E-mini futures after 1997. For the analysis based on
E-mini futures, we investigate the period from September 1997 to December 2012. Finally,
for ETFs, we analyze the period from January 1993, when SPY was introduced, to December
2012.
Although sector ETFs constructed to reflect broad industries are available, our analysis only
considers ETFs on the S&P 500 index because sector ETFs are roughly only half of the size of
S&P 500 index ETFs, so their impact on aggregate correlations should be much smaller than
that of S&P 500 ETFs.
3.4.2 Correlation among Stocks
Because our focus is to find evidence of the impact of index demand shocks at an aggregate
level and not to investigate whether this impact differs across stocks, we follow Pollet and
Wilson (2010) and study a measure of aggregate stock return correlation. To be more precise,
for each month t , we compute the S&P 500 average (value weighted) correlation using daily
stock returns as follows:
ρt = Σ500i=1Σ500j=1wi tw j tρi j t , (3.31)
where ρi j t is the Pearson stock return correlation between stocks i and j , and wi t and w j t
are their weights in month t . This average correlation ρt lies between -1 and 1 and will be 1
when all pairwise stock returns are perfectly correlated.
We choose to compute correlations at a monthly frequency to have a reasonable number
of observations, given that we only have 15 years of data for E-mini futures; however, the
results presented below are robust if we use quarterly correlations. Unlike rolling windows,
using non-overlapping windows avoids the problem of having a few observations that affect
m consecutive periods, with m being the window span. For example, if we compute 1-year
rolling correlations, the correlation jumps on October 19, 1987, due to the market crash and
remains high for an entire year, with a peak almost a year later on September 29, 1988. The
rolling correlation only returns to its pre-cash level two years after the crash. By contrast,
the monthly correlation returns to its pre-crash level a few months after the crash. We follow
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) and calculate the monthly S&P 500 volatility using
daily returns during the month. Letting Nt denote the number of trading days, the sample
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FIGURE 3.4: Average correlation and realized volatility over time.
Panel A shows the monthly average correlation of S&P 500 stocks and S&P 500 realized volatility over
time. Panel B compares the average correlation of high-beta stocks and low-beta stocks over time.
volatility of the S&P 500 index for a given month t is
SPVolt =
(
Σ
Nt
i=1r
2
i t +2ΣNt−1i=1 ri t ri+1,t
) 1
2
, (3.32)
where ri t is the S&P 500 daily return on day i of month t . The cross term is included to control
for return auto-correlation.
Figure 3.4 reports monthly value weighted average correlations among S&P 500 stocks and
monthly S&P 500 realized volatility during the sample period. As can be seen in Panel A, the
average correlation usually lies between 10 and 60 percent. Towards the end of the sample
period, the average correlation was at historically high levels, with three recent bursts of cor-
relation, namely the Lehman default, the Flash Crash and the downgrade of United States
sovereign debt by Standard and Poor’s. These high correlations were matched in intensity
only during the 1987 market crash. Figure 3.4 also shows that correlations move mostly in
the same direction as volatility over time. For example, during the market crash in 1987, both
volatility and correlation spike. High volatility and correlation can also be observed during
the recent financial crisis, when volatility reaches 77% and the average correlation jumps to
73%. However, the average level of correlation had been gradually increasing over the previ-
ous ten years; it has remained high after the crisis, despite the fact that volatility has returned
to a low level. This result shows that even though correlation levels ebb and flow with volatil-
ity cycles, correlations can sometimes decouple from volatility.
As our model shows that correlations between non-index stocks are also affected by demand
shocks to index derivatives, we also compute the average correlation of non-S&P 500 stocks.
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However, non-index stocks are not directly included in the index and also have correlated
fundamentals with index stocks. Hence, non-index stocks would play a hedging role in in-
vestors’ portfolios. The price of these stocks would also change because they hedge investors’
positions in the affected securities.
Due to the large number of non-S&P 500 stocks, we further divide these stocks into two
equally sized groups according to their market beta. Stocks with high market beta are grouped
in the high-beta category, while stocks with lower market beta are included in the low-beta
group. Similar to the computation of the S&P 500 correlation, we obtain the average corre-
lations within the high and low beta groups using equation (3.31), where the weight wi t is
given by the market capitalization of stock i divided by the total market capitalization of its
group.
Panel B of Figure 3.4 indicates that the evolution of correlations among non-index stocks over
time is similar to that of S&P 500 stocks. Furthermore, the average correlations of the high
and low beta groups move together over time. Stocks with higher beta have higher average
correlations with each other than stocks with lower beta.
3.4.3 Construction of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables
We use the monthly average correlation ρt as the dependent variable. Because this correla-
tion measure, computed in Section 3.4.2, lies between -1 and 1, we perform a Fisher transfor-
mation to obtain a modified correlation measure that takes values on the entire real line,
ρ¯t = 1
2
ln
(
1+ρt
1−ρt
)
. (3.33)
This modified correlation ρ¯t is a strictly monotone transform of the actual correlation and
is employed as the dependent variable in our empirical analysis. The modified correlation
is close to the average Pearson correlation ρt when the latter lies between -0.5 and 0.5. For
larger values, the Fisher transform might result in modified correlations exceeding 1.
Because the dependent variable is computed at a monthly frequency, all explanatory vari-
ables are also constructed for each month. The results in Section 3.3 indicate that correla-
tions in stock prices are related to demand shocks to index products. However, these demand
shocks are not directly observable and are hard to disentangle from other sources of trading
activity. As a proxy for demand shocks, we use the ratio of the dollar trading volume of index
futures or ETFs to the aggregate dollar trading volume of S&P 500 stocks during each month:
Trading Ratio= ETF (futures) dollar trading volume
S&P 500 dollar trading volume
.
This ratio directly compares the volume in both markets and has several advantages. First,
using dollar trading volume automatically controls for the size of the contract. Contract sizes
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for E-mini futures, legacy futures and ETFs are currently 50, 250 and 1/10, respectively. Sec-
ond, dividing ETF or futures volume by the dollar trading volume of the S&P 500 controls for
other potential drivers of comovement. For example, Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005)
argue that investors trade stocks based on the ’category view’ or ’habit view’, i.e., they buy or
sell all stocks that they consider to be in the same category. If stocks are correlated for that
reason, the aggregate stock trading volume of the stocks will be high and our trading ratio
will tend to be lower. Third, the trading ratio is likely to increase in the presence of a demand
shock that hits only index products. When a demand shock hits both the stock market and
index products, the ratio does not necessarily increase. Hence, the ratio constitutes a good
proxy for demand shocks that hit only the index derivatives market.6
The literature explaining the time variation of average stock market correlations is sparse and
has only identified a few factors that might explain stock return correlations. We incorporate
these factors as well as several economic variables that are commonly used in explaining
stock returns and volatilities as controls in our analysis. We now describe the stock market,
bond market and macroeconomic variables that we use.
From the stock market, we include the realized volatility SPVolt and the current month re-
turn for the S&P 500 because there is evidence that correlations increase in bear markets and
volatile markets (see, for example, Longin and Solnik (1995) and Ang and Chen (2002)).
From the bond market, we include the 3 month treasury bill rate and the default spread.
During our sample period, the interest rate is not stationary, and thus the difference in the
interest rate is taken as the independent variable. As the default spread, we use the yield
difference between AAA bonds and BAA bonds from CRSP; their difference has historically
been a good indicator of whether the economy was in recession or expansion.
We also include several macroeconomic variables such as industrial production growth, pol-
icy uncertainty, inflation and sentiment. We include these quantities because correlations
have been found to depend on the phase of the business cycle and are high during recessions
(Ledoit, Santa-Clara, and Wolf (2003) and Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1994)). We collect data
on the growth rate of US industrial production to control for growth in the economy. Com-
pared with GDP growth, industrial production has the advantage of being available monthly.
Because the impact of economic growth might be reflected slowly in financial markets, we
use the following variable in the regression:
∆IndustrialProductiont = log
(
Σti=t−11IndustrialProductioni
)−log(Σt−11j=t−23IndustrialProduction j ) .
Basically, we take the log difference between industrial production during the last 12 months
and that during the prior 12 months. The impact of policy uncertainty on different economic
variables such as growth, inflation and investment has been studied extensively in the liter-
ature (see Bloom (2009), Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2010), and Jones and Olson (2013)
6 For ETFs, an alternative way to compare trading activity for the index ETF market and the underlying mar-
ket is to compute turnover. Using the turnover ratio, we find results similar to those reported below; therefore,
they are omitted for brevity.
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among others). Because increased policy uncertainty negatively affects the stock market, it
might increase stock return correlations. We obtain the policy uncertainty index from the
website by Baker, Bloom and Davis. Inflation has an impact on stock returns. The previ-
ous literature finds a negative relationship between stock returns and inflation in the short
term, but this relationship becomes positive in the long term (see Jaffe and Mandelker (1976)
and Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) for an example). Regardless of the sign of this impact,
inflation is likely to have a similar impact on all stocks and thus to increase stock return cor-
relations. We take the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and
use the inflation rate as the independent variable. The inflation rate inflationt is computed
as the logarithm of the ratio of CPI values at t and t −1. We also include market sentiment,
which is obtained from Baker and Wurgler’s website. Their sentiment index is based on the
common variation in six underlying proxies for sentiment. Sentiment is found to have an
impact on the cross-section of stock returns (see Baker and Wurgler (2006), for example). For
example, when sentiment is low, subsequent returns are higher for newly listed, more volatile
and unprofitable stocks. Although sentiment’s impact on stock returns varies, we still include
it as a control variable.
The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 3.1 and their correlations in
Table 3.2. As can be seen in Table 3.1, average stock return correlations are highest for index
stocks and lowest for low-beta non-index stocks. Transformed correlations are on average
close to Pearson correlations, but with much higher maximum values and skewness.
[Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 about here]
As can been seen from the first column of Table 3.2, the average stock return correlation is
highly correlated with volatility, with a correlation of 62 percent. Its correlation with the other
variables is generally much lower.
3.4.4 Hypotheses and Regression Specification
The goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether index demand shocks affect stock
return correlations. As demonstrated in Section 3.3.5, these demand shocks should affect
both index and non-index stocks. Accordingly, in our empirical analysis, we test the following
three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. ETF and futures trading activity affects the correlations of S&P 500 stocks.
Hypothesis 2. ETF and futures trading activity affects the correlations of non-S&P 500 stocks.
Hypothesis 3. ETF trading activity has a stronger impact on correlations than futures trading
activity.
Before estimating the regressions to test the hypotheses, it is necessary to test the stationarity
of all the variables to avoid making spurious inferences. To do so, we employ the Augmented
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Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test with a lag selected based on the Schwarz information criterion. The
values of the ADF test are reported in Table 3.1. The ADF test confirms the stationarity of
average correlation ρ¯t and realized monthly volatility SPVolt .
However, the trading ratios for ETFs, futures and E-mini futures are found to be non-stationary.7
We use three approaches to remove the non-stationarity of the trading ratios. The first is to
subtract the average value during the previous year from the raw series. The resulting trad-
ing ratios are stationary. The second is to take the log of the growth in the trading ratio, i.e.,
log
(
TradingRatiot
TradingRatiot−1
)
, to obtain a stationary time series. The third is to fit an ARIMA model with
order selected using the Schwarz information criterion. The fitted ratio reflects activity that
is forecastable but highly variable across months, while the residual of the time series repre-
sents the unexpected trading ratio, which we use as a regressor in our analysis. Although the
results are the weakest when we use the trading ratios constructed using the second method,
they are similar across methods. In the following, we therefore only report the results ob-
tained when using the residual fitted using the ARIMA model.
As a benchmark, we first run a regression that only includes all control variables:
ρ¯t = β0+β1SPVolt +β2CurrentReturnt +β3∆3MonthTbillt +β4CreditSpreadt
+β5Termspreadt +β6∆IndustrialProductiont +β7Inflationt +β8PolicyUncertaintyt
+β9ρ¯t−1+εt . (3.34)
The variance inflation factor is below 5, suggesting that there is no multicollinearity issue
with this specification.
We then add our proxy for demand shocks as an explanatory variable, i.e., estimate the re-
gression
ρ¯t = β0+β1∆IndexTradingt +β2SPVolt +β3CurrentReturnt +β4∆3MonthTbillt
+β5CreditSpreadt +β6Termspreadt +β7∆IndustrialProductiont +β8Inflationt
+β9PolicyUncertaintyt +β10ρ¯t−1+εt . (3.35)
The coefficient β1 measures the impact of index trading activity on stocks’ average correla-
tions. A significant and positive β1 is evidence that index trading activity affects these corre-
lations.
7Using the Zivot and Andrews unit root test, which allows for a structural break in the time series, gives
similar results.
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3.4.5 Results for S&P 500 Stocks
The estimation results for regressions (3.34) and (3.35) when using the average correlation of
S&P 500 stocks are reported in Table 3.3. We use four different trading ratios as explanatory
variables: all futures (sum of legacy and E-mini futures), legacy futures, ETFs and E-mini fu-
tures. Because these index products were introduced at different points in time, we perform
the estimation for different time periods as reported in the header row in the table.
[Table 3.3 about here]
The coefficient of realized volatility is significant and positive in all regressions. This result
is consistent with the observation in Section 3.4.2 that the average correlation and volatility
generally move in the same direction.8
Although their significance is lower than that of volatility, other variables also affect average
correlations. Specifically, a negative current market return is associated with higher average
correlation. This result is in line with the observation that stocks are more strongly corre-
lated during market turmoil. The coefficient of the credit spread is significantly positive in
one of the subperiods, reflecting the fact that a higher spread reflects weak macroeconomic
conditions, which tend to be associated with higher correlations. The results in Table 3.3 also
confirm the intuition that the inflation rate is high when stock return correlations are high
because inflation affects most stocks in a similar way. Indeed, the coefficient for Inflationt
is significantly positive for two of the subperiods. As expected, policy uncertainty is signifi-
cantly positively related to average correlations. Other controls such as the T-bill rate, senti-
ment and industrial production are insignificant.
Focusing now on the trading ratios, we see that all trading ratios are significantly and posi-
tively related to average correlations. The coefficient is the highest for ETFs at 3.748, which
is consistent with the model’s prediction that demand shocks to ETFs should have a stronger
impact because of physical replication. The coefficient for E-mini futures is around 0.612,
much higher than the coefficient for legacy futures, which is 0.103. This difference is prob-
ably due to the fact that legacy futures are floor-based, and there are delays in execution.
Therefore, the arbitrage relationship between E-mini futures and the underlying stocks is
more likely to hold for E-mini futures than for legacy futures. In other words, a demand shock
to E-mini futures is more likely to lead to arbitrage activity between the E-mini futures and
the stock market than a shock to the legacy futures market. In the last column of Table 3.3,
both ETFs and futures are included in the regression. It turns out that trading activity in both
markets has a significant positive impact on average stock correlations.
When comparing the R2 of the benchmark regression and the combined regression for the
period during which only legacy futures are traded, the increase in R2 achieved by adding
8We also estimate the regression using VIX as a measure of index volatility and find similar results, which
are not reported for brevity.
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futures trading activity is only approximately 1.3 percent. But for the entire period and peri-
ods when E-mini futures and ETFs are traded, including futures and ETF trading activity can
lead to a large increase in R2. The increase in R2 is around 4 percent for the entire sample, 9
percent for the E-mini sample, and 17 percent for the ETF sample. Overall, the results show
that a large part of the time variation in index stock correlations can be explained by index
trading activity. This result holds even when controlling for a wide set of variables that are
known to affect correlations.
3.4.6 Results for Non-S&P 500 Stocks
We now investigate whether futures and ETF trading activity also explains the time variation
in correlations of non-index stocks. To accomplish this investigation, we run the benchmark
regression (3.34) as well as the combined regression (3.35) using the average correlation of
non-S&P 500 stocks as the independent variable. We categorize non-S&P 500 stocks into
two groups according to their beta, i.e., build a high beta group and a low beta group. The
regression results are reported in Table 3.4 for high-beta stocks and Table 3.5 for low-beta
stocks.
[Table 3.4 about here]
[Table 3.5 about here]
As expected, the coefficients of the control variables have the same sign as for index stocks.
In general, a higher correlation is associated with higher volatility, a lower current month
return, a higher credit spread, lower industrial production growth, higher inflation and more
policy uncertainty. One exception is that the credit spread is negatively associated with the
correlation of high and low beta stocks for the period when legacy futures are traded (see
Table 3.4 and 3.5) because during 1982-1997, correlations spiked during the 1987 crash, while
the credit spread remained low in October 1987. Black Friday had a substantial impact on
the relation between the correlation and the credit spread. During other periods, the credit
spread is more likely to be positively linked with correlation, echoing the positive significant
coefficients observed for other periods.
Although non-S&P stocks are not included in the index, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that their
correlations can in part be explained by trading activity in index products. Except for the
time period 1982-1997, when only floor-based futures were traded, the coefficient of index
trading activity is significantly positive. The t-statistics are especially high for E-mini futures
as well as for ETFs. Moreover, as was the case for index stocks, ETFs have higher coefficients
than E-mini and floor-based futures. The coefficient for ETFs is above 2, while it is around
0.5 for E-mini futures. Turning to R2, for the entire period, the increase in R2 achieved by
adding futures trading activity as an explanatory variable is only approximately 1 percent.
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Surprisingly, as the last row of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest, incorporating E-mini futures and
ETF trading ratios significantly increases R2 by 6 to 9 percent. Summarizing, trading activity
in index products such as ETFs and E-mini futures is also important in explaining the time
variation of non-index stocks’ correlations. These results might appear to be surprising but
are in line with the predictions of the model presented in Section 3.3.
Although index trading activity affects the correlations of both index and non-index stocks,
one would expect the magnitude of the impact to differ between groups. To examine this
hypothesis, we pool all monthly correlations (for index stocks, high beta stocks and low beta
stocks) together in one regression. We also introduce a dummy variable Iindex that indicates
whether the observation relates to index stocks or not along with an interaction term Iindex ·
∆IndexTradingi . Formally, we estimate the following regression:
ρ¯i = β0+β1∆IndexTradingi +β2Iindex +β3Iindex ·∆IndexTradingi +β4SPVoli
+β5CurrentReturni +β6∆3MonthTbilli +β7CreditSpreadi +β8Termspreadi
+β9Inflationi +β10∆IndustrialProductioni +β11PolicyUncertaintyi +εi . (3.36)
Coefficient β3 measures the differential sensitivity of S&P stock correlations to index trading
activity compared with non-index stocks. The results for different subperiods are presented
in Table 3.6.
[Table 3.6 about here]
As can be seen in Table 3.6, index trading activity has a significant impact on correlations.
Moreover, the coefficient for the index dummy is significantly positive, indicating that index
stock correlations are significantly higher than non-index stock correlations. This result is in
line with Figure 3.4, where the correlations of index stocks are higher than those of non-index
stocks. More importantly, the interaction term Iindex ·∆IndexTradingi is significantly positive
for E-mini futures and ETFs showing that these two types of index products have a higher
impact on index stock correlations than on the correlations of non-index stocks. In other
words, index stock return correlations are more sensitive to changes in index trading activity.
When using trading activity in all futures, Iindex ·∆IndexTradingi is significant at the 10% level,
confirming that futures (both floor-based and Emini) have a higher impact on index stocks
than on non-index stocks.
Summarizing, the results in this section show that index trading activity also affects the corre-
lation of non-index stocks. The impact, however, is found to be lower than for index stocks.9
9A similar comparison can be performed to test whether index trading activity has a differential impact on
high beta and low beta stocks. The results, however, suggest that there is no significant difference between these
two groups of stocks.
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3.4.7 Are Correlations Excessive?
The previous section finds that index trading activity is positively associated with correla-
tions. A natural question is whether the increased return comovement reflects the faster in-
corporation of common information or "excessive" price movements due to non-fundamental
shocks. The answer to this question depends on whether demand shocks consist of pure
noise or contain some information about the economy that the market has not yet incor-
porated into stock prices. In this section, to distinguish between these two possibilities, we
follow the idea of Da and Shive (2012) and examine the relationship between return reversals
and correlations.
In the first step, for every month t , we run the following regression for all stocks in the S&P
500 index
r ji t = a
j
t +b jt r ji−1,t +ε
j
i t ,
where r ji t denotes stock j ’s return on day i in a given month t . The coefficient b
j
t measures
stock j ’s return today relative to its return on the previous day. In the presence of a non-
fundamental shock, the stock price might overshoot and then revert back to a level that is in
line with its fundamentals on the next day. Therefore, a high level of return reversals indicates
that returns are often driven by non-fundamental shocks. We then sum the b jt of all stocks
weighted according to their market capitalization to obtain an aggregate measure of return
reversals for a given month t :
bt =Σ500j=1w j tb jt .
Equipped with this measure of return reversals, we test whether higher return reversals are
associated with greater return correlations by regressing bt on average correlations:
bt =α0+α1ρ¯t +α2bt−1+εt . (3.37)
The idea is that ifα1 is significantly negative, then a higher correlation is associated with more
return reversals. In this case, correlation is likely to be excessive. As can be seen from Panel
A in Table 3.7, where the regression results are reported, α1 is significantly negative for all
subperiods, except for 1982-1997 when only legacy futures were traded. The results provide
support that correlations could be excessive.
[Table 3.7 about here]
In the second step, we test the conjecture that more return reversals are also related to index
trading activity. We run the following regression:
bt =β0+β1IndexTradingt +β2bt−1+εt .
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As reported in Panel B of Table 3.7, return reversals are significantly associated with futures
(sum of E-mini and floor-based futures) and ETF trading activity. For E-mini futures, the
results are weaker, but the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent
level. The regressions essentially confirm that higher index trading activity is associated with
more return reversals.
Summarizing, correlations are found to have a significant relationship with return reversals,
suggesting that they are excessive. Examining the relation between index trading activity and
return reversals, we find that index trading activity is a significant driver of return reversals.
3.5 Conclusion
In the traditional theory, stock returns are correlated due to the correlation of their funda-
mentals. In this paper, we challenge this view by providing theoretical and empirical evi-
dence that index trading activity affects average stock return correlations. Our contribution
is two-fold. First, we develop an equilibrium model to investigate how ETF and futures de-
mand shocks affect equilibrium stock prices and their correlations. Second, we empirically
test whether demand shocks to index products increase stock return correlations. Our results
confirm that index trading activity, a proxy for demand shocks, can explain a large part of the
time variation in stock return correlations.
The most striking finding in this paper is that the correlations of non-index stocks are also
significantly related to index trading activity: trading in index products not only increases
the correlations of index stocks but also those of non-index stocks. When comparing the
impact of index product trading on index and non-index stocks, in line with our intuition,
we find that the correlations of index stocks are more sensitive to changes in index trading
activity than those of non-index stocks. Furthermore, we find that despite their lower dollar
trading volume, ETFs have a higher impact on correlations than futures, both theoretically
and empirically.
A natural extension would be to generalize our two-period model to multiple periods. A
multi-period set-up has the advantage of allowing changes in stock prices (returns) to be
linked with demand shocks. However, in a multi-period model with demand shocks, the co-
efficient of equilibrium stock prices solves a quadratic equation and has multiple equilibria.
More specifically, the number of solutions of such a model would be 2N , where N is the num-
ber of assets.
78 Chapter 3. How Index Futures and ETFs Increase Stock Return Correlations
APPENDIX
3.A Derivation of Equilibrium Prices
From Section 3.3.3, to derive the equilibrium price, we insert the expressions for the optimal
portfolios into the market clearing conditions. Stock investors’ optimal portfolio is given by
X ∗s = (C +γsΣˆ)−1(µˆ−P +
1
Ns
CQ). (3.38)
For futures arbitrageurs, the optimal positions in stocks and futures are respectively
X ∗1 =
c f µˆ
Tb+γ1bT ΣˆbP f − (γ1bT Σˆb+ c f )PTb
c f bTCb+ (bTCb+ c f )γ1bT Σˆb
b, (3.39)
y∗ = −(γ1b
T Σˆb+bTCb)P f +bTCbµˆTb+γ1bT ΣˆbPTb
c f bTCb+ (bTCb+ c f )γ1bT Σˆb
. (3.40)
For ETF providers, the optimal positions in stocks and the ETF are
X ∗2 =−
PTb−Pet f
bTCb+ cet f
b, (3.41)
z∗ = P
Tb−Pet f
bTCb+ cet f
. (3.42)
Equilibrium in ETF and futures markets requires
N1y
∗+q f = 0, (3.43)
N2z
∗+qet f = 0. (3.44)
Inserting the optimal portfolio positions (3.38)-(3.42) in the market clearing conditions yields
−(γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb)P f +bTCbµˆTb+γ1bT ΣˆbPTb
c f bTCb+ (bTCb+ c f )γ1bT Σˆb
=− q f
N1
, (3.45)
PTb−Pet f
bTCb+ cet f
=−qet f
N2
. (3.46)
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Using these conditions, we can express the equilibrium futures and ETF prices in terms of
demand shocks and the stocks prices as
P f =
q f
N1
a+bTCbµˆTb+γ1bT ΣˆbPTb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
, (3.47)
Pet f =PTb+
qet f
N2
(bTCb+ cet f ) , (3.48)
where a ≡ c f bTCb + (bTCb + c f )γ1bT Σˆb. The optimal investment in stocks can then be
expressed solely in terms of demand shocks and stock prices,
X ∗1 =
c f µˆ
Tb+γ1bT Σˆb
q f
N1
a+bTCbµˆT b+γ1bT ΣˆbPT b
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb − (γ1b
T Σˆb+ c f )PTb
a
b
= γ1b
T Σˆb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
q f
N1
b+
(
c f + γ1b
T ΣˆbbTCb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
)
bbT
a
(µˆ−P ) , (3.49)
X ∗2 =
qet f
N2
b . (3.50)
Inserting the optimal stock investment into the stock market equilibrium condition, we have
Ns(C +γsΣˆ)−1(µˆ−P + 1
Ns
CQ)+N1 γ1b
T Σˆb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
q f
N1
b
+
N1
(
c f + γ1b
T ΣˆbbTCb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
)
bbT
a
(µˆ−P )+N2
qet f
N2
b =Q . (3.51)
Simplifying and defining α= γ1bT Σˆb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb and λ=
N1
a
(
c f + γ1b
T ΣˆbbTCb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
)
, we have
Ns(C +γsΣˆ)−1(µˆ−P + 1
Ns
CQ)+N1α
q f
N1
b+λbbT (µˆ−P )+N2
qet f
N2
b =Q . (3.52)
Solving, equilibrium stock prices are given by
P = µˆ+αD−1bq f +D−1bqet f +D−1
(
(C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I
)
Q , (3.53)
whereD =Ns(C+γsΣˆ)−1+λbbT . The equilibrium futures and ETF prices can be obtained by
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inserting equilibrium stock prices into equations (3.47) and (3.48)
P f =
q f
N1
a+bTCbµˆTb
γ1bT Σˆb+bTCb
+γ1αbT
(
µˆ+αD−1bq f +D−1bqet f +D−1
(
(C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I
)
Q
)
Pet f = bT
(
µˆ+αD−1bq f +D−1bqet f +D−1
(
(C +γsΣˆ)−1C − I
)
Q
)+ qet f
N2
(bTCb+ cet f ) .
3.B Impact of Demand Shocks on Prices in a Special Case
In this section, we prove that in the special case when stocks have independent liquidity (C is
a diagonal matrix) and investors have independent posterior beliefs (Σˆ is a diagonal matrix),
demand shocks only impact index stocks. In other words, we prove that D−1b has elements
larger than or equal to zero for stocks included in the index and zero entries for non-index
stocks whenC and Σˆ are diagonal matrices.
Let B denote the matrix λbbT . Since b only has non-zero entries for the first k stocks which
are included in the index, B can be written as a block matrix: B =
(
B1 0
0 0
)
, where B1 is a
k×k matrix. It can be proved that B is a positive semi-definite matrix.
Define A = Ns(C +γsΣˆ)−1. Since C and Σˆ are positive definite diagonal matrices, A is also
a positive definite diagonal matrix. We can decompose A into two diagonal matrices as(
A1 0
0 A2
)
, where A1 and A2 are of dimension k ×k and N −k ×N −k, respectively. D−1b
can be written in terms of A and B :
D−1b = (A+B )−1b =
(
(B1+ A1)−1 0
0 A−12
)
b . (3.54)
Because the (k + 1)th to N th elements of b are zero (these are the weights for non-index
stocks), from equation (3.54), it follows that D−1b also has zero entries for elements k + 1
to N which are the coefficients for non-index stocks.
We need to prove that the first k entries ofD−1b are larger than or equal to zero. Let D¯ denote
the adjugate matrix of D , the inverse of D can be written in terms of the adjugate matrix as
follows
D−1 = 1
det(D)
D¯ , (3.55)
where D¯i j = (−1)i+ j det
(
(Dk,h)1≤k 6= j≤N ,1≤h 6=i≤N
)
.
The i th element of D−1b can also be computed using the adjugate matrix as follows
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1
det(D)
N∑
j=1
D¯i jb j = 1
det(D)
det

B11+ A11 B12 .. B1,i−1 b1 B1,i+1... B1n
B21 B22+ A22 .. B2,i−1 b2 B2,i+1... B2n
...
Bn1 Bn2 .. Bn,i−1 bn Bn,i+1... Bnn + Ann

= 1
det(D)λbi
det

B11+ A11 B12 .. B1,i−1 B1,i B1,i+1... B1n
B21 B22+ A22 .. B2,i−1 B2,i B2,i+1... B2n
...
Bn1 Bn2 .. Bn,i−1 Bn,i Bn,i+1... Bnn + Ann

= 1
det(D)λbi
det

BT +

A11
... A22 ...
...
... Ai−1 ...
... 0 ...
... Ai+1 ..
..
... Ann


≥ 0 .
The last inequality follows from the fact that the determinant of a positive semi-definite ma-
trix is larger than or equal to zero. Hence, D−1b has positive or zero entries for index stocks.
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All Futures 1982-2012 Legacy 1982-1997 Emini 1997-2012 ETFs 1993-2012
∆AllFuturesRatiot 0.241 0.176
(3.805) (4.650)
∆LegacyFuturesRatiot 0.103
(2.123)
∆EminiFuturesRatiot 0.612
(7.407)
∆ETFRatiot 3.748 3.295
(7.447) (6.544)
SPVolt 2.648 2.824 3.703 3.889 1.559 1.307 1.839 0.819 0.882
(6.185) (6.352) (11.367) (14.190) (2.405) (2.440) (2.971) (2.272) (2.637)
CurrentReturnt -0.527 -0.370 -0.100 -0.022 -0.752 -0.444 -0.741 -0.142 -0.061
(-3.293) (-2.348) (-0.443) (-0.093) (-3.717) (-2.173) (-4.173) (-0.783) (-0.345)
∆3MonthTbillt -0.002 -0.000 0.014 0.011 -0.007 0.008 -0.010 0.039 0.038
(-0.089) (-0.002) (0.663) (0.592) (-0.079) (0.098) (-0.131) (0.772) (0.729)
CreditSpreadt 0.019 0.010 0.006 -0.002 0.032 0.051 0.033 0.074 0.079
(0.926) (0.453) (0.388) (-0.177) (0.855) (1.590) (0.867) (2.755) (3.053)
∆IndustrialProductiont 0.122 0.160 -0.449 -0.386 0.678 0.840 0.624 0.469 0.572
(0.317) (0.373) (-1.080) (-0.853) (1.150) (1.684) (1.111) (0.952) (1.279)
Inflationt 7.904 6.037 16.733 13.896 2.254 -1.046 4.125 2.019 1.847
(2.404) (1.874) (3.172) (2.660) (0.476) (-0.243) (0.979) (0.654) (0.636)
PolicyUncertaintyt - - - - 0.092 0.085 0.080 0.082 0.079
- - - - (1.652) (1.685) (1.486) (2.483) (2.356)
ρ¯t−1 0.419 0.434 0.286 0.294 0.383 0.423 0.420 0.478 0.474
(7.750) (8.333) (5.784) (5.652) (3.881) (5.066) (5.108) (9.889) (10.226)
Adjusted R2 0.539 0.578 0.671 0.684 0.481 0.574 0.557 0.724 0.734
TABLE 3.3: Regression results for S&P 500 stocks.
The table reports the estimated coefficients from regressing the average correlation of index stocks
on different explanatory variables including index trading activity, monthly realized volatility, the
current month market return, the 3-month treasury bill rate, the credit spread, the growth in indus-
trial production, inflation and policy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty is only available since 1985,
thus it is only employed for the periods 1993-2012 and 1997-2012. The t-statistics shown in paren-
theses are based on Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. The coefficients for sentiment are
not reported, as this variable is only available until 2010. We run the regression for the subperiod
until 2010 and find that sentiment is not significant. For brevity, the results including sentiment
are not reported.
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All Futures 1982-2012 Legacy 1982-1997 Emini 1997-2012 ETFs 1993-2012
∆AllFuturesRatiot 0.173 0.183
(2.428) (2.743)
∆LegacyFuturesRatiot 0.013
(0.281)
∆EminiFuturesRatiot 0.615
(7.921)
∆ETFRatiot 3.053 2.583
(6.312) (5.136)
∆SPVolt 2.321 2.449 2.849 2.874 1.188 0.978 1.373 0.601 0.661
(8.142) (7.603) (10.560) (10.434) (2.415) (2.439) (3.044) (1.742) (2.001)
CurrentReturnt -0.482 -0.344 -0.543 -0.532 -0.278 0.029 -0.367 0.118 0.202
(-3.075) (-2.117) (-3.537) (-3.103) (-1.217) (0.122) (-1.778) (0.560) (0.947)
∆3MonthTbillt 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.017 0.029 0.012 0.049 0.048
(1.103) (1.171) (1.649) (1.636) (0.253) (0.485) (0.208) (1.226) (1.161)
CreditSpreadt -0.005 -0.012 -0.036 -0.037 0.068 0.087 0.072 0.104 0.109
(-0.270) (-0.525) (-1.835) (-2.013) (1.951) (3.050) (2.002) (3.645) (3.962)
∆IndustrialProductiont -0.338 -0.297 0.261 0.268 0.514 0.730 0.433 0.364 0.466
(-0.654) (-0.582) (0.537) (0.542) (0.694) (1.223) (0.613) (0.612) (0.833)
Inflationt 2.486 1.263 6.036 5.663 0.884 -2.465 2.107 0.394 0.216
(0.838) (0.410) (1.052) (0.954) (0.250) (-0.773) (0.592) (0.116) (0.067)
PolicyUncertaintyt - - - - 0.122 0.113 0.111 0.108 0.106
- - - - (2.632) (2.615) (2.382) (3.759) (3.537)
ρ¯t−1 0.576 0.590 0.181 0.183 0.406 0.445 0.437 0.487 0.483
(9.362) (9.477) (2.916) (3.129) (7.325) (7.932) (9.378) (12.120) (11.740)
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.601 0.554 0.551 0.568 0.653 0.631 0.729 0.739
TABLE 3.4: Regression results for high beta non-S&P 500 stocks.
The table reports the estimated coefficients from regressing the average correlation of high beta
stocks on different explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are the same as in the regres-
sion for index stocks. We include index trading activity, monthly realized volatility, the current
month market return, the 3-month treasury bill rate, the credit spread, the growth in industrial
production, inflation and policy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty is only available since 1985, thus
it is only employed for the periods 1993-2012 and 1997-2012. The t-statistics shown in parenthe-
ses are based on Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. The coefficients for sentiment are not
reported, as this variable is only available until 2010. We run the regression for the subperiod until
2010 and find that sentiment is not significant. For brevity, the results including sentiment are not
reported.
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All Futures 1982-2012 Legacy 1982-1997 Emini 1997-2012 ETFs 1993-2012
∆AllFuturesRatiot 0.113 0.071
(2.424) (1.688)
∆LegacyFuturesRatiot -0.001
(0.098)
∆EminiFuturesRatiot 0.428
(6.486)
∆ETFRatiot 2.447 2.264
(5.349) (4.742)
∆SPVolt 1.466 1.550 2.112 2.108 0.674 0.518 0.780 0.156 0.179
(5.749) (5.284) (8.381) (7.980) (1.760) (1.662) (2.285) (0.749) (0.882)
CurrentReturnt -0.302 -0.210 -0.273 -0.274 -0.225 -0.000 -0.263 0.140 0.173
(-2.420) (-1.692) (-3.113) (-3.085) (-1.088) (-0.001) (-1.456) (0.724) (0.886)
∆3MonthTbillt 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.022 0.003 0.034 0.034
(0.770) (0.840) (1.194) (1.195) (0.234) (0.434) (0.072) (1.030) (1.005)
CreditSpreadt -0.010 -0.015 -0.033 -0.033 0.038 0.054 0.039 0.072 0.074
(-0.822) (-1.007) (-2.980) (-2.995) (1.363) (2.271) (1.476) (4.136) (4.363)
∆IndustrialProductiont -0.267 -0.241 0.000 -0.000 0.477 0.641 0.392 0.365 0.409
(-0.765) (-0.669) (0.013) (-0.002) (0.945) (1.481) (0.865) (0.936) (1.098)
Inflationt 1.662 0.815 3.108 3.157 -0.066 -2.592 0.895 -0.685 -0.761
(0.700) (0.333) (0.971) (0.983) (-0.235) (-0.884) (0.315) (-0.244) (-0.275)
PolicyUncertaintyt - - - - 0.093 0.090 0.082 0.086 0.085
- - - - (1.904) (1.884) (1.768) (2.565) (2.494)
ρ¯t−1 0.667 0.686 0.150 0.150 0.507 0.520 0.551 0.565 0.560
(12.412) (13.025) (2.858) (2.972) (7.466) (8.054) (9.869) (13.492) (13.546)
Adjusted R2 0.641 0.652 0.657 0.6552 0.585 0.647 0.655 0.751 0.752
TABLE 3.5: Regression results for low beta non-S&P 500 stocks.
The table reports the estimated coefficients from regressing the average correlation of low beta
stocks on different explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are the same as in the regres-
sion for index stocks. We include index trading activity, monthly realized volatility, the current
month market return, the 3-month treasury bill rate, the credit spread, the growth in industrial
production, inflation and policy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty is only available since 1985, thus
it is only employed for the periods 1993-2012 and 1997-2012. The t-statistics shown in parenthe-
ses are based on Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. The coefficients for sentiment are not
reported, as this variable is only available until 2010. We run the regression for the subperiod until
2010 and find that sentiment is not significant. For brevity, the results including sentiment are not
reported.
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All Futures Emini ETFs
1982-2012 1997-2012 1993-2012
∆IndexTrading 0.100 0.473 2.322
(2.622) (7.555) (7.361)
Iindex 0.103 0.066 0.071
(5.939) (3.638) (4.534)
Iindex ·∆IndexTrading 0.107 0.252 1.533
(1.902) (2.194) (2.952)
SPVol 2.913 0.705 0.743
(10.634) (2.452) (2.550)
CurrentReturn -0.281 -0.036 0.191
(-2.525) (-0.265) (1.710)
∆3MonthTbill 0.033 0.061 0.060
(1.674) (1.479) (1.662)
CreditSpread 0.054 0.160 0.185
(2.180) (4.797) (5.238)
∆IndustrialProduction -0.200 1.440 1.232
(-0.283) (1.175) (1.808)
Inflation -4.914 -5.221 -2.228
(-1.208) (-1.443) (-0.583)
PolicyUncertainty - 0.172 0.182
- (4.952) (5.004)
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.544 0.589
TABLE 3.6: Comparison of the impact of index trading activity on the correlations of index and non-
index stocks.
This table reports the results of pooled regressions of the correlations between index stocks, low
beta stocks and high beta stocks on a number of explanatory variables. The dependent variable
is the monthly average correlation of index stocks, high beta stocks and low beta stocks. In ad-
dition to the explanatory variables in Table 3.3-3.5, we include a dummy variable Iindex indicat-
ing whether the correlation relates to index stocks or not and its interaction with index trading
Iindex ·∆IndexTrading. For the period 1982-2012, ∆IndexTrading includes trading activity in all fu-
tures contracts. For 1997-2012, it includes Emini futures trading activity. For the subperiod 1993-
2012,∆IndexTrading includes ETF trading activity. The t-statistics shown in parentheses are based
on Newey-West standard errors with 0 lag to correct for heteroscedasticity. Since we pool the cor-
relations of index stocks, low beta stocks and high beta stocks in one regression, there is no need
to adjust for autocorrelation.
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Panel A
1982-2012 1982-1997 1997-2012 1993-2012
ρ¯t -0.121 -0.032 -0.141 -0.138
(-4.737) (-0.896) (-5.727) (-6.131)
bt−1 0.060 0.028 0.028 -0.060
(0.713) (0.279) (0.380) (-0.537)
Adjusted R2 0.079 0 0.106 0.117
Panel B
All Futures Legacy Emini ETFs
1982-2012 1982-1997 1997-2012 1993-2012
∆IndexTrading -0.053 -0.039 -0.091 -0.645
(-2.573) (-1.428) (-1.823) (-2.794)
bt−1 0.113 0.0522 0.028 0.0398
(1.308) (0.509) (0.380) (0.310)
Adjusted R2 0.020 0 0.0311 0.005
TABLE 3.7: Testing whether correlations are excessive.
This table shows the results of regressing return reversals on correlations (Panel A) and index trad-
ing activity (Panel B). The dependent variable in both regressions is the monthly weighted average
of return reversals. The lag of the dependent variable bt−1 is included in the regression to correct
for autocorrelation.

Chapter 4
The Impact of Liquidity on Information
Acquisition
Abstract
This paper extends the information acquisition problem considered in Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2010) to a more realistic setting with transaction costs, including both pro-
portional and quadratic transaction costs. Our findings differ from those obtained without
transaction costs. As an asset’s transaction costs rise, it becomes less attractive for investors to
learn about it. Investors’ decision about which assets to learn depends on their initial hold-
ings. Moreover, transaction costs might change investors’ information acquisition choice
from specialized learning to generalized learning. Hence, in addition to assets’ Sharpe ratio,
investors’ initial asset holdings and assets’ liquidity play an important role in determining
optimal information acquisition strategies.
The author is extremely grateful to Maria Putintseva for her suggestions and help for checking the computa-
tions.
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4.1 Introduction
Many players in financial markets, such as mutual fund and hedge fund managers, actively
search for superior information regarding the value of traded assets in order to profit from
such information. Professional investors spend substantial amounts of time and resources
acquiring information about individual companies, industries, and the macroeconomy to
sharpen their investment decisions. However, although investors might acquire substantial
economic and financial information regarding a traded asset, investment opportunities are
commonly subject to a type of uncertainty that resolves only ex post: imperfect information
regarding the investment payoff. The present paper examines this type of uncertainty and
assumes that investors can exert effort to collect information about assets’ payoffs.
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) assume that investors can acquire information be-
fore they make their portfolio choice and develop a model in which portfolio and information
decisions are jointly determined. In their model, information can be used to make more pre-
cise predictions about asset payoffs, i.e. to reduce the conditional variance of such payoffs.
When the possibility of learning exists, investors with different objective functions and learn-
ing technologies make different information and portfolio decisions.
However, the Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) model is built on the assumption of a
perfectly liquid market. In their model, assets can be purchased and sold immediately with-
out any cost and in any quantity. Such an assumption is not consistent with actual markets
in which assets are costly to trade. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity on
investors’ information acquisition decision. It is well-established that transaction costs are a
significant factor in determining the trading behavior of financial market participants, opti-
mal asset allocations, and assets’ equilibrium prices. However, the direction and magnitude
of the impact of transaction costs on information acquisition have not previously been ana-
lyzed in the literature.
Our study’s contribution is to introduce transaction costs into a model based on Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp (2010) and to characterize the impact of transaction costs on optimal in-
formation acquisition. Because transaction costs affect investors’ optimal investment strate-
gies, optimal information allocation is also affected. For example, investors might take a
more aggressive position in an asset when that asset’s transaction costs drop. Accordingly,
investors might collect more information on these assets that have low transaction costs be-
cause higher benefits can now be obtained from learning about them than from learning
about assets with high transaction costs.
We consider two types of transaction costs in our model: proportional and quadratic trans-
action costs. Proportional transaction costs have been used in numerous studies (see Con-
stantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2009) for example). Typically, there is a no-trade region,
and investors that begin in the no-trade region simply do not trade; however, any allocation
outside the no-trade region causes investors to trade until they reach the nearest boundary of
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the no-trade region. We consider a situation with two risky assets and one bundle. Although
we do not have a closed-form solution, we are able to characterize the impact of liquidity
on information acquisition behavior using numerical methods. We also consider quadratic
transaction costs, as assumed by Garleanu and Pedersen (2013). Quadratic transaction costs
capture the observation that the cost of immediacy is a convex function of trade size. Because
such transaction costs are differentiable, we obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal in-
formation acquisition policy for the multi-asset case.
Although Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) discuss a number of utility functions, our
analysis focuses on the mean-variance utility function, which is one of the most widely used
utility functions. Moreover, we consider both an additive learning technology and an entropy
learning technology. Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, as might be ex-
pected, we demonstrate that the liquidity of an asset affects the attractiveness of learning
about it. As the trading costs of an asset increase, it becomes less attractive for investors to
learn about it; this conclusion holds for various learning technologies and transaction costs
functions. Second, when introducing a bundle which has lower transaction costs than trad-
ing all the constituent stocks, we find that only those investors with additive learning capacity
diversify their information allocations. Although trading the bundle is cheaper than trading
the constituent stocks, investors with entropy learning technology choose to learn about only
one asset. Third, investors equipped with different learning capacities and starting alloca-
tions might choose to learn about different assets. Instead of having one asset that attracts
the attention of all investors, investors with higher learning capacities typically prefer more
liquid assets because such investors take more aggressive positions, while other investors
are less sensitive to changes in transaction costs. Fourth, transaction costs not only affect
the attractiveness of assets but also whether investors choose to learn about one or multiple
assets. With mean-variance utility and without transaction costs, investors engage in special-
ized learning, meaning that they learn about a single asset. With transaction costs, the opti-
mal information acquisition policy for investors with an additive learning technology might
be combined learning, for both proportional and quadratic transaction costs. With quadratic
transaction costs, investors with an entropy learning technology might also use generalized
learning to achieve a higher utility meaning that they learn about multiple assets. Hence,
introducing transaction costs not only affects the relative attractiveness of assets but also in-
vestors’ learning behavior.
This paper is related to the literature on endogenous information acquisition in financial
markets (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980); Verrecchia (1982); Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp (2010); Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)). Our analysis also fits into a larger
branch of the literature that addresses portfolio choice with frictions such as illiquidity. Illiq-
uidity is modeled as either the inability to trade continuously (see Longstaff (2001) and Longstaff
(2009) for example) or using transaction costs. Because our model setting is static, we take the
second approach. We view illiquidity as a type of explicit transaction cost that investors pay
when rebalancing their portfolios. Many papers investigate the optimal portfolio choice for
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an agent facing transaction costs. A few examples include Dybvig (2005) for the two-period
case, and Dumas and Luciano (1991), Liu (2004), Liu and Loewenstein (2002), Lo, Mamaysky,
and Wang (2004), and Constantinides, Jackwerth, and Perrakis (2009) for the dynamic setting.
Our main contribution is to combine both information acquisition and transaction costs in
a single setup in order to investigate how liquidity and information acquisition interact.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the framework of
the paper, including preferences, the investment opportunity set and the investor’s portfolio
and information choice problem. Section 4.3 presents the results with proportional trans-
action costs in the two-asset case. Section 4.4 considers the case of multiple assets but with
quadratic transaction costs. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.5.
4.2 Model Setup
We borrow the three-period setup of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). In the first
period, investors choose the precision of signals about asset payoffs. In the second period,
investors observe the signal and then make their portfolio choices. In the last period, payoffs
are realized.
4.2.1 Financial Assets
In our model, the available investment universe consists of one riskless asset, two risky assets,
and a bundle that is a linear combination of the two risky assets. The constant risk-free rate is
denoted by r . The two risky assets, with prices P = [P1,P2]′, provide payoffs (returns) that are
denoted by f = [ f1, f2]′. Assuming that the weight of asset 1 in the bundle is b, the bundle has
an excess return of b f1+ (1−b) f2. The excess returns are not public information to investors.
Without loss of generality, we assume that risky assets are independent in our model, which is
the same assumption made by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). This is without loss
of generality since if assets are correlated, we can form principal components such that the
linear combination of the initial assets are independent. We can interpret the independent
assets so formed as risk factors. Because the risk factors are linear combinations of the initial
assets, investment in the risky factors can easily be translated into investment in the initial
assets.
Trading these three assets involves proportional transaction costs. Let t1, t2, t3 denote the
corresponding proportional trading costs for trading asset 1, asset 2, and the bundle. The
same transaction cost is incurred whether buying or selling assets. We assume that t3 ≤
bt1 + (1− b)t2, i.e., trading the bundle is cheaper than trading the constituent stocks. The
bundle in our model can be interpreted as an index consisting of all the assets in the model
(in our simple model, there are only 2 assets). It would be interesting to determine whether
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the convenience of trading an index product leads investors to learn about multiple assets.
4.2.2 Investors’ Beliefs
In the first period, investors share a common prior belief regarding the payoffs of the risky
assets in the third period, which is captured by a normal distribution f ∼ (µ,Σ). Given the
independence of f , Σ is a diagonal matrix. In the first period, investors can acquire infor-
mation regarding payoffs by obtaining unbiased but noisy signals of the payoff η = f + eη,
where eη ∼ N (0,Ση). We assume that the signals are also independent, i.e. Ση is also a diag-
onal matrix. The smaller the diagonal elements of Ση are, the closer the signals are to actual
payoffs. The precision of the signalη hinges on how investors allocate their learning capacity.
Obviously, when investors do not want to learn about asset i , Ση(i , i )=∞.
In the first period, investors make their information acquisition decision by choosing the
precision matrix Ση. In the second period, they observe the signal and update their beliefs
about the payoff using Bayes’ rule. We let E2 denote the posterior expectation combining the
prior belief and the signal. Let µˆ and Σˆ denote the payoff’s mean and variance conditional on
the signal respectively. Using Bayes’ rule, combining the noisy signals and the ex ante belief,
we obtain
µˆ= E2[ f |µ,η]= (Σ−1+Σ−1η )−1(Σ−1µ+Σ−1η η) , (4.1)
Σˆ=V2[ f |µ,η]= (Σ−1+Σ−1η )−1 . (4.2)
Based on these updated beliefs, investors then make their portfolio decision. Payoffs are
realized in period 3.
4.2.3 Investors’ Utility
Investors’ preferences are captured by a utility function denoted by u2(W ), where W denotes
terminal wealth at time 3. Because investors can learn the payoff at time 2, we let u1 denote
another utility function to capture investors’ preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
Such a utility function is considered under the expectations of the prior belief, E1. In period
1, an investor’s utility is defined as
U1 = E1 [u1 (E2[u2(W )])] . (4.3)
The curvature of u1 determines whether investors prefer early or late resolution of uncer-
tainty. Because expectation E2 depends on the outcome of the signal, learning at time 2
makes E2[u2(W )] a random variable. The randomness of the expectation gives higher utility
to investors with convex u1 and lower utility to investors with concave u1. Hence, investors
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with convex u1 prefer early resolution of uncertainty, while investors with concave u1 prefer
late resolution of uncertainty. When u1 is a linear function, investors are indifferent as to
when the information is disclosed.
Although many types of preferences have been discussed in the literature, we focus on one
of the most commonly used types of utility. We assume that u1(x) = − ln(−x) and u2(W ) =
−exp(−γW ). Because payoffs are normally distributed, such a utility function is equivalent
to a mean-variance utility function:
U1 = E1[γE2[W ]− γ
2
2
V2[W ]] , (4.4)
where V2 denotes the variance of terminal wealth conditional on the signal. Assume that in-
vestors are initially endowed with θ0 of risky assets which have a total value W0. Let θ denote
investors’ holdings in period 2. Letting TC (·) denote the trading cost function, investors are
subject to the following budget constraint:
W =W0r +θ′( f −Pr )−TC (θ−θ0) . (4.5)
Substituting wealth back into the utility function, we obtain
U1 = E1
[
γE2[W0r +θ′( f −Pr )−TC (θ−θ0)]− γ
2
2
V2[θ
′( f −Pr )]
]
. (4.6)
Since r , γ and W0 are not choice variables and are multiplicative constants, we drop these
without changing the optimization problem. The time 1 utility simplifies to
U1 = E1
[
E2[θ
′( f −Pr )−TC (θ−θ0)]− γ
2
V2[θ
′( f −Pr )]
]
. (4.7)
To derive optimal information and portfolio choice, we must first solve for the optimal port-
folio as a function of posterior beliefs and then choose the posterior belief variance that max-
imize the utilityU1.
4.2.4 Portfolio Choice with Given Beliefs
For a given belief about asset payoffs
(
µˆ,Σˆ
)
, investors maximize the following utility function
in period 2:
U (µˆ,Σˆ)= θ′(µˆ−Pr )−TC (θ−θ0)− γ
2
θ′Σˆθ . (4.8)
Obviously, we have U1 = E1(U ). The portfolio after trading in period 2 is θ = θ0+T q , where
q = [q1, ...,q6] denotes a vector indicating the selling/buying of risky asset 1, 2, and the bun-
dle. We have q ≥ 0, i.e., when investors buy or sell i , q takes positive values in the correspond-
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ing position. The matrix T can be written as
T =
[
−1 1 0 0 −b b
0 0 −1 1 b−1 1−b
]
. (4.9)
In our model, transaction costs are proportional. Hence, TC (θ−θ0)=Cq , where
C = [t1, t1, t2, t2, t3, t3]′. (4.10)
We can write the utilityU in terms of q as follows:
U (θ)= (θ0+T q)′(µˆ−Pr )− γ
2
(θ0+T q)′Σˆ(θ0+T q)−C ′q . (4.11)
The Lagrangian function of the optimization problem is
L (q)= (θ0+T q)′(µˆ−Pr )− γ
2
(θ0+T q)′Σˆ(θ0+T q)−C ′q +λ′q , (4.12)
subject to
q ≥ 0 . (4.13)
The complementary slackness condition is
λiqi = 0, for i = 1, ..,6. (4.14)
The first-order condition with respect to q is
∂L
∂q
= T ′(µˆ−Pr )−γT ′Σˆ(θ0+T q)−C +λ . (4.15)
The second-order derivative is
∂2L
∂q2
=−γT ′ΣˆT , (4.16)
which is a negative semi-definite matrix. Therefore, the Lagrangian function is concave, and
we have interior solutions. When comparing different candidates to search for the optimal
solution, we can eliminate some obvious interior points that are not optimal. For the same
target position, investors adopt the most cost-efficient way to trade. For example, when in-
vestors attempt to buy both assets, investors first buy the bundle and then fill the remaining
position by trading the individual asset. In the end, we obtain the following 13 cases by elim-
inating trading that is not cost efficient:
(1) q1 > 0 ; (2) q2 > 0 ; (3) q3 > 0 ; (4) q4 > 0 ; (5) q5 > 0 ; (6) q6 > 0 ;
(7) q1 > 0,q4 > 0 ; (8) q2 > 0,q3 > 0 ; (9) q1 > 0,q5 > 0 ; (10) q2 > 0,q6 > 0 ;
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FIGURE 4.1: Portfolio choice with proportional transaction costs.
This figure displays investors’ portfolio choice. The parameters are the following: risk aversion γ= 5,
the expected return and volatility of both risky assets µˆ1−rP1 = µˆ2−rP2 = 0.1 and
√
Σˆ11 =
√
Σˆ22 = 0.3,
respectively. Transaction costs of both risky assets are t1 = t2 = 0.01, while the transaction costs of the
bundle are t3 = 0.005. The number in parenthesis in each region corresponds to the case number.
(11) q3 > 0,q5 > 0 ; (12) q4 > 0,q6 > 0 ; (13) do nothing .
Due to the complexity of the computations, we leave the exact solutions to the 13 cases to
Appendix 4.A.
Figure 4.1 illustrates these 13 cases as a function of the investor’s initial allocation. Investors
who begin in the no-trade region which is represented by the interior of the hexagon would
simply retain their initial allocation. When there are trading costs, rebalancing all the way to
the ideal portfolio is not profitable. When investors begin with an allocation outside of the
no-trade region, they trade until they reach the target, i.e., the boundaries of the hexagon.
There are 12 transaction regions. The arrows represent the transaction directions in these
transaction regions. For example, in the buy 1 and sell 2 region (the quadrant on the top left),
investors buy asset 1 and sell asset 2 to reach the target.
4.2.5 Learning Technology
Since the ex ante variance Σ is given, the posterior variance Σˆ computed in equation (4.2)
is not random. Every signal variance Ση has a unique posterior belief variance Σˆ associated
with it. Hence, following Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), we can define information
choice as optimizing over posterior belief variance Σˆ directly rather than over the signal vari-
ance Ση. The smaller the diagonal matrix elements of Σˆ are, the more precise the posterior
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belief is.
How much information investors can acquire depends on their overall learning capacity,
which we denote by K . We consider two types of learning technologies in our model, an
additive learning technology and an entropy learning technology, which are also discussed
in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010).
Additive learning defines the learning capacity K as the sum of the differences between the
inverse of the posterior and prior precision of each asset
2∑
i=1
(
Σˆ−1i i −Σ−1i i
)≤K . (4.17)
Entropy learning defines capacity K as the sum of the ratio of the precision, i.e.,
2∑
i=1
ln
(
Σˆ−1i i Σi i
)≤K . (4.18)
Furthermore, we also impose the non-forgetting constraint to ensure that investors cannot
obtain more precise information about one asset by forgetting the prior information about
another asset. Mathematically, the constraint can be written as
0≤ Σˆi i ≤Σi i , or equivalently, ∞≥ Σˆ−1i i ≥Σ−1i i for i = 1,2 . (4.19)
4.2.6 The Information Choice Problem
Armed with the optimal portfolio θ∗ for a given belief
(
µˆ,Σˆ
)
, we can derive investors’ optimal
information choice by means of the following maximization problem:
max
Σˆ
E1
[(
θ∗
(
µˆ,Σˆ
))T
(µˆ−Pr )−TC (θ∗ (µˆ,Σˆ)−θ0)− γ
2
(
θ∗
(
µˆ,Σˆ
))T
Σˆ
(
θ∗
(
µˆ,Σˆ
))]
, (4.20)
subject to the learning constraint
2∑
i=1
ln
(
Σˆ−1i i Σi i
)≤K or 2∑
i=1
(
Σˆ−1i i −Σ−1i i
)≤K , (4.21)
and the non-forgetting constraint
∞≥ Σˆ−1i i ≥Σ−1i i , for i = 1,2 . (4.22)
The expectation E1 defined in (4.20) is taken over the posterior mean µˆ. µˆ depends on the
realization of signals and is a random variable in the first period. It follows a normal distribu-
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tion with the following mean and variance
E1
(
µˆ
) = (Σ−1+Σ−1η )−1(Σ−1µ+Σ−1η E1(η))=µ , (4.23)
V1
(
µˆ
) = Σˆ−1Σ−1η V1(η)Σ−1η Σˆ= Σˆ−1Σ−1η (Σ+Ση)Σ−1η Σˆ=Σ− Σˆ . (4.24)
The last equality in (4.24) follows from the fact that Σ and Ση are diagonal matrices.
Unlike Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), in which optimal portfolio holdings are a
smooth function of posterior beliefs, optimal portfolio holdings in the case of proportional
transaction costs are a non-smooth function of the posterior beliefs and cannot be differen-
tiated. Therefore, a closed-form solution is not possible.
For a given Σˆ, the expectation E1 in equation (4.20) can be computed as the sum of the inte-
grals of function U over 13 different regions corresponding to the 12 trading regions and the
no-trade region. The precise functional form of U differs in the 13 regions and is presented
in Appendix 4.B together with the boundaries of the 13 regions. Having the integrand U in
closed-form, numerical integration allows us to find the optimal choice of posterior belief
variance much faster than using simulation methods.
4.3 Two Risky Assets and Proportional Transaction Costs
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) consider a case involving mean-variance utility and
entropy-learning capacity and conclude that investors spend all their capacity in learning
about the asset with the highest squared Sharpe ratio. In our setting with transaction costs,
the results are more complicated. Initial allocations, transaction costs, and the Sharpe ratio
all play a role in determining investors’ optimal information acquisition. Because we con-
sider two types of learning technology that generate different results, we report the results in
two subsections.
4.3.1 Results for Additive Learning Technology
We first consider the additive learning technology and observe the following properties.
Proposition 4 When a risky asset’s trading costs increase, learning about it becomes less at-
tractive to investors.
When an asset’s transaction costs increase, the expected net return of trading the asset de-
creases which makes learning about it less profitable. This effect is illustrated in Panel A of
Figure 4.2. In the case considered in the figure, there are two risky assets and the bundle is not
available for trading. Assets 1 and 2 have the same volatility, but asset 1 has a higher expected
return. As the transaction costs of asset 1 increase, its attractiveness decreases. Once the
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FIGURE 4.2: Information acquisition with proportional transaction costs and an additive learning
technology.
This figure shows the optimal choice of learning about asset 1 measured in terms of the posterior
volatility
√
Σˆ11. Panel A shows the case in which the transaction costs of asset 1 vary. Panel B extends
Panel A by allowing for various learning capacities. Panel C plots the case in which the initial endow-
ment of asset 2 changes. The parameters for Panel A are µ1− rP1 = 0.1, µ2− rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.15,p
Σ22 = 0.15, t2 = 0.01, K = 10, θ0(1) = 0, θ0(2) = 0, and γ = 5. In Panel B, the parameter values are
the same as those in Panel A, and we allow learning capacity to vary from K = 5 to 8, 10, and 15.
The parameters for Panel C are µ1 − rP1 = 0.1, µ2 − rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.3,
p
Σ22 = 0.3, t1 = 0.02,
t2 = 0.02, K = 10, θ0(1)= 0.3 and γ= 5. In Panel D, the parameters are the same as those in Panel C and
θ0(2)= 0.3. Moreover, we allow for trading the bundle in this figure, and we set the weight b = 0.5.
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cost exceeds a certain level, investors start learning about both assets. When asset 1 becomes
very expensive to trade with t1 = 0.08, investors choose not to learn about asset 1.1 Indeed, in
the setting with trading costs, expected return and volatility are not sufficient to measure the
asset’s attractiveness. Investors take transaction costs into account when comparing assets.
Proposition 5 Investors with various learning capacitiesmight choose to learn about different
assets.
Although increased transaction costs of one asset generally lead investors to learn about
other assets, the magnitude of the impact tends to be larger for those investors with higher
learning capacities. This relationship is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 4.2 , in which we al-
low learning capacity to vary. Investors with low learning capacity, K = 5, continue to learn
exclusively about asset 1 when t1 increases from 0.01 to 0.04. Investors with higher learn-
ing capacity K = 10 begin to generalize their learning at the point at which t1 = 0.028. It
is likely that investors with higher skills take more aggressive positions than less skilled in-
vestors; therefore, their information acquisition is more sensitive to changes in trading costs.
Consequently, investors with different learning capacity might choose to learn about differ-
ent assets. These results differ from the case with no transaction costs, in which all investors
choose to learn about only one asset.
Proposition 6 When investors’ initial asset allocations vary, investors choose to learn about
different assets.
In a setting with transaction costs, the starting allocation has an impact on information ac-
quisition. Consider the example shown in Panel C of Figure 4.2, in which both assets have
the same transaction costs and ex ante volatility, but asset 1 has a higher expected return.
When the initial holdings of asset 2 are extreme, either below -20% or above 35%, investors
only learn about asset 2. However, when the initial holdings of asset 2 are less extreme, be-
tween -20% and 0% and between 20% and 35%, investors learn about both assets. Finally,
when the initial holdings of asset 2 are between 0% and 20%, investors only learn about as-
set 1. The optimal precision of asset 1 is a U-shaped curve of the initial holdings of asset
2. The reason for such a learning curve is simple: when making their information acquisi-
tion decision, investors also consider transaction costs. Therefore, investors choose to learn
about those assets that they expect to trade. When the initial allocation of asset 2 is extreme,
investors expect to trade asset 2 and spend all their capacity in learning about this asset’s pay-
off. When the initial allocation of asset 2 is less extreme, asset 1, which has a higher Sharpe
ratio, becomes more attractive for investors to learn about. It is worth noting that without
transaction costs no matter where investors start, they always make the same learning de-
cision. However, when there are transaction costs, investors might choose to learn about
different assets depending on their starting allocations.
1The optimal information choice with additive learning and mean-variance utility but without transaction
costs is not discussed by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010). We solve this case in Section 4.4.1.
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Proposition 7 When the transaction costs of the bundle decrease, combined learning becomes
more attractive.
This property is illustrated in Panel D of Figure 4.2 where we allow for the trading of the bun-
dle. In our example, assets 1 and 2 are identical except that asset 1 has a higher expected
return. Both assets have equal weights in the bundle, i.e. b = 0.5. When the bundle has the
same trading costs as individual assets, investors choose to learn about asset 1 only. When
the bundle’s transaction costs t3 decrease, investors spend less capacity on learning about
asset 1 and begin learning about both assets. Effectively, the ability to trade the bundle at low
cost makes changing the allocation to asset 2 cheaper, and therefore acquiring information
about it more attractive.
4.3.2 Results for Entropy Learning Technology
As discussed in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), one drawback of the additive learn-
ing technology is that it is not scale neutral in the sense that share splits or reverse splits
change the feasible information set. Therefore, we also consider entropy learning, which is
scale-neutral. Although many results derived from additive learning still hold, there are cer-
tain differences, and we report the results in this section.
Proposition 8 When a risky asset’s trading costs increase, learning about it becomes less at-
tractive to investors.
This property is identical to the case of additive learning technology. In addition to the Sharpe
ratio, transaction costs play a role in determining optimal information acquisition. Moreover,
as shown in Panel A of Figure 4.3 , with the entropy learning technology, investors choose to
learn about a single asset, i.e. use specialized learning. This observation is consistent with
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), who also find that the additive learning technol-
ogy favors generalized learning and entropy learning technology favors specialized learn-
ing. The reason is that the second-order condition for the learning constraint with respect
to Σ−1i i is zero for additive learning, whereas it is negative for entropy learning. Hence, the
second-order condition of the Lagrangian with respect to Σ−1i i is more likely to be positive
when the constraint is entropy rather than additive learning because the learning constraint
enters negatively into the Lagrangian function.
Proposition 9 Investors with various learning capacitiesmight choose to learn about different
assets.
This property is the same as for additive learning technology. However, since it is generally
optimal to learn about a single asset, Panel B of Figure 4.3 shows that investors choose to
learn about either asset 1 or asset 2. The lower capacity, the higher the level of t1 required to
induce investors to learn about asset 2.
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FIGURE 4.3: Information acquisition with proportional transaction costs and an entropy learning
technology.
This figure shows the optimal choice of learning about asset 1 measured in terms of the posterior
volatility
√
Σˆ11. Panel A shows the case in which the transaction costs of asset 1 vary. Panel B extends
Panel A by allowing for various learning capacities. Panel C plots the case in which the initial allocation
of asset 2 changes. The parameters for Panel A are µ1−rP1 = 0.1, µ2−rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.15,
p
Σ22 =
0.15, t2 = 0.01, K = 1, θ0(1)= 0, θ0(2)= 0, and γ= 5. In Panel B, the parameter values are the same as
those in Panel A, and we allow learning capacity to vary from K = 0.5 to 0.8, 1, and 1.5. The parameters
for Panel C are µ1− rP1 = 0.07, µ2− rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.3,
p
Σ22 = 0.3, t1 = 0.02, t2 = 0.02, K = 0.5,
θ0(1)= 0.3 and γ= 5.
4.4. Multiple Assets and Quadratic Transaction Costs 105
Proposition 10 When investors’ initial asset allocations vary, investors choose to learn about
different assets.
This property is identical to the one we observe for additive learning technology. Extreme
initial allocations in a given asset induce investors to learn about that asset, while balanced
initial allocations induce investors to learn about assets that have higher expected returns.
Therefore, this property is robust to different definitions of learning technology.
Proposition 11 Nomatter how low the transaction costs of the bundle are, combined learning
never occurs.
Although combined learning might be optimal for investors with additive learning technol-
ogy, this is not the case for entropy learning technology. With the possibility to trade the
bundle, it appears that it is never optimal for investors with entropy learning technology to
learn about both assets, no matter how cheap trading the bundle is.2
4.4 Multiple Assets and Quadratic Transaction Costs
With proportional transaction costs, the no-trade region becomes complicated when the
number of risky assets exceeds two. Although the no-trade region can still be characterized in
closed form, solving equation (4.20) requires integrating a complicated piecewise quadratic
function with a complex domain. Computing the objective function in each region is time-
consuming.3 Nonetheless, the qualitative results we obtain for two assets should remain the
same.
In this section, we consider the case of an arbitrary number of assets N in a setting with
quadratic transaction costs. More specifically, we assume that the transaction costs incurred
when rebalancing the portfolio by θ−θ0 are 12
(
θ−θ0)′Λ(θ−θ0) and thatΛ≥ 0 is a diagonal
matrix such that there are no correlated transaction costs.
To keep the analysis tractable, a bundle that is cheaper to trade is not available. Due to its
differentiability, the assumption of quadratic transaction costs makes the computation of
the optimal portfolio rather straightforward and allows us to obtain a closed-form solution
for optimal information acquisition.
The use of quadratic transaction costs can be justified because the cost of immediacy is usu-
ally a convex function of the trade size. A trader who requires immediate execution of a large
2We did not manage to prove that investors with entropy learning technology never learn about multiple
assets. The result is based on 10,000 observations of different parameter values selected randomly.
3We can use simulations to estimate the integral; however, even for the case of two risky assets, at least
10,000 simulations are required to obtain results with 1% accuracy. Computing the utility function with multiple
assets requires more intensive computations.
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order may have only the first portion filled at the best bid or ask quote. The second portion
is filled at the second-best bid or ask price in the order book, and so on. Thus, the cost of
immediacy increases more than in proportion to the trade size, particularly for large trades.
Such convexity can be captured by a quadratic transaction cost function.
To solve the information and portfolio choice problems we first determine the portfolio for a
given belief (µˆ,Σˆ) in the second period. With quadratic transaction costs, the utility function
U , defined in equation (4.8), becomes
U = θ′ (µˆ− rP)− γ
2
θ′Σˆθ− 1
2
(
θ−θ0)′Λ(θ−θ0) . (4.25)
The first-order condition is:(
µˆ− rP)−γΣˆθ−Λ(θ−θ0)= 0 . (4.26)
Solving gives the optimal portfolio
θ∗ = (γΣˆ+Λ)−1 (µˆ− rP +Λθ0)= A−1 (µˆ− rP +Λθ0) , (4.27)
where A ≡ γΣˆ+Λ.
Substituting the solution back into the objective function (4.25), simplifying and taking the
expectation of µˆ, the first period utility functionU1 as defined in (4.7) becomes
U1 = 1
2
Tr
(
A−1(Σ− Σˆ))+1
2
(
µ− rP)′ A−1 (µ− rP)+(θ0)′Λ′A−1 (µ− rP)+1
2
(θ0)′(ΛA−1Λ−Λ)θ0 . (4.28)
Denote ai = 12γΛi i + 12
(
(µi − rPi )+θ0i Λi i
)2 + 12Σi i . Obviously, ai > 0 for all i . Appendix 4.C
shows that the information acquisition optimization problem (ignoring some constant terms)
reduces to
max
Σˆ
n∑
i=1
ai
γΣˆi i +Λi i
, (4.29)
subject to
n∑
i=1
ln
(
Σˆ−1i i Σi i
)≤K or n∑
i=1
(
Σˆ−1i i −Σ−1i i
)≤K , (4.30)
∞≥ Σˆ−1i i ≥Σ−1i i , for i = 1,2, ...,n . (4.31)
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4.4.1 Results for Additive Learning Technology
In this subsection, we examine the case with additive learning technology. Denoting ki = Σˆ−1i i ,
the Lagrangian in this case is given by
L =
n∑
i=1
ai
γ
ki
+Λi i
+λ0
(
K −
n∑
i=1
(
ki −Σ−1i i
))+ n∑
i=1
λi
(
ki −Σ−1i i
)
. (4.32)
The first and second-order derivatives with respect to ki are
∂L
∂ki
= aiγ(
γ+Λi iki
)2 −λ0+λi (4.33)
and
∂2L
∂k2i
=− 2aiγ(
γ+Λi iki
)3Λi i . (4.34)
Since the Hessian of L is a diagonal matrix, it is negative (positive) definite if and only if
all its diagonal elements are negative (positive). Because the second order derivative of L
is negative for all i , the objective function is concave. For the complementary slackness
condition λi
(
ki −Σ−1i i
) = 0 to hold, whenever ki > Σ−1i i , we have λi = 0. Defining a function
hi (ki )≡ aiγ(γ+Λi iki )2 , the optimal information choice is k
∗
i =max(Σ−1i i ,h−1i (λ0)), where λ0 solves
K =∑ni=1 max(Σ−1i i ,h−1i (λ0)).
For quadratic transaction costs with additive learning technology, we observe properties sim-
ilar to those observed in Section 4.3.1. Figure 4.4 illustrates a simple case with only two
risky assets in which both assets have the same volatility but asset 1 has a higher excess re-
turn. Panel A of Figure 4.4 shows that when the transaction costs of both assets are the same
(Λ11 = Λ22 = 0.01), investors choose to learn about asset 1 only. As the transaction costs of
asset 1 increase, investors also begin to learn about asset 2. If transaction costs exceed 0.043,
investors specialize in learning only about asset 2. This result is similar to that in the case with
proportional transaction costs. In Panel B, we compare the information choices of investors
with various learning capacities. Panel B shows that investors with a higher learning capacity
switch earlier to combined learning as asset 1’s transaction costs Λ11 increase. Consistent
with the case of proportional trading costs, more skilled investors are more sensitive to trad-
ing costs. Panel C shows that as their starting allocations to asset 2 vary, investors choose
different assets to learn about. The asset they learn about is usually the one that they expect
to trade more. An extreme position in asset 2 induces investors to spend more capacity in
learning about this asset. Compared with the case with proportional transaction costs, we
need fairly high transaction costs to obtain the results in Panel C because for trading sizes be-
low 1, using the same coefficient (t1 = Λ11 and t2 = Λ22) gives much lower transaction costs
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FIGURE 4.4: Information acquisition with quadratic transaction costs and an additive learning tech-
nology.
This figure shows the optimal choice of learning about asset 1 measured in terms of posterior volatility√
Σˆ11. Panel A shows the case in which asset 1’s transaction costs vary. Panel B extends Panel A by
allowing for various learning capacities. Panel C plots the case in which the initial endowment of asset
2 changes. The parameters for Panel A are µ1− rP1 = 0.1, µ2− rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.15,
p
Σ22 = 0.15,
Λ22 = 0.01, K = 10, θ0(1) = 0, θ0(2) = 0, and γ = 5. In Panel B, the parameter values are the same as
those in Panel A, and we allow learning capacity to vary from K = 5 to 8, 10 and 15. The parameters
for Panel C are µ1− rP1 = 0.07, µ2− rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.15,
p
Σ22 = 0.15, Λ11 = 0.1, Λ22 = 0.1, K = 10,
θ0(1)= 0.3 and γ= 5.
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for the quadratic function than for proportional transaction costs.
In order to compare these results with those in the case with no transaction costs, we must
solve the maximization problem whenΛ= 0. Since this case is not discussed in Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp (2010), we briefly sketch the solution. In the special case in whichΛ= 0,
the objective function is a weighted sum of posterior beliefs
∑n
i=1
1
γ (
1
2 (µi − rPi )2 + 12Σi i )ki .
The learning capacity constraint bounds the sum of the precisions from above, whereas the
non-forgetting condition bounds each ki from below. The maximum of the Lagrangian func-
tion is reached at a corner. Specifically, investors choose to learn about the asset for which
the expression (µi − rPi )2+Σi i is highest. By contrast, with both quadratic and proportional
transaction costs, investors choose to learn about multiple assets. Thus, transaction costs not
only change the relative attractiveness of the risky assets but also have an impact on whether
investors choose to engage in specialized or generalized learning. This shows that in the pres-
ence of transaction costs, the utility function and the learning technology alone do not fully
determine whether investors engage in specialized or generalized learning.
4.4.2 Results for Entropy Learning Technology
We now investigate the solution for the entropy learning technology. Letting Ki ≡ ln
(
Σi i
Σˆi i
)
, we
have Σˆi i = Σi ieKi and the entropy learning technology constraint can be written in terms of Ki as
Σni=1Ki ≤K . The non-forgetting constraint can be written as Ki ≥ 0. The Lagrangian function
can then be written in terms of Ki as follows:
L =
n∑
i=1
ai
γΣi i
eKi
+Λi i
+λ0
(
K −Σni=1Ki
)+ n∑
i=1
λiKi . (4.35)
The first and second-order derivatives ofL with respect to Ki are
∂L
∂Ki
= aiγΣi i
(γΣi i
eKi
+Λi i )2eKi
−λ0+λi (4.36)
and
∂2L
∂K 2i
= aiγΣi i
(γΣi i
eKi
+Λi i )3e2Ki
(
γΣi i −Λi ieKi
)
. (4.37)
Again, since the Hessian ofL is a diagonal matrix, it is negative (positive) definite if and only
if all its diagonal elements are negative (positive). Notably, the sign of the diagonal elements
of the Hessian matrix hinges on the values of the parameters. It is obvious that the Hessian
is positive definite if and only if γΣi i −Λi ieKi > 0 for all i . If the opposite holds true for all
i , the Hessian is negative definite. Because Ki is bounded by 0 and K , it follows directly
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that a sufficient condition for a positive definite Hessian matrix is that K < ln
(
γΣi i
Λi i
)
holds
for all i , which is the case when assets are very liquid (low Λi i ), investors’ prior uncertainty
about the expected payoff Σi i is large, investors have low learning capacity K and their risk
aversion γ is high. At the other extreme, when γΣi i −Λi ie0 < 0 for all i , the Hessian matrix is
negative definite. The Hessian matrix is negative definite only when assets are highly illiquid
and investors have accurate prior beliefs and low risk aversion.
We now investigate the properties of the optimal solution in these two cases. When the Hes-
sian matrix is positive definite, or (in other words) the Lagrangian function is convex, the
optimal solution is a corner solution in which investors spend all their capacity in learning
about a single asset. The asset j about which investors choose to acquire information is the
one for which the expression − a jγΣ j j+Λ j j +
a j
γΣ j j
eK
+Λ j j
is highest.
An example with two assets of a situation giving rise to specialized learning is shown in Figure
4.5. Overall, the results are very similar to those for the case of proportional transaction costs
reported in Figure 4.3. Specifically, trading costs reduce the attractiveness of learning about a
given asset (Panel A), overall learning capacity affects which assets investors choose to learn
about (Panel B), as does their initial allocation (Panel C).
By contrast, when the Hessian matrix is negative definite, the Lagrangian function is concave,
and we have interior solutions. For the complementary slackness condition λiKi = 0 to hold,
we must have λi = 0 when Ki > 0. Defining gi (Ki ) = aiγΣi i
(
γΣi i
eKi
+Λi i )2eKi
, the optimal information
choice is K ∗i =max(0,g−1i (λ0)), where λ0 solves K =
∑n
i=1 max(0,g
−1
i (λ0)).
An example of a situation giving rise to generalized learning is shown in Figure 4.6. In this ex-
ample, to ensure the concavity of the Lagrangian function, we use very high transaction costs
and fairly low volatility, specifically Λ11 =Λ22 = 0.1 and
p
Σ11 =
p
Σ22 = 0.1. As was the case
with entropy learning technology and proportional transaction costs, we observe the follow-
ing: as trading costs increase, learning about the asset with the highest Sharpe ratio becomes
less attractive to investors (Panel A). Investors with various learning capacities might choose
to learn about different assets (Panel B). In addition, various starting allocations lead to dif-
ferent information choices (Panel C). In contrast to the case with proportional trading costs
and to the case with no transaction costs, investors learn about multiple assets.
Our results show that for the entropy learning technology with quadratic transaction costs,
whether specialized or generalized learning arises depends on the parameter values. A key
driver of whether one or the other arises is how the convexity of the objective function in sig-
nal precision compares with the convexity of the learning capacity constraint. Because trans-
action costs affect the curvature of the objective function, it follows naturally that investors
might switch from specialized to generalized learning when transaction costs are introduced.
Table 4.1 summarizes investors’ information acquisition for all the cases considered in the
paper.
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FIGURE 4.5: Information acquisition with quadratic transaction costs and an entropy learning tech-
nology: Specialized learning
This figure describes investors’ optimal information acquisition in a setting in which specialized learn-
ing arises. The figure reports the optimal choice of learning about asset 1 measured in terms of pos-
terior volatility
√
Σˆ11. Panel A shows the case in which the transaction costs of asset 1 vary. Panel B
extends Panel A by allowing for various learning capacities. Panel C plots the case in which the initial
allocation of asset 2 changes. The parameters for Panel A areµ1−rP1 = 0.1, µ2−rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.3,p
Σ22 = 0.3, Λ22 = 0.01, K = 1, θ0(1) = 0, θ0(2) = 0 and γ = 5. In Panel B, the parameter values are the
same as those in Panel A, and we allow learning capacity to vary from K = 0.5 to 0.8, 1 and 1.5. The
parameters for Panel C are µ1−rP1 = 0.07, µ2−rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.3,
p
Σ22 = 0.3,Λ11 = 0.1,Λ22 = 0.1,
K = 1, θ0(1)= 0.3 and γ= 5.
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FIGURE 4.6: Information acquisition with quadratic transaction costs and an entropy learning tech-
nology: Generalized learning
This figure describes investors’ optimal information acquisition in a setting in which generalized
learning arises. The figure reports the optimal choice of learning about asset 1 measured in terms
of posterior volatility
√
Σˆ11. Panel A shows the case in which the transaction costs of asset 1 vary.
Panel B extends Panel A by allowing for various learning capacities. Panel C plots the case in which
the initial allocation of asset 2 changes. The parameters for Panel A are µ1− rP1 = 0.1, µ2− rP2 = 0.05,p
Σ11 = 0.1,
p
Σ22 = 0.1,Λ22 = 0.1, K = 1, θ0(1)= 0, θ0(2)= 0 and γ= 5. In Panel B, the parameter values
are the same as those in Panel A, and we allow learning capacity to vary from K = 0.5 to 0.8, 1 and 1.5.
The parameters for Panel C are µ1 − rP1 = 0.07, µ2 − rP2 = 0.05,
p
Σ11 = 0.1,
p
Σ22 = 0.1, Λ11 = 0.2,
Λ22 = 0.2, K = 1, θ0(1)= 0.3 and γ= 5.
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4.5 Conclusion
Taking transaction costs into account has a large impact on optimal portfolios and asset
prices. The literature has recognized that transaction costs are a significant factor in de-
termining investors’ trading and consumption behavior. However, the impact of transaction
costs on investors’ optimal information acquisition is seldom discussed in the literature. This
paper is one of the first attempts made in this respect.
We conduct our analysis in a simple setting with mean-variance investors and consider both
proportional and quadratic transaction costs. As expected, we find that liquidity (measured
by transaction costs) affects the relative attractiveness of learning about asset payoffs to in-
vestors. As an asset’s transaction costs increase, this asset becomes less attractive to learn
about. Moreover, we find that investors with different learning capacities and initial alloca-
tions choose to learn about different assets. The most striking finding is that transaction costs
might also affect whether investors choose specialized or generalized learning. Hence, once
one accounts for liquidity, several factors besides assets’ Sharpe ratio play an important role
in determining investors’ learning behavior.
114 Chapter 4. The Impact of Liquidity on Information Acquisition
APPENDIX
4.A Portfolio Choice with Proportional Transaction Costs
This section presents the solution to the portfolio choice problem discussed in Section 4.2.4.
Our starting point is the Lagrangian function and the first-order condition in equations (4.12)
and (4.15) shown in the text. Although we assume in the text that the two risky assets are in-
dependent under the posterior belief, we present the solution for the general case and denote
the correlation coefficient by ρ.
The Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the non-zero elements of the trading vector q
must be zero. To determine which elements of q are non-zero, we use the first-order condi-
tion (4.15) with λ set to 0:
T ′
(
µˆ−Pr −γΣˆθ0)−γT ′ΣˆT q −C = 0 .
We let V denote the matrix T ′ΣˆT . Assuming
Σˆ=
[
σˆ21 ρσˆ1σˆ2
ρσˆ1σˆ2 σˆ
2
2
]
,
the elements of V , vi j can be written as
vi j = T1iT1 j σˆ21+ (T2iT1 j +T1iT2 j )ρσˆ1σˆ2+T2iT2 j σˆ22 .
Define x1 and x2 as follows:
x1 = (µˆ1− rP1)−γσˆ1(σˆ1θ01 +ρσˆ2θ02) ,
x2 = (µˆ2− rP2)−γσˆ2(ρσˆ1θ01 + σˆ2θ02) .
To characterize the solution, we must distinguish cases where a single asset is traded and
those where two assets are traded. For the cases in which investors trade only a single asset,
i.e., only one qi takes a positive value, then λi = 0 for that i . We obtain the FOC
T1i xi −Ci −γvi iqi = 0 .
Solving for qi yields
qi = T1i xi −Ci
γvi i
.
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For the cases in which two assets are traded, i.e. two elements of q , qi and q j , are positive,
the FOC is[
T1i T2i
T1 j T2 j
][
x1
x2
]
−
[
Ci
C j
]
−γ
[
vi i vi j
v j i v j j
][
qi
q j
]
= 0 , (4.38)
Solving for qi and q j , we have[
qi
q j
]
= 1
γ(vi i v j j − v2i j )
[
v j j −vi j
−vi j vi i
][
T1i x1+T2i x2−Ci
T1 j x1+T2 j x2−C j
]
. (4.39)
We introduce some notation to simplify the expressions:
A = b[σˆ1((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2ρ− (µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1)]+ (1−b)[σˆ2((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1)] ,
v˜1 = bσˆ21+ (1−b)ρσˆ1σˆ2 ,
v˜2 = bρσˆ1σˆ2+ (1−b)σˆ22 ,
v˜ = b2σˆ21+2b(1−b)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (1−b)2σˆ22 ,
C1 =
(µˆ1− rP1)σˆ22− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2
γ|Σˆ| ,
C2 =
(µˆ2− rP2)σˆ21− (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ1σˆ2
γ|Σˆ| ,
%¯1 = ρσˆ2(t2(1−b)− t3)+ t2bσˆ1
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)b
= t2v˜
1− t3ρσˆ1σˆ2
γ|Σˆ|b ,
%¯2 = ρσˆ1(t1b− t3)+ t1(1−b)σˆ2
γσˆ21σˆ2(1−ρ2)(1−b)
= t1v˜
2− t3ρσˆ1σˆ2
γ|Σˆ|(1−b) ,
%1 = σˆ2(t2(1−b)− t3)+ t2bρσˆ1
γσˆ21σˆ2(1−ρ2)b
= t2v˜
2− t3σˆ22
γ|Σˆ|b ,
%2 = σˆ1(t1b− t3)+ t1(1−b)ρσˆ2
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)
= t1v˜
1− t3σˆ21
γ|Σˆ|(1−b) ,
∆1 =
t2ρσˆ1σˆ2+ t1σˆ22
γ|Σˆ| ,
∆2 =
t1ρσˆ1σˆ2+ t2σˆ21
γ|Σˆ| ,
κ˜1 = t1v˜ − t3v˜
1
γ|Σˆ|(1−b) ,
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κ˜2 = t2v˜ − t3v˜
2
γ|Σˆ|b ,
A = b[σˆ1((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2ρ− (µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1)]+ (1−b)[σˆ2((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1)] ,
A˜ = A
γ|Σˆ| = (1−b)C1−bC2 =
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (µˆ2− rP2)v˜1
γ|Σˆ| ,
B = γ(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02) ,
B˜ = (b(µˆ1− rP1)+ (1−b)(µˆ2− rP2)) .
We now describe the solutions; it involves a total of 13 cases, corresponding to 12 trade re-
gions and 1 no-trade region. In each case, we describe the non-zero elements of q ; all ele-
ments not mentioned are zero.
Case (1) [sell asset 1; i.e., q1 > 0]
q1 = −(µˆ1− rP1)− t1
γσˆ21
+θ01 +
ρσˆ2
σˆ1
θ02 .
Case (2) [buy asset 1; i.e., q2 > 0]
q2 = (µˆ1− rP1)− t1
γσˆ21
−θ01 −
ρσˆ2
σˆ1
θ02 .
Case (3) [sell asset 2; i.e., q3 > 0]
q3 = −(µˆ2− rP2)− t2
γσˆ22
+ ρσˆ1
σˆ2
θ01 +θ02 .
Case (4) [buy asset 2; i.e., q4 > 0]
q4 = (µˆ2− rP2)− t2
γσˆ22
− ρσˆ1
σˆ2
θ01 −θ02 .
Case (5) [sell bundle; i.e., q5 > 0]
q5 =
−(b(µˆ1− rP1)+ (1−b)(µˆ2− rP2))− t3+γσˆ1(bσˆ1+ (1−b)ρσˆ2)θ01 +γσˆ2(bρσˆ1+ (1−b)σˆ2)θ02
γ[b2σˆ21+2b(1−b)σˆ1σˆ2+ (1−b)2σˆ22]
.
Case (6) [buy bundle; i.e., q6 > 0]
q6 =
(b(µˆ1− rP1)+ (1−b)(µˆ2− rP2))− t3−γσˆ1(bσˆ1+ (1−b)ρσˆ2)θ01 −γσˆ2(bρσˆ1+ (1−b)σˆ2)θ02
γ[b2σˆ21+2b(1−b)σˆ1σˆ2+ (1−b)2σˆ22]
.
Case (7) [sell asset 1, buy asset 2; i.e., q1 > 0, q4 > 0]
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q1 = θ01 +
−σˆ2((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1)− t2ρσˆ1σˆ2− t1σˆ22
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)
,
q4 =−θ02 +
σˆ1((µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1(µˆ1− rP1)− σˆ2ρ)− t1ρσˆ1σˆ2− t2σˆ21
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)
.
Case (8) [buy asset 1, sell asset 2; i.e., q2 > 0, q3 > 0]
q2 =−θ01 +
σˆ2((µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1)− t2ρσˆ1σˆ2− t1σˆ22
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)
,
q3 = θ02 +
−σˆ1((µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1− (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2)− t1ρσˆ1σˆ2− t2σˆ21
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)
.
Case (9) [sell asset 1 and bundle; i.e., q1 > 0, q5 > 0]
q1 =−
(b−1)θ01 +bθ02
1−b +
−(1−b)A+ t3v˜1− t1v˜
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)2
,
q5 =
θ02
1−b +
(µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2ρ− (µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)
+ σˆ1(t1b− t3)+ t1(1−b)ρσˆ2
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)2
.
Case (10) [buy asset 1 and bundle; i.e., q2 > 0, q6 > 0]
q2 =
bθ02 − (1−b)θ01
1−b +
(1−b)A+ t3v˜1− t1v˜
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)2
,
q6 =−
θ02
1−b +
(µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1− (µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2ρ
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)
+ σˆ1(t1b− t3)+ t1(1−b)ρσˆ2
γσˆ1σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)(1−b)2
.
Case (11) [sell asset 2 and bundle; i.e., q3 > 0, q5 > 0]
q3 =
[bθ02 + (b−1)θ01]
b
+ bA+ t3v˜
2− t2v˜
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)b2
,
q5 =
θ01
b
− (µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1
γσˆ21σˆ2(1−ρ2)b
+ t2bρσˆ1− σˆ2(t3− t2(1−b))
γσˆ21σˆ2(1−ρ2)b2
.
Case (12) [buy asset 2 and bundle; i.e., q4 > 0, q6 > 0]
q4 =
(1−b)θ01 −bθ02
b
+ −bA+ t3v˜
2− t2v˜
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)b2
,
q6 =−
θ01
b
+ (µˆ1− rP1)σˆ2− (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1
γσˆ21σˆ2(1−ρ2)b
+ t2bρσˆ1− (t3− t2(1−b))σˆ2
γσˆ21σˆ
2
2(1−ρ2)b2
.
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4.B Numerical Integration
This appendix shows how to compute the expectation E1 in equation (4.20). The expectation can be
computed as the sum of the integrals of function U over 13 different regions corresponding to the 12
trading regions and the no-trade region. To be more precise,
U1 = E1(U )=
13∑
i=1
∫ ∫
Ri
U (µˆ1, µˆ2) f (µˆ1, µˆ2)d µˆ1d µˆ2,
where f (µˆ1, µˆ2) denotes the joint density of (µˆ1, µˆ2) andRi denotes the region i . The precise functional
form ofU differs in the 13 regions and it is derived by inserting the optimal portfolio choice computed
in Appendix 4.A into equation (4.11). The boundaries of each region are obtained by requiring the non-
zero elements of the trading vector q to be non-negative. The functional form ofU and the boundaries
of the 13 regions are the following.
Case (1) [sell asset 1]:
The boundary for this region is: C2 ≥ θ02 +%2, C2 ≤ θ02 +∆2, (µˆ1− rP1)≤−t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 .
The region exists if ∆2 > %2 or t3 > t1b− t2(1−b) .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2
2γσˆ12
+(µˆ1−rP1)
t1−γθ02ρσˆ1σˆ2
γσˆ21
+θ02(µˆ2−rP2)+
t21
2γσˆ21
− t1
θ01σˆ1+θ02ρσˆ2
σˆ1
− γ
2
(θ02)
2σ22(1−ρ2) .
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−∞,−t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [ (θ
0
2 +%2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
+ (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2σˆ1 ,
(θ02 +∆2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
+ (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2σˆ1 ] .
Case (2) [buy asset 1]:
The boundary for this region is: C2 ≤ θ02 −%2, C2 ≥ θ02 −∆2, (µˆ1− rP1)≥ t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 .
The region exists if ∆2 > %2 or t3 > t1b− t2(1−b) .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2
2γσˆ12
+(µˆ1−rP1)
−t1−γθ02ρσˆ1σˆ2
γσˆ21
+θ02(µˆ2−rP2)+
t21
2γσˆ21
+t1
θ01σˆ1+θ02ρσˆ2
σˆ1
−γ
2
(θ02)
2σ22(1−ρ2) .
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 ,+∞] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [ (θ
0
2 −∆2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ1
2 + (µˆ1− rP1)
ρσˆ2
σˆ1
,
(θ02 −%2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
+ (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2σˆ1 ] .
Case (3) [sell asset 2]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≥ θ01 +%1, C1 ≤ θ01 +∆1, (µˆ2− rP2)≤−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 .
The region exists if ∆1 > %1 or t3 > t2(1−b)− t1b .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ2− rP2)
2
2γσˆ22
+(µˆ2−rP2)
t2−γθ01ρσˆ1σˆ2
γσˆ22
+θ01(µˆ1−rP1)+
t22
2γσˆ22
− t2
θ02σˆ2+θ01ρσˆ1
σˆ2
− γ
2
(θ01)
2σ21(1−ρ2) .
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The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−∞,−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01] .
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [ (θ
0
1 +%1)γ|Σˆ|
σ22
+ (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2 ,
(θ01 +∆1)γ|Σˆ|
σ22
+ (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2 ] .
Case (4) [buy asset 2]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≤ θ01 −%1, C1 ≥ θ01 −∆1, (µˆ2− rP2)≥ t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 .
The region exists if ∆1 > %1 or t3 > t2(1−b)− t1b .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ2− rP2)
2
2γσˆ22
+(µˆ2−rP2)
−t2−γθ01ρσˆ1σˆ2
γσˆ22
+θ01(µˆ1−rP1)+
t22
2γσˆ22
+t2
θ02σˆ2+θ01ρσˆ1
σˆ2
−γ
2
(θ01)
2σ21(1−ρ2) .
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 ,+∞] .
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [ (θ
0
1 −∆1)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ22
+ (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2 ,
(θ01 −%1)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ22
+ (µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2 ] .
Case (5) [sell bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: A˜ ≥ θ01(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜1, A˜ ≤ θ01(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜2, B˜ ≤B − t3 .
The region exists if κ˜2 >−κ˜1 or bt1+ (1−b)t2 > t3.
The utility function is given by:
U = B˜
2
2γv˜
+ (µˆ1− rP1)(γ((1−b)θ
0
1 −bθ02)v˜2+ t3b)− (µˆ2− rP2)(γ((1−b)θ01 −bθ02)v˜1− t3(1−b))
γv˜
+
[
t23 −2γt3(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)
2γv˜
− γ((1−b)θ
0
1 −bθ02)2|Σˆ|
2v˜
]
.
Define
(µˆ1− rP1)∗ =
(γ(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)− t3)v˜1+ ((θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|)(1−b)− t1v˜ + t3v˜1
v˜
,
(µˆ1− rP1)† = (µˆ1− rP1)∗+ t1b+ t2(1−b)− t3
b
.
The integral is the sum of integrals over two sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−∞, (µˆ1− rP1)∗] ,
(µˆ2−rP2) ∈
[
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
− t2v˜ − t3v˜2bv˜1 ,
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
+ t1v˜ − t3v˜1(1−b)v˜1
]
.
The second integral is computed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)∗, (µˆ1− rP1)†] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈
[
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
− t2v˜ − t3v˜2bv˜1 ,
γ(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)− t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)
1−b
]
.
Case (6) [buy bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: A˜ ≤ θ01(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜1, A˜ ≥ θ01(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜2, B˜ ≥B + t3 .
The region exists if κ˜2 >−κ˜1 or bt1+ (1−b)t2 > t3.
The utility function is given by:
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U = B˜
2
2γv˜
+ (µˆ1− rP1)(γ((1−b)θ
0
1 −bθ02)v˜2− t3b)− (µˆ2− rP2)(γ((1−b)θ01 −bθ02)v˜1+ t3(1−b))
γv˜
+
[
t23 +2γt3(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)
2γv˜
− γ((1−b)θ
0
1 −bθ02)2|Σˆ|
2v˜
]
.
Denote
(µˆ1− rP1)∗ =
(γ(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)+ t3)v˜1+ ((θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|)(1−b)+ t1v˜ − t3v˜1
v˜
,
(µˆ1− rP1)† = (µˆ1− rP1)∗− t1b+ t2(1−b)− t3
b
.
The integral is the sum of integrals over two sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)†, (µˆ1− rP1)∗] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈
[
γ(v˜1θ01 + v˜2θ02)+ t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)
1−b ,
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
+ t2v˜ − t3v˜2bv˜1
]
.
The second integral is computed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)∗,+∞] ,
(µˆ2−rP2) ∈
[
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
− t1v˜ − t3v˜1(1−b)v˜1 ,
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2− (θ01(1−b)−θ02b)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
+ t2v˜ − t3v˜2bv˜1
]
.
Case (7) [sell asset 1, buy asset 2]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≤ θ01 −∆1, C2 ≥ θ02 +∆2 .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| − (µˆ2− rP2)∆2+ (µˆ1− rP1)∆1
+ t
2
1 σˆ
2
2+2t1t2ρσˆ1σˆ2+ t22 σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| − t1θ
0
1 + t2θ02 .
Define:
(µˆ1− rP1)∗ = (ρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 + σˆ21θ01)γ− t1 .
The integral is the sum of integrals over two sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−∞, (µˆ1− rP1)∗] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2σˆ1 +
(θ02 +∆2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
,+∞] .
The second integral is computed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)∗,+∞] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1) σˆ2ρσˆ1 −
(θ01 −∆1)γ|Σˆ|
ρσˆ1σˆ2
,+∞] .
Case (8) [buy asset 1, sell asset 2]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≥ θ01 +∆1, C2 ≤ θ02 −∆2 .
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The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| + (µˆ2− rP2)∆2− (µˆ1− rP1)∆1
+ t
2
1 σˆ
2
2+2t1t2ρσˆ1σˆ2+ t22 σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| + t1θ
0
1 − t2θ02 .
Denote
(µˆ1− rP1)∗ = (ρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 + σˆ21θ01)γ+ t1 .
The integral is the sum of integrals over two sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−∞, (µˆ1− rP1)∗] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−∞, (µˆ1− rP1) σˆ2ρσˆ1 −
(θ01 +∆1)γ|Σˆ|
ρσˆ1σˆ2
] .
The second integral is computed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)∗,+∞] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−∞, (µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2σˆ1 +
(θ02 −∆2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
] .
Case (9) [sell asset 1, sell bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: C2 ≤ θ02 +%2, A˜ ≤ θ01(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜1 .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| + (µˆ1− rP1)%¯2− (µˆ2− rP2)%2
+ t
2
3 σˆ
2
1−2t3t1v˜1+ t21 v˜
2(1−b)2γ|Σˆ| − t1θ
0
1 −
θ02(t3−bt1)
1−b .
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−∞, (θ
0
2 +%2)γv˜1
1−b +
(θ01(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜1)γσ21
1−b ],
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈
[
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2
v˜1
− (θ
0
1(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜1)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
,
(µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2
σˆ1
+ (θ
0
2 +%2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
]
.
Case (10) [buy asset 1, buy bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: C2 ≥ θ02 −%2, A˜ ≥ θ01(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜1 .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| − (µˆ1− rP1)%¯2+ (µˆ2− rP2)%2
+ t
2
3 σˆ
2
1−2t3t1v˜1+ t21 v˜
2(1−b)2γ|Σˆ| + t1θ
0
1 +
θ02(t3−bt1)
1−b .
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [ (θ
0
2 −%2)γv˜1
1−b +
(θ01(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜1)γσ21
1−b ,+∞] .
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈
[
(µˆ1− rP1)ρσˆ2
σˆ1
+ (θ
0
2 −%2)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ21
,
(µˆ1− rP1)v˜2
v˜1
− (θ
0
1(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜1)γ|Σˆ|
v˜1
]
.
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Case (11) [sell asset 2, sell bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≤ θ01 +%1, A˜ ≥ θ01(1−b)−θ02b+ κ˜2 .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| + (µˆ2− rP2)%¯1− (µˆ1− rP1)%1
+ t
2
3 σˆ
2
2−2t3t2v˜2+ t22 v˜
2b2γ|Σˆ| − t2θ
0
2 −
θ01(t3− (1−b)t2)
b
.
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−∞, (θ
0
1 +%1)γv˜2
b +
(θ02b−θ01(1−b)− κ˜2)γσ22
b ] ,
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈
[
(µˆ2− rP2)v˜1
v˜2
+ (−θ
0
2b+θ01(1−b)+ κ˜2)γ|Σˆ|
v˜2
,
ρ(µˆ2− rP2)σˆ1
σˆ2
+ (θ
0
1 +%1)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ22
]
.
Case (12) [buy asset 2, buy bundle]:
The boundary for this region is: C1 ≥ θ01 −%1, A˜ ≤ θ01(1−b)−θ02b− κ˜2 .
The utility function is given by:
U = (µˆ1− rP1)
2σˆ22−2(µˆ1− rP1)(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1σˆ2+ (µˆ2− rP2)2σˆ21
2γ|Σˆ| − (µˆ2− rP2)%¯1+ (µˆ1− rP1)%1
+ t
2
3 σˆ
2
2−2t3t2v˜2+ t22 v˜
2b2γ|Σˆ| + t2θ
0
2 +
θ01(t3− (1−b)t2)
b
.
The integration is performed over the following region:
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [ (θ
0
1 −%1)γv˜2
b +
(θ02b−θ01(1−b)+ κ˜2)γσ22
b ,+∞] ,
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈
[
(µˆ2− rP2)ρσˆ1
σˆ2
+ (θ
0
1 −%1)γ|Σˆ|
σˆ22
,
(µˆ2− rP2)v˜1
v˜2
− (θ
0
2b−θ01(1−b)+ κ˜2)γ|Σˆ|
v˜2
]
.
Case (13) [no-trade region]:
The boundary for this region is: (µˆ2− rP2) ≤ t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 , B˜ ≤ B + t3, (µˆ1− rP1) ≤ t1+
γσˆ21θ
0
1 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 ,
(µˆ2− rP2)≥−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 , B˜ ≥B − t3, (µˆ1− rP1)≥−t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 .
The utility function is given by:
U = θ01(µˆ1− rP1)+θ02(µˆ2− rP2)−
γ
2
((θ01)
2σˆ21+2ρσˆ1σˆ2θ01θ02 + (θ02)2σˆ22) .
Denote
(µˆ1− rP1)+ = t3
b
− t2 1−b
b
+γ(θ01σˆ21+θ02ρσˆ1σˆ2) ,
(µˆ1− rP1)− = t2 1−b
b
− t3
b
+γ(θ01σˆ21+θ02ρσˆ1σˆ2) .
Depending on the level of transaction costs, the integration region differs.
Case 13a: If t3 > t2(1−b), we have (µˆ1− rP1)+ > (µˆ1− rP1)− .
The integral is the sum of integrals over three sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
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(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 , (µˆ1− rP1)−] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [B − t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)1−b , t2+γσˆ
2
2θ
0
2 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01] .
The second integral is computed over the region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)−, (µˆ1− rP1)+] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 , t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01] .
The third integral is computed over the region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)+, t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 ,
B + t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)
1−b ] .
Case 13b: If t3 < t2(1−b) holds, we have (µˆ1− rP1)+ < (µˆ1− rP1)− .
The integral is the sum of integrals over three sub-regions. The first integral is computed over the fol-
lowing region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [−t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02 , (µˆ1− rP1)+] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [B − t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)1−b , t2+γσˆ
2
2θ
0
2 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01] .
The second integral is computed over the region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)+, (µˆ1− rP1)−] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [B − t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)1−b ,
B + t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)
1−b ] .
The third integral is computed over the region:
(µˆ1− rP1) ∈ [(µˆ1− rP1)−, t1+γσˆ21θ01 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ02] ,
(µˆ2− rP2) ∈ [−t2+γσˆ22θ02 +γρσˆ1σˆ2θ01 ,
B + t3−b(µˆ1− rP1)
1−b ] .
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Substituting the optimal portfolio choice in equation (4.27) back into the objective function
in the second period as defined in equation (4.25) yields
U = (µˆ− rP +Λθ0)′ A−1(µˆ− rP )− γ
2
(
µˆ− rP +Λθ0)′ A−1ΣˆA−1 (µˆ− rP +Λθ0)
−1
2
(
A−1
(
µˆ− rP +Λθ0)−θ0)′Λ(A−1 (µˆ− rP +Λθ0)−θ0)
= 1
2
(
µˆ− rP)′ A−1 (µˆ− rP)+ (θ0)′Λ′A−1 (µˆ− rP)+ 1
2
(θ0)′(ΛA−1Λ−Λ)θ0 . (4.40)
Given that E1(µˆ− rP )=µ− rP and V1(µˆ− rP )=Σ− Σˆ, for any diagonal matrix B , the expec-
tation of
(
µˆ− rP)′B (µˆ− rP) is given by:
E1
((
µˆ− rP)′B (µˆ− rP)) = Tr(B (Σ− Σˆ))+ (µ− rP )′B (µ− rP ) .
Using the fact that A is a diagonal matrix, the expectation of U as given in equation (4.40) is
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given by:
U1 = 1
2
Tr
(
A−1(Σ− Σˆ))+ 1
2
(µ− rP )′A−1(µ− rP )+ (θ0)′Λ′A−1(µ− rP )+ 1
2
(θ0)′(ΛA−1Λ−Λ)θ0
= 1
2
n∑
i=1
Σi i − Σˆi i
γΣˆi i +Λi i
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
(µi − rPi )2
γΣˆi i +Λi i
+
n∑
i=1
(µi − rPi )θ0i Λi i
γΣˆi i +Λi i
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
(θ0i )
2Λ2i i
γΣˆi i +Λi i
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
(θ0i )
2Λ2i i
= − 1
2γ
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
1
γ
Λi i +Σi i + (µi − rPi )2+2(µi − rPi )θ0i Λi i + (θ0i )2Λ2i i
γΣˆi i +Λi i
+ 1
2
n∑
i=1
(θ0i )
2Λ2i i .
Introducing the notation ai = 12γΛi i + 12Σi i + 12 (µi − rPi +θ0i Λi i )2 and ignoring the constants,
maximizingU1 is equivalent to maximizing the expression
n∑
i=1
ai
γΣˆi i +Λi i
.
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